



PARTNERSHIPS AND EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

HOW TO TURN THEM INTO A WIN-WIN APPROACH

SUMMARY

To become more strategic and autonomous, the European Union has to better use its global partnerships. Managing external security threats to the EU requires active and reliable partnerships, first and foremost with more capable and like-minded partners. Moreover, partnerships can increase the Union's capacity to act in Europe and beyond. Today, the EU has several partnerships. While the number has grown over the last decades, their palpable use in the security and defence domain has rarely been demonstrated.

But the pressure on the EU to deliver more in the field of international security is growing. The Russian war against Ukraine is a watershed for European security, by pressuring both EU institutions and members to unprecedented collective decisions, such as sanction packages on Russia and the delivery of weapons financed by the European Peace Facility. Russian military aggression adds to ongoing security challenges around Europe, from instability in the south to transnational challenges. While the US administration is strongly committed to supporting Ukraine and European defence, America's focus on the systemic rivalry with China remains a structural trend that risks turning US attention away from Europe again.

Internally, the narrative of strategic autonomy has been pushed mainly by France and the European Commission led by Ursula Von der Leyen. The 2022 Strategic Compass operationalises that ambition through four lines of action: Act, Secure, Invest and Partner. The importance of partnerships as an enabling tool is hence growing. In order to deliver, EU partnerships with NATO, the US and the UK have to be prioritised and pushed forward. The EU should focus on identifying its interests, engage partners and invest in implementation.



AUTHORS

CLAUDIA MAJOR

Head of the International Security
Research Division,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)

ALESSANDRO MARRONE

Head of the Defence Programme,
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

**FRIEDRICH
EBERT
STIFTUNG**

Fondation
Jean Jaurès

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	3
1. Strategic autonomy in security and defence: partners as an enabling dimension	4
2. Current state of partnerships: numerous, but fragmented and with little direction	6
3. Prospects and tendencies in co-operation: pragmatism ahead	11
4. The way forward for partnerships	13
Conclusion	19
Bibliography	20
About the authors	23

FEPS
FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN
PROGRESSIVE STUDIES



THE FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE STUDIES (FEPS)

European Political Foundation - N° 4 BE 896.230.213
Avenue des Arts 46 1000 Brussels (Belgium)
www.feps-europe.eu
@FEPS_Europe



FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG

EU-Office Brussels
Rue du Taciturne 38
BE-1000 Brussels (Belgium)
<https://brussels.fes.de>
@fes_brussels



FONDATION JEAN JAURÈS

12 Cité Malesherbes,
75009 Paris
France
www.jean-jaures.org
@j_jaures



This Policy Brief was produced with the financial support of the European Parliament. It does not represent the view of the European Parliament.

Introduction

‘Security’ can be described as the sum of what you can contribute to it and where partners can help. This particularly applies to the EU because of its interconnectedness with other countries and regions as well as its traditional support of multilateral co-operation. Moreover, having 27 member states does imply a range of bilateral partnerships, which added to those of the EU makes the issue even more relevant and complex for the Union.

Despite rhetorical ambitions, the EU is not yet successful as an international strategic actor in security and defence, that is, in defining its priorities, providing the necessary resources and assuring implementation. Partnerships can be a key instrument to enable the EU to achieve strategic autonomy. They embody the Union’s support for rules-based multilateralism, co-operative security, and its international ambition. They can increase the power of the EU instruments: well designed and consciously used partnerships can be a force multiplier and enabler for the Union. Additionally, partners who co-operate with the EU are less likely to team up with Europe’s systemic rivals and work against the Union.

Yet, the results of EU partnerships are mixed, particularly in the defence realm. Adaptations seem necessary due to changing internal and external settings. Internally, the recently introduced Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF), alongside the 2022 Strategic Compass, require a rewiring. Externally, the war in Ukraine, the crises surrounding Europe in the South and

South-East, China’s rise as a systemic rival of the West and subsequent US prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific, and finally the complicated relations between London and Brussels as a result of Brexit, call for a re-thinking of current priorities in EU partnerships.

Actually, the Union has to shoulder a larger share of military tasks in and around Europe to face current challenges, even more so should the US decide to limit its contribution to the security of the Old Continent and its neighbourhood. This could happen temporarily, if the majority of American resources are engaged in the Indo-Pacific, or if the US chooses not to be involved in a crisis in the Middle East and Africa – as has already happened with Syria, Libya, Mali and Yemen. Expectations are increasing for the Union to shape its environment and play a bigger role in defending the international order.

Against this backdrop, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought once again, after decades, a conventional, large-scale, fully fledged war onto European soil and directly to the EU’s border – by all criteria the most immediate and acute security challenge. The Union has demonstrated a high degree of cohesion by responding through the hardest sanctions ever adopted, and by using the European Peace Facility (EPF) instrument – and therefore the EU budget – to donate up to 2 billion euros to Kyiv in terms of military equipment.¹ The use of the EPF represents a historic step for EU partnerships in the defence field, in both crisis and wartime.

¹ In practical terms, the EU is reimbursing individual member states which are donating part of their military stocks to Ukraine; the Union is also co-ordinating national donations through the EU military committee, and set up a task force to help co-ordination among member states on the replenishing of their inventories.

The Union action took place within a broader Western response to the war waged by Moscow, whereby co-ordination since February 2022 has unfolded in various formats such as NATO, EU-US relations, and ad hoc coalitions.² This is where partners could help. In political terms the EU can gain greater legitimacy through co-operation. In military terms, it might access capabilities it misses. In industrial terms, via co-operation with partners the Union can maintain its technological edge in many fields. In a nutshell, it is about pooling resources to reach

objectives that can only be achieved, or better achieved, together. To increase its capacity to act, the EU thus needs to identify essential partnerships and align them more closely with European interests.

This policy brief starts by analysing what strategic autonomy means in security and defence policy and what role partners could play. It then takes stock of current co-operation dynamics in order to analyse ways for the EU to make better use of partnerships.

1. Strategic autonomy in security and defence: partners as an enabling dimension

The core of strategic autonomy is the capacity to act. It requires the ability to identify desirable political goals, and to craft and implement plans to achieve those goals. It comprises four dimensions: political; institutional; capability; and industrial.³ In other words, in the security and defence field, for the EU, strategic autonomy is not about autonomy from someone, but autonomy to do something.⁴

Political capacity to act

Europeans must better define their security and defence priorities. There are at least three key aspects to this.

First, who is this 'Europe'? The choice boils down

to the EU, the European NATO allies, or smaller groups of European countries in coalitions of the willing. The EU has the highest potential to act because of the aggregated military and civilian resources of the bloc, but it is lacking crucial military actors like the UK.

Second, who can provide leadership? Within the EU, France and Germany play a key role. When it comes to crisis management, Italy is the largest European contributor to – and often leader of – international operations under EU, UN and NATO umbrellas. For specific regions, other countries are crucial, for example Poland for the eastern neighbourhood. In certain areas such as defence industrial policy, the Commission is essential through both its regulatory power and the investments made via

2 In April 2022, the summit in Ramstein (Germany) of more than 40 countries including also non-EU and non-NATO members was a significant example in this regard.

3 Järvenpää, Pauli, Claudia Major and Sven Sakkov. October 2019. "European Strategic Autonomy: Operationalising a Buzzword." International Centre for Defence and Security Report: 1-37. https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ICDS_Report_European_Strategic_Autonomy_J%C3%A4rvenp%C3%A4_Major_Sakkov_October_2019.pdf; Major, Claudia, and Christian Mölling. 2020. "Less Talk, More Action." *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, no. 4 (2), <https://ip-quarterly.com/en/less-talk-more-action>.

4 Graziano, Claudio. "Speech at the Sub-Committee on Security and Defence – European Parliament – 'The role of the European Union Military Committee in the current evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy'." https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/161801/06_sub%20committee%20on%20security%20and%20defence.pdf.

EDF and other EU funds. Outside the EU, the UK has a considerable shaping power. This points again to the increasing role of smaller formats, which allow to link EU and non-EU-members like the UK in a common effort for European defence. The issue is complicated by the fact that Brussels and London have not agreed a security co-operation framework after Brexit. Moreover, France, Germany, Italy and Spain are keen to co-operate within the EU, that is, through the PESCO⁴ format as they represent the largest military and defence investors in the Union; however their attitudes towards co-operation with the UK do differ, as epitomised by the French opposition to third countries' involvement in PESCO and EDF.

Third, the level of ambition needs to be more clearly defined, that is, what Europeans want to achieve in security and defence terms. Europeans recognise NATO's key role in collective defence, as confirmed once again after Russia's invasion of Ukraine when Italy, France and Hungary took the lead on new multinational battalions to be deployed in south-eastern Europe within a NATO framework.⁵ Hence, the EU concentrates on crisis management and has recently focused on smaller and civilian missions. Yet the bloc has not been willing to decisively act in the medium- to high-intensity scenarios surrounding Europe, from Libya to Syria down to Mali. Such inaction happens despite EU treaties, and the founding documents of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) include tasks such as peace-making and joint disarmament operations, thus raising doubts about the European political will to intervene in crises, with or without partners. The European withdrawal from Afghanistan following the US decision to leave Kabul confirmed these doubts. Against this backdrop,

the 2022 Strategic Compass re-affirms the EU will to act militarily to protect its interests in the current international security environment, but it remains to be seen whether Europeans will live up to the commitments they have signed.

Institutional governance to act

Europeans need to be able to call upon the governance and executive structures to implement their priorities in the security and defence domains. The EU has modest structures for crisis management through the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) established in 2017, in terms of personnel and mandate. According to the Strategic Compass, the MPCC will be enhanced by 2025 to become a fully fledged headquarters for EU operations. Beyond crisis management, for the foreseeable future, Europeans will be able to organise collective defence only within the framework of NATO, and they have expressed no ambition to do otherwise. Indeed, the Strategic Compass does not focus on collective defence, but rather on operations abroad, for instance through the Rapid Deployment Capacity. As a result, the EU needs functional political, institutional and legal relations with partners, first with NATO, the US and the UK.

Capabilities and operations

Capacity to act requires the necessary resources available to implement its goals. So far, Europeans have not been able to fulfil their own level of ambition in terms of military and civilian capabilities for crisis management, as defined in the EU.⁶ For instance, the 1999 Helsinki

5 <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/nato-must-now-transform-old-missions-new-strategy>

6 Douglas, Barry, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, Marie-Louise Chagnaud, Nick Childs, Bastian Giegerich, Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz. 2018. "Protecting Europe: meeting the EU's military level of ambition in the context of Brexit." IISS Research Papers: 1-44. <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2018/11/could-eu-deliver-military-ambitions-brexite>.

Headline Goals foresaw the establishment of a rapid European intervention force of 60,000 troops, which was never implemented. Since 2007 the EU has established 1,200-unit-strong multinational Battlegroups, which are offered and led on a rotational basis by a different member. Here, partners can act as force multipliers, in view of both offering forces in operations but also engaging in joint projects to develop new capabilities. The elephant in the room is the UK, since British military has co-operated with EU members for decades on a variety of capability development endeavours, and post-Brexit continues to do so under different circumstances.

Defence industry basis for action

The ability of European states to maintain expertise in strategic, innovative and next-generation technology and to secure a supply chain of defence material is a crucial condition

2. Current state of partnerships: numerous, but fragmented and with little direction

In recent years the Union has developed partnerships in the field of security and defence also thanks to the 2016 EU Global Strategy. This document, issued by the then High Representative Federica Mogherini, laid down the overarching vision for foreign and security policy, based on European principles and values, and articulated a number of guidelines for the action of both EU institutions and member states. It attached great importance to several bilateral and multilateral partnerships, in line with the aforementioned EU posture in favour of multilateralism and international co-operation.

In the Strategic Compass, adopted directly by the EU wHead of State and Government in 2022, partners feature as a key pillar. Still the

for the EU capacity to act. But the fragmentation of the European defence industrial landscape and worries about national sovereignty that many states link to their industry do hinder the necessary co-operation, integration and interdependence which would produce a better capability output. Here, partners can bring in necessary financial means and/or technical expertise by co-operating with EU members and industries.

These four elements underline that strategic autonomy is not about rejecting alliances. If the Union's ambition is to shape the international security environment according to its priorities and values, rather than subordinating to the rules set by others, it will be better placed to do so with partners. As mentioned above, it is not about autonomy from someone, but rather about autonomy to do something by developing and using as Europeans the necessary capabilities in partnership as far as possible with others.

Compass's indications in the 'Partner' chapter are relatively vague in comparison with those in the Act, Invest and Secure chapters.

The main directions encompass:

- strengthening co-operation with strategic partners such as NATO, the UN and regional partners, including the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), AU (African Union) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations);
- developing more tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and others; and

- developing tailored partnerships in the Western Balkans, EU eastern and southern neighbourhoods, Africa, Asia and Latin America, including through enhancing dialogue and co-operation, promoting participation in CSDP missions and operations and supporting capacity-building.⁷

Among the more concrete and innovative elements, there is the commitment to a biennial summit bringing together all EU partners in order to share and promote the Union's vision on the international agenda main issues, including security and defence.⁸

As a whole, there is not much change in the Compass's approach with respect to the recent past. Against this backdrop, the intensity of co-operation and the specific settings continues to vary according to topic and partner, without an overall standardised approach.

Formal partnerships

Traditionally, partnerships in the security and defence fields have focused on three areas:⁹

1. Operations: co-operation with countries to support CSDP missions and operations, including via a Framework Participation Agreement or a Security of Information Agreement.
2. International Organisations: close co-operation mainly with the UN, NATO, AU and OSCE.
3. Third states – partnerships on specific topics: with EU candidate countries (like Albania), and others, to co-operate on cyber, the fight against terrorism, resilience, as well as participation in the Battlegroup roster; more recently on capabilities, including institutional arrangements to co-operate with the European Defence Agency (EDA) signed by Norway, Switzerland, Serbia and Ukraine,¹⁰ within PESCO whereby the US, Canada and Norway joined a project on military mobility;¹¹ finally, the EDF regulations in principle allow participation from and thus co-operation with entities based in European Economic Area countries.¹²

This leads to a very broad range of partners, as Table 1 shows.

7 Council of the EU. 2022. "A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security." <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf>.

8 Ibid.

9 Adapted from Tardy, Thierry. 2018. "Revisiting the EU's security partnerships." *EU Institute for Security Studies, Policy brief*, 1-4. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%201%20Security%20Partnerships.pdf>.

10 European Defence Agency. "Partners." <https://eda.europa.eu/who-we-are/partners>.

11 Council of the EU. 2021. "PESCO: Canada, Norway and the United States will be invited to participate in the project Military Mobility." <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/05/06/pesco-canada-norway-and-the-united-states-will-be-invited-to-participate-in-the-project-military-mobility>.

12 See in this regard among others, Marrone, Alessandro. October 2019. "National Expectations regarding the European Defence Fund: The Italian Perspective." ARES Comment #42. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ARES-42-EDF-Italy.pdf>.

Table 1. EU multilateral and bilateral partners

Multilateral partnerships	Bilateral partnerships
<p>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</p> <p>United Nations (UN)</p> <p>African Union (AU)</p> <p>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)</p> <p>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</p> <p>Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)</p> <p>League of Arab States (LAS)</p>	<p>United States, Canada, Norway, United Kingdom, Turkey, Japan, Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, China, Djibouti, Chile, Colombia</p> <p>Countries with active CSDP Missions Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Iraq, Central African Republic, Ukraine, Libya, Moldova, Palestinian Territories, Mali, Niger, Kosovo, Georgia, Sahel, Mediterranean (IRINI) Source: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/_en</p> <p>Crisis Management – Framework for Participation Agreement Vietnam, Jordan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Australia, Colombia, Korea, Chile, Georgia, Moldova, North Macedonia, Albania, New Zealand, Serbia, United States, Montenegro, Turkey, Canada, Ukraine, Norway, Iceland, (+Switzerland) Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:ps0013</p> <p>European Neighbourhood Policy Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine Source: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/european-neighbourhood-policy_de</p> <p>Third countries participating in PESCO projects Canada, Norway, US Source: https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/permanent-structured-cooperation-(PESCO)</p>

Such a long list of partnerships carries a positive message: it shows the EU conviction that co-operation is empowering. Since the 1990s, the Union has consistently reached out first to neighbouring countries and then far away ones, by placing at the same time strong emphasis on regional and multilateral organisations. The basic assumption is that global challenges require co-operative, international endeavours – an assumption that constitutes one of the cornerstones of the EU's very existence. Over time the Union has tried to apply such an approach also to security and defence, because in this field EU policy has more weight when other countries align themselves with the 27 members. In military terms, the Union can benefit from contributions towards its operation. In industrial terms, partners can bring added financial or technical value. Partnerships thus enlarge the pool of available resources.

Yet, this long list also conveys a more problematic dimension: it reveals that the EU has so far shown little strategic thinking in its approach to partnerships. Against this backdrop, the Strategic Compass introduced a clear differentiation between on the one hand strategic partners including multilateral organisations (UN, NATO, OSCE, AU and ASEAN), and four NATO members (Canada, Norway, the US and the UK) plus Japan, and on the other hand tailored partnerships with the rest of the world.

Such differentiation is helpful but does not radically change the fact that partnerships have grown over time into a fragmented network while the overall coherence and strategic guidance to bring various elements together remains weak. As a result, partnerships do not always deliver and instead can create frustrations on both sides.

Underdeveloped crucial partnerships

When it comes to security, defence and European strategic autonomy, the most important partnerships are those with NATO, the US and the UK, for several reasons: the Atlantic Alliance's powerful mandate and membership; the unique American global military power; the UK importance for European security and London's military and industrial linkages with EU countries. These three partnerships all share a focus on the security of Europe, and in the NATO-EU case count on overlapping membership and a track record of agreements, which dates back to 2003 and accelerated after 2016. As a result, they are deeply interconnected with European strategic autonomy, particularly if the latter is meant as autonomy to do something and not autonomy from someone.

The **EU-NATO partnership** has moved 'from coexistence to co-operation'¹³ over the last 20 years. NATO and the EU agreed on institutional co-operation in 2003 via the Berlin Plus agreements, which led to the first EU military operations using NATO assets in the Western Balkans, but with little consequence. In 2016, the deteriorating security situation in and around Europe and the good relationship between NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and EU High Representative Mogherini led to a change. EU and NATO signed a joint declaration on a strategic partnership, stating that "in light of the common challenges [...] we have to step-up our efforts [...]. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing."¹⁴

A second declaration in 2018 confirmed the partnership. Both organisations identified a number of concrete areas for co-operation, such

13 De Maio, Giovanna. 2021. "Opportunities to Deepen EU-NATO Cooperation", Brookings Institute, December 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf.

14 European Council. 2016. "Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>.

as hybrid threats, cyber security and defence, maritime security, technological innovation.¹⁵ Subsequently, 74 co-operative actions were adopted. Also, liaisons were put into place in both organisations in terms of staff meetings, exchange of documents, participation of the High Representative in NATO political summits and the Secretary General in EU summits, and so on. Overall, however, progress has been slow, except for in a few areas like military mobility. The Russia-Ukraine war brought greater cohesion in the Western camp, including more NATO-EU co-ordination. NATO enhanced its military posture in the eastern flank from Bulgaria to Slovakia, and EU budget has been used to finance the donation of military equipment from member states to Kyiv. The war also prompted the historical decision by Finland and Sweden to join NATO, a watershed which further increases – from 21 to 23 out of 27 – the number of European countries that are members of both frameworks. This in turn should likely enhance EU-NATO co-operation.

Nevertheless, political and bureaucratic problems continue to block the relationship. There are practical obstacles, like the lack of a secure communication system to share information. More important are political obstacles embodied by several states in the EU (Greece, Cyprus) and NATO (Turkey). The EU relationship with Turkey has become confrontational, and the bigger the tensions, the more it negatively affects EU-NATO relations.¹⁶

Co-operation eventually was often reduced to practical staff-to-staff interaction and annual reports, but didn't make a breakthrough at the political level.¹⁷ Depending upon the outcome, Turkey's current blocking of the Finnish, and particularly the Swedish, NATO application might further complicate EU-NATO co-operation in the long run.

As long as this political blockage persists, EU-NATO co-operation will not be able to make a qualitative jump despite the Strategic Compass and the NATO 2030 report – the preparatory document for the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept – calling for it.

The **EU-US link** has been patchy. There is co-operation: since 2011, the US can contribute civilian personnel to EU missions thanks to a framework agreement. American and EU militaries have worked together in the field, for example in Mali. As mentioned above, in 2021 Washington joined the PESCO project on military mobility by signing a number of political and legal commitments in favour of EU defence and CSDP. In December 2021, American Secretary of State Antony Blinken and High Representative Josep Borrell launched a US-EU dialogue on security and defence, and Washington began to negotiate an administrative arrangement with EDA to foster practical co-operation.¹⁸ Still, the strategic relationship has traditionally suffered from both the US fear that EU efforts would undermine NATO, and the US frustration at the

15 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2018. "Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156626.htm.

16 Bond, Ian, Luigi Scazzieri and Senem Aydin-Düzgit. 2021. "EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Co-Operation With Neighbours: Mapping Diversity." Centre for European Reform (CER): 1-12. <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2021/eu-foreign-security-and-defence-policy-co-operation>.

17 Speranza, Lauren and Jack Crawford. 2021. "NATO-EU Relations: A Missed Opportunity". CEPA, 7 July 2021, <https://cepa.org/nato-eu-relations-a-missed-opportunity/>; Biscop, Sven. 2018. "EU-NATO Relations: A Long-Term Perspective." Instituto de Defensa Nacional, no. 150: 85-93. <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/11/NeD150.pdf>.

18 EEAS. 2021. "EU-U.S.: Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission." 3 December 2021. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-us-joint-statement-secretary-state-united-states-america-and-eu-high-representative-foreign_en.

little practical European commitment for defence in terms of military investments – even more so if the latter are compared to the bold words on strategic autonomy. Washington hence watched EU defence efforts with suspicion, particularly in the defence industrial field where often American and European industries compete with each other. The first fear has lost ground in the Biden administration, and the uplift of EU defence budgets – particularly the German one – represent a breakthrough in this regard. Yet, relevant and effective co-operation structures between Washington and Brussels still need to be established.

EU-UK co-operation remains a crucial goal, but for the time being it is practically impossible.¹⁹ With foreign, security and defence policy co-operation not being covered in the December 2020 Trade and Cooperation Agreement, there is currently no framework for the EU and the UK to co-operate on issues like Russia. Major European countries do so with London via the G7 on sanctions, and within NATO on deterrence and defence.

The current UK government's rejection of an institutionalised UK-EU co-operation complicates co-ordination between the UK and the Union, despite that both PESCO and EDF are legally open to third-country participation – as epitomised by the Canada, Norway and US examples. The Strategic Compass mentions the UK among the EU strategic partners, but does not make any further opening towards London.

Against this backdrop, most EU countries chose a mix of 'ad-hocism', informal contacts and co-operation in smaller formats. Particularly the E3 composed of France, the UK and Germany is for the UK a comfortable way to be linked to the EU without having to enter institutionalised agreements. Rome and London are negotiating a bilateral agreement covering security and defence. As it stands now, neither the UK nor the EU benefit from the currently limited and difficult co-operation.

3. Prospects and tendencies in co-operation: pragmatism ahead

To better reflect on how to improve EU partnerships, it is worth having a look at current dynamics of co-operation. The most important dynamic observed over the last decade is that EU countries seem to follow an increasing 'pick-and-choose' tendency in flexible formats, and do focus less on the common EU dimension. This

may be due to the cumbersome process to reach the unanimity on security and defence policies requested by the treaties for any EU action, as well as to the flexibility and effectiveness of smaller groups among willing and able countries which share a specific agenda.

¹⁹ This paragraph builds upon: Major, Claudia and Nicolai von Ondarza. 2021. "Germany, the EU and Global Britain: So Near, Yet So Far." Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment 2021/C31: 1-8. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/germany-the-eu-and-global-britain-so-near-yet-so-far>. See also: Niblett, Robin. 2021. "Global Britain lays out its stall, but EU missing in action." Chatham House, 23 March 2021, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/03/global-britain-lays-out-its-stall-eu-missing-action>.

The fact that PESCO has been joined by 25 member states out of 27 was somehow a missed opportunity to build a mini-lateral co-operation avantgarde within the EU institutional framework, as inclusiveness prevailed over ambition,²⁰ and it is hampering PESCO development and output.

The pick-and-choose tendency concerns all four dimensions of strategic autonomy. In terms of political co-operation, the negotiations in the Minsk format on Ukraine after 2014 took place outside the EU. The Iran negotiations equally started outside the Union but have later on been put into the EU framework. The little co-ordination that there currently is with the UK takes place outside institutionalised frameworks.

This also applies to operational engagements. France proposed the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) in 2017 as a coalition of those countries willing and able to engage in operations.²¹ EU membership was not a condition to participate in order to include the UK. The E2I is also joined by Denmark, which used to have an opt-out from the CSDP, which it decided to reverse in the referendum held on 1 June 2022. The E2I focus was explicitly on the capacity to act which – from a French perspective – the slow and cumbersome decision-making procedures in the EU did not allow for. Still, E2I did not launch an operation under its umbrella. Rather, France led ad hoc coalition operations like Takuba in Mali and the European maritime presence in the Strait of

Hormuz. Interestingly, the Strategic Compass explicitly refers to European operations as being somehow supported by the EU, as an implicit way to increase flexibility to act beyond EU unanimity mechanisms.²²

The same pick-and-choose pattern applies in industrial co-operation, where some robust co-operative projects take place outside the EU frameworks like PESCO and the EDF. Most notable is the Future Combat Air System, launched by France and Germany in 2017 and later joined by Spain, and the Tempest project set up by the UK, Italy and Sweden in 2019 to develop a sixth-generation fighter aircraft. Both projects are out of the EU frameworks, and even after the Strategic Compass there is little chance either of them will come into it. In terms of military capabilities, a lot of co-operation takes place outside of EU embedding. The integration of the German and Dutch land forces, the Nordic co-operation or the Franco-British one are just some examples.

Such tendency for pragmatic, ad hoc formats seems to work in parallel with the commitment at the EU level epitomised by the adoption of the Strategic Compass in 2022. Moreover, the establishment of the informal PESCO4 co-ordination group among France, Germany, Italy and Spain since 2017 represents an interesting example where mini-lateral co-operation supports EU-wide co-operation. Indeed, these countries pulled together the launch of PESCO, worked on the definition of its governance,

20 Marrone, Alessandro. November 2017. "Permanent Structured Cooperation: An Institutional Pathway for European Defence." IAI Commentaries 17: 26. <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/permanent-structured-cooperation-institutional-pathway-european-defence>.

21 Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling. 2018. "Die Europäische Interventionsinitiative EI2." Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik Policy Brief, 13 June 2018, <https://dgap.org/en/node/30940>; Zandee, Dick and Kimberly Kruijver. 2019. "The European Intervention Initiative: Developing a Shared Strategic Culture for European Defence." Clingendael Report: 1-26. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/The_European_Intervention_2019.pdf.

22 Marrone, Alessandro. 2022. "Una Bussola per l'Europa della difesa." AffariInternazionali, 22 March 2022. <https://www.affarinternazionali.it/una-bussola-strategica-per-leuropa-della-difesa/>.

and participate in large parts of its projects, including the most robust ones like Eurodrone.

4. The way forward for partnerships

The current patchy nature of the partnerships hinders the EU in making the most of them and might limit the commitment of partners. The Union should prioritise its commitments and focus on three crucial partnerships: with NATO, the US and the UK. They are the most relevant for EU military operations, capability development and defence industrial policy. The Russia-Ukraine war makes these partnerships even more important, because they directly relate to the collective defence of most EU members, the management of Russia's aggressive posture, and the strategic stability of Europe as a whole.

A strategic approach: linking the EU level of ambition to its tools

The EU large web of partnerships suffers two main shortfalls. On the one hand a lack of overall strategy, here understood as guidance and priorities. Unfortunately, the Strategic Compass didn't manage to offer it. On the other hand, the unsatisfactory results of crucial partnerships with the UK, NATO and the US. The EU partnerships vary a lot, and not having a one-size-fits all model is not a problem as long as

partnerships are built consciously, with a clear objective in mind.

Defining criteria of a strategic approach to EU partnerships

This confronts the EU with important tensions. The first is about reconciling the different tracks in the Union's external actions. CSDP operations used to be central in partnerships in the 2000s, but EU military interventions abroad stagnated or declined from the 2010s. Currently, they are neither the only nor the most important asset for co-operation. Tackling today's security challenges requires a broader approach that includes resilience, cyber, migration, innovation and technological aspects. These different dimensions need to be harmonised and enabled to be mutually reinforcing. It is not by chance in recent years that the European Neighbourhood Policy has included some security aspects. The Compass somehow recognises such a reality but unfortunately gives few guidelines in this regard.

The second tension is about the necessary stability that institutional frameworks offer and the inertia and lack of flexibility they also confer. There is a need for flexibility and situation-adapted frameworks to assure effectiveness, speed and the possibility of associating with high-value partners. The EU needs to offer the possibility of smaller coalitions of the willing, as the current debate about Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union shows.²³ The Strategic Compass explicitly refers to European-led coalitions in positive terms, and calls for the EU to co-ordinate CSDP missions with ad hoc ones. In particular, the Compass envisages a co-ordination between the EU Atalanta mission operating in the Gulf of Aden and the French-led European maritime presence in the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, such a pragmatic attitude towards operations should not turn the Union into a two-class club where the able and willing play away while the unable or unwilling comfortably stay at home: some form of shared threat assessment, strategic dialogue and military/financial burden-sharing is necessary for EU cohesion and effectiveness on the world stage.

Third, there is a tension between giving partners a bigger say in co-operation and compromising the EU autonomy of decision-making. The Union could, for example, associate selected partners in early stages planning for CSDP missions, to increase their interest in and ownership of the operation. At a more strategic level, inviting the NATO Secretary General to EU summits in exchange for High Representative participation

in the Alliance's summits represents a win-win praxis, to be replicated also at ministerial level.

In order to engage in successful partnerships it is highly important to analyse why partners would be interested in co-operating with the EU, to assess the likelihood of beneficial co-operation, and identify what the EU can bring to the partners. Yet, the starting point should be a clearly defined EU interest.

The criteria to engage in partnership should take into account at least three complementary elements:²⁴

- The security interest they represent for the EU: this aspect has to be clearly spelled out, as the international security environment is increasingly marked by great power competition, and the EU moves well beyond the earlier debate on soft power versus hard power.
- What partners bring to the EU in both the short term and long term, across multiple domains.
- The extent to which they share EU values: in general this element is a relevant issue in many EU partnerships, but not for those considered in this paper with the US, the UK and NATO.

²³ Article 44 TEU states: "Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions."

²⁴ Tardy, Thierry. 2018. "Revisiting the EU's security partnerships." EU Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief: 1-4. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%201%20Security%20Partnerships.pdf>.

The three crucial partnerships for a successful EU on security and defence

The three key partnerships necessary for Europe's security and stability, a more capable EU in crisis management, and better positioning with regard to the systemic competition with China are those with NATO, the US and the UK. The Russia-Ukraine war confirms these are the partnerships the EU needs to urgently invest in.

1. EU-NATO

The EU interest is to have mutually reinforcing institutions, stronger political dialogue and greater co-operation at working level. The 2016 and 2018 joint declaration represents the starting point to reach this goal, and the six progress reports show some limited achievements in the various areas.²⁵

On top of that, further synergies are possible in the areas of capabilities, new technologies, and operational domains like maritime and space.²⁶ Non-proliferation and arms control is a further area where the EU has made progress in terms of strategic thinking and diplomatic dialogue²⁷ and there is room for co-operation with NATO. Yet, while the war in Ukraine has shown the increased need for arms control, it has also decreased the chances for it to make progress any time soon.

Since 21 states are members of both organisations and this may become 23 if Finland and Sweden join NATO, there is a European structural interest in the convergence between both actors. The Russian war against Ukraine war makes a compelling case for cohesion within the Western camp for the sake of Europe's security and stability, and therefore for better EU-NATO partnership. It also soothes the negative impact of long-standing political obstacles such as the Turkey-Cyprus issue. Ankara's troubling position has been further confirmed by its opposition to Sweden and Finland's bid for NATO membership.

Having said that, a complicating factor in today's security challenges and the related answers lies in the fact that they greatly overlap: fighting disinformation is for example part of resilience; war and peace are not clearly separated.

Against this background, it is worth reflecting upon a division of labour whereby institutions are mutually reinforcing. Equally necessary is more clarity on the responsibilities as it would enable stronger political dialogue and greater practical co-operation. Table 2 suggests a tentative division of labour. In doing so, it assumes more clarity then exists in reality in order to provide a conceptual tool to unpack various issues.

25 Council of the EU. 2021. "PESCO: Canada, Norway and the United States will be invited to participate in the project Military Mobility." <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/03/eu-nato-cooperation-sixth-progress-report/>.

26 Simon, Luís. 2019. "EU-NATO Cooperation in an Era of Great-Power-Competition." German Marshall Fund to the United States (GMFUS), 26 November 2019. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/eu-nato-cooperation-era-great-power-competition>.

27 EU non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. <https://www.nonproliferation.eu/>.

Table 2. Potential distribution of priority responsibilities between EU and NATO

	Lead	Support
Collective defence	NATO	EU
Military crisis management	EU depending on scenario	NATO depending on scenario
Military crisis management	EU	NATO
Standardisation	NATO	EU
Resilience	EU	NATO
Industrial co-operation	EU	NATO
Technical innovation and regulations	EU	NATO
Disinformation	EU	NATO

In particular, when it comes to military crisis management in regions where EU interests are at stake, from Africa to the Middle East, the US deep-rooted, long-term retrench from these regions makes NATO unlikely to take action as it did from 2001 to 2021: the dramatic end of the mission in Afghanistan is a case in point. Russia's war in Ukraine further steers the Atlantic Alliance towards collective defence on the eastern flank. Even where NATO has a deployed mission like in Iraq, the Europeans are leading and committing most capabilities: in 2022 Italy has taken over the command in Baghdad from Denmark.²⁸ Europeans should realise that the stability and security of these regions depend mainly on their direct commitment, and can expect from NATO only limited support in terms for example of logistics or niche capabilities. This is the field where European strategic autonomy could and should be implemented through a win-win approach with partnerships, namely through NATO support for operations run either by the EU or by European-led coalitions.

Concerning capabilities, EDA should step up co-operation with the Alliance with regards to the synergy between the NATO Defence Planning Process and the EU Capability Development Plan, as well as on technological innovation. On the former, recently NATO has established the Defence Investments Accelerator for the North Atlantic area (DIANA) and EDA has launched a Defence Innovation Hub, and there is an obvious case for co-operation – all the more considering

EU interest is to keep the US engaged in European security, given its dependence on key military assets such as American nuclear deterrence (via NATO); to forge a common approach to China; and to build a mutually beneficial relationship in the defence industrial realm.

Recent decisions show an improvement under the Biden administration. As mentioned before, with the opening of PESCO to third countries, the USA investments via EDF and other tools.

At the same time, there are policy areas where it is not useful or feasible to think in terms of lead/support. For instance, when it comes to arms control and non-proliferation, both the EU and NATO play a very indirect but still relevant role in supporting decision-making processes that take place either bilaterally – mostly between the US and Russia – or through multilateral frameworks which go beyond the NATO-EU perimeter, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

2. EU-US

The US signed up to participate in the military mobility project.²⁹ In several statements, Washington is openly supporting EU defence efforts as complementary to NATO.³⁰ The Transatlantic Technology Council was launched in October 2021, and in 2022 the US-EU dialogue on security and defence kicked off.

28 NATO. 2022. "Italy assumes command of NATO Mission Iraq." 10 May 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195106.htm. Notably, EU countries – mostly Italy – have led the NATO KFOR mission in Kosovo since its establishment in 1999: NATO. 2022. "NATO's role in Kosovo." 19 May 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm

29 Council of the EU. 2021. "PESCO: Canada, Norway and the United States will be invited to participate in the project Military Mobility." <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/05/06/pesco-canada-norway-and-the-united-states-will-be-invited-to-participate-in-the-project-military-mobility/>.

30 The White House. 2021. "United States - France Joint Statement." <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/29/united-states-france-joint-statement/>; Herszenhorn, David M. 2021. "Biden's Team Wants EU's Allies to Get Real on 'Strategic Autonomy'." POLITICO, 19 November 2021. <https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-us-eu-strategic-autonomy-brussels-g20/>.

The Russia-Ukraine war brings a new priority for US-EU partnership. As mentioned above, the Union has committed 2 billion euros of its European Peace Facility budget to finance military donations to Kiev, and the EU Military Committee is playing a support role in the implementation of such support. The Union has also adopted huge, unprecedented sanctions against Moscow. As a result, the EU has merited a seat at the table with the US to discuss the way ahead for the Western approach to the Russia-Ukraine war, which is first and foremost a challenge for Europe's security and stability. Therefore, EU-US dialogue on security and defence should put the current conflict and its possible solutions at the top of its agenda. Once again, here partnerships are to be managed in a win-win approach with strategic autonomy.

At the same time, given China's rise and US long-term focus on it, co-operation needs to be developed in those fields where this competition is carried out, mainly emerging and disruptive technologies, including innovation and export control, regulation of global commons (maritime, space and cyberspace) and international order writ large. This includes defence industrial and capability co-operation, as the looming administrative agreement between the US and the EDA underlines. In particular, the EU is the second space power worldwide after the US thanks to the assets of its main members – France, Italy and Germany – but also thanks

to EU-funded space programmes such as Copernicus and Galileo. The nexus between space and defence is expanding: it is a field of strategic competition between the US, China and Russia – all owning anti-satellite weapons. In addition, in 2019 NATO declared space as operational domain.³¹ The EU is increasingly addressing such a nexus, as the Strategic Compass has mandated the elaboration of a EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence by 2023, and is working out an approach to space-traffic management.³² Here again the Union should continue to pursue its autonomy in this strategic domain, but also to co-operate with the US in terms of regulations (including on space-traffic management), technological co-operation, and space situational awareness as pre-requisites for keeping this domain safe and secure vis-à-vis the systemic rivals Russia and China.

3. EU-UK

The EU interest is to act together with the UK on shared security priorities rather than acting against each other³³ and to safeguard the wealth of military, technological and industrial co-operation which generate mutually reinforcing capabilities across the Channel.³⁴ Unfortunately, an institutionalised co-operation is realistic only in the mid- to long term, and only if there is a substantial political change in the UK.

31 See in this regard Marrone, Alessandro and Michele Nones (eds). February 2022. "The Expanding Nexus between Space and Defence." Document IAI 22 | 01. <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/expanding-nexus-between-space-and-defence>.

32 La Rocca, Giancarlo, Karolina Muti and Alessandro Marrone. May 2022. "A Congested Space and its Safety. The Importance of Space Traffic Management." IAI, 1st SPACEWAYS STM Brief. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/stm_brief_1.pdf.

33 Mölling, Christian, and Bastian Giegerich. 2018. "The United Kingdom's Contribution to European Security and Defence." IISS and DGAP: 1-16. https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/the_united_kingdoms_contribution_to_european_security_and_defence.pdf.

34 Sartori, Paola, Alessandro Marrone and Michele Nones. July 2018. "Looking Through the Fog of Brexit: Scenarios and Implications for the European Defence Industry." Document IAI 18 | 16. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1816.pdf>.

In the short to medium term, 'ad-hocism' and co-operation in smaller formats such as the E3, issue-based co-ordination on common interests – such as on sanctions via the G7 – or defence industrial co-operation bilaterally will dominate. Meanwhile, the EU High Representative should regularly attend the E3, as happened with the Iran negotiations, to avoid the criticism of those formats being exclusive and non-transparent³⁵ as well as to better link them to the EU framework by achieving synergies.

The E2I should be exploited as a flexible format to address security issues with the UK through a mini-lateral group which is inclusive enough to include larger militaries – with the exception of Poland – but far more flexible than the EU. Since it was launched with the idea of fostering a European strategic culture and to prepare for contingency scenarios, it could be particularly useful to deal with the plethora of crises in

regions relevant for Europe's security interests, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Being outside the EU framework but including ten EU members, it would also serve as a bridge between London and a significant part of the Union.

Successful co-operation via flexible formats in the medium term can create reliable working relationships, (re-)build trust, and produce positive results, thus establishing the foundation for long-term institutionalised co-operation.

The ultimate goal should be a normalisation and institutionalisation of EU-UK relations. The super election year 2024, when the US, the UK and the EU will vote and potentially reposition themselves, could be an opportunity to pave the way for this. Until then, the EU has to ensure co-ordination with London through mini-lateral formats.

Conclusion

In the security and defence domain the EU has to prioritise and move forward the three key partnerships with the US, NATO and the UK with a beneficial effect on its strategic autonomy. Each partnership has its own specificities, challenges and opportunities, but they are complementary and mutually reinforcing: progress in one partnership would likely benefit the others by fuelling a positive momentum. The Russia-Ukraine war represents a defining moment for

the international security environment and for the EU as security provider at home and in its immediate neighbourhood, and thus puts these three partnerships into a renewed perspective. Pragmatism and flexibility are key for the short to mid-term, but the Northern Star should remain a more structured, effective and solid partnership, with NATO, the UK and the US as the other side of the strategic autonomy coin.

35 See Major, Claudia, and Nicolai von Ondarza. 2021. "Germany, the EU and Global Britain: So Near, Yet So Far." Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment 2021/C31: 1-8. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/germany-the-eu-and-global-britain-so-near-yet-so-far>.

Bibliography

Biscop, Sven (2018) 'EU-NATO Relations: A Long-Term Perspective', *Nação e Defesa* No. 150, Instituto de Defesa Nacional, Lisbon.

Bond, Ian, Luigi Scazzieri and Senem Aydin-Düzgit (2021) 'EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Co-Operation With Neighbours: Mapping Diversity', Centre for European Reform (CER), London-Brussels-Berlin, May.

Council of the EU (2021) 'PESCO: Canada, Norway and the United States will be invited to participate in the project Military Mobility', May.

Council of the EU (2022) 'A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security', March.

De Maio, Giovanna (2021) 'Opportunities to Deepen EU-NATO Cooperation', Brookings Institute, Washington, December.

Douglas, Barry, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, Marie-Louise Chagnaud, Nick Childs, Bastian Giegerich, Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz (2018) 'Protecting Europe: meeting the EU's military level of ambition in the context of Brexit', IISS Research Papers, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, November.

European Council (2016) 'Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', July.

European Defense Agency (2022), Partners, Council of the European Union, accessed 4 July 2022, <https://eda.europa.eu/who-we-are/partners>.

European External Action Service (2021) 'EU-U.S.: Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice President of the European Commission', December.

Graziano, Claudio (7 September 2020) 'Speech at the Sub-Committee on Security and Defence - European Parliament - "The role of the European Union Military Committee in the current evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy"'.

Herszenhorn, David M. (2021) 'Biden's Team Wants EU's Allies to Get Real on "Strategic Autonomy"', *Politico*, November.

Järvenpää, Pauli, Claudia Major and Sven Sakkov (2019) 'European Strategic Autonomy: Operationalising a Buzzword', ICDS Report, International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, October.

La Rocca, Giancarlo, Karolina Muti and Alessandro Marrone (2022) 'A Congested Space and its Safety. The Importance of Space Traffic Management', 1st SPACEWAYS STM Brief, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, May.

Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling (2018) 'Die Europäische Interventionsinitiative EI2', DGAP Policy Brief, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berlin, June.

Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling (2020) 'Less Talk, More Action', *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, No. 4 (2).

Major, Claudia and Nicolai von Ondarza (2021) 'Germany, the EU and Global Britain: So Near, Yet So Far', SWP Comment 2021/C31, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, April.

Marrone, Alessandro (2017) 'Permanent Structured Cooperation: An Institutional Pathway for European Defence', IAI Commentaries 17 (26), Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, November.

Marrone, Alessandro (2019) 'National Expectations regarding the European Defence Fund: The Italian Perspective', *ARES Comment #42*, Armament Industry European Research (ARES) Group, Paris, October.

Marrone, Alessandro (2022) 'Una Bussola per l'Europa della difesa', *Affari Internazionali*, March.

Marrone, Alessandro and Michele Nones (eds) (2022) 'The Expanding Nexus between Space and Defence', Document IAI 22 (01), Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, February.

Niblett, Robin (2021) 'Global Britain lays out its stall, but EU missing in action', Expert Comment, Chatham House, London, March.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2018) 'Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation', July.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2022) 'Italy assumes command of NATO Mission Iraq', May.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2022) 'NATO's role in Kosovo', May.

Sartori, Paola, Alessandro Marrone and Michele Nones (2018) 'Looking Through the Fog of Brexit: Scenarios and Implications for the European Defence Industry', Document IAI 18 (16), Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, July.

Shea, Jamie (2022) 'NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy', Expert Comment, Chatham House, London, June.

Simon, Luís (2019) 'EU-NATO Cooperation in an Era of Great-Power-Competition', German Marshall Fund to the United States (GMFUS), Washington, November.

Speranza, Lauren and Jack Crawford (2021) 'NATO-EU Relations: A Missed Opportunity', Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), Washington, July.

Tardy, Thierry (2018) 'Revisiting the EU's security partnerships', EUISS Policy Brief, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, January.

The White House (2021) 'United States - France Joint Statement', October.

Zandee, Dick and Kimberly Kruijver (2019) 'The European Intervention Initiative: Developing a Shared Strategic Culture for European Defence', Clingendael Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', The Hague, September.

About the authors



CLAUDIA MAJOR

Dr Claudia Major heads the International Security Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. Her work focuses on security and defence policy in Europe (EU, NATO, Germany). Previous positions include the Center for Security Studies at the ETH Zurich, the EU Institute for Security Studies and the German Foreign Office. Claudia is a member of various committees, such as the Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention of the German Foreign Office. She graduated from the Free University Berlin and Sciences Po Paris and holds a PhD from the University of Birmingham (UK).

ALESSANDRO MARRONE

Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme at Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), where he has been working since 2007. He is also professor at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence, and has been teaching for four years at the University of Perugia. He holds a PhD in History of Europe from the La Sapienza University of Rome and a Master of Science in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Previously he was awarded a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and MSc in International Relations from the LUISS Guido Carli.



**STRATEGIC
AUTONOMY**
pathways to progressive action

This policy brief is published as part of 'European Strategic Autonomy: Pathways to Progressive Action', a project co-organised by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies, the Brussels office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

Cover photo: Shutterstock / Sergey Nivens

About FEPS

The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) is the think tank of the progressive political family at EU level. Its mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform progressive politics and policies across Europe.

FEPS works in close partnership with its 68 members and other partners, including renowned universities, scholars, policymakers and activists, forging connections among stakeholders from the world of politics, academia and civil society at local, regional, national, European and global levels.

European Political Foundation - N° 4 BE 896.230.213 | Avenue des Arts 46 1000 Brussels (Belgium)

www.feps-europe.eu | Twitter/Instagram: [@FEPS_Europe](https://twitter.com/FEPS_Europe) | Facebook: [@FEPSEurope](https://facebook.com/FEPSEurope)

ON SIMILAR TOPICS

