



WAR IN UKRAINE, REFUGEES, INCLUSION AND HUMAN MOBILITY

THE CHALLENGES FOR A PROGRESSIVE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY

ABSTRACT

After summarising the main EU decisions on the reception of Ukrainian refugees, with reference to the decision to grant them temporary protection, this policy brief analyses the migration profile and problems of reception and integration. The flows from Ukraine are largely composed of women and children, posing pressing needs for integration into schooling and the labour market, addressing the problems of brain waste and segregation.

The latter are also discussed in the light of the different geopolitical scenarios and therefore with respect to short-term and medium-to-long-term needs. The importance for the EU to equip itself with a flexible capacity to foresee and respond to migratory flows, combining measures for social and economic integration with measures that enable the mobility of people, overcoming existing discrimination in the treatment of different nationalities, is highlighted. This requires more solidarity among EU member states and territories. More generally, the proliferation of protracted crises around Europe calls for a new risk-management policy outside and inside the Union. Growing tensions must be prevented and governed with a progressive policy based on the recognition of human rights, investing in universal welfare and social and territorial cohesion, as well as on the nexus between migration and development in Ukraine.

Finally the Pact on Migration and Asylum should provide for more, diversified and intertwined safe channels of entry and mobility.



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Introduction


On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Over a few months, the war caused internal displacements and large movements of refugees. At the end of August 2022, estimates by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) showed that more than 7 million refugees have entered European Union (EU) member states, distributing themselves mainly in neighbouring states, as well as in Germany, Italy, Spain and even Turkey.¹ Before the war, in 2020, a total of 1,714,656 Ukrainians lived in Europe (excluding Ukraine and Russia).²

The sharing of borders between the EU and Ukraine, the existence of a visa-free regime, the structural nature of circulatory and seasonal movements and the growth of migratory chains and diasporas in the member states

have facilitated the displacement of millions of people in just a few months. At the time of writing, the war is continuing and no meaningful ceasefire and peace talks are underway, so several future scenarios are still open.

Several analysts have pointed out that this war has caused the largest flow of refugees into Europe since the Second World War. The EU's response was immediate and unified. A few days after the attack (on 4 March 2022),³ the European Council approved the activation of Directive 55 for the granting of temporary reception to Ukrainian refugees.⁴ The decision was also shared and supported by the members of the Visegrad group – which are usually against the opening of EU borders for refugees – due to their geographical position and their direct involvement in the political and migratory consequences of the war.

Figure 1. Refugees from Ukraine, recorded by country, 31 August 2022.




On 17 March, the European Commission provided the Operational guidelines for the implementation of Council implementing Decision 2022/382;⁵ on 23 March it launched the platform on EU solidarity with Ukraine⁶ to diffuse practical information on rights and support options for those fleeing Ukraine; and on 28 March it presented a 10-point plan that aims to ensure stronger European coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war against Ukraine.⁷ On 4 April, the Council “adopted legislative amendments making it possible for member states to redirect resources from cohesion policy funds and the Fund for European Aid for the Most Deprived (FEAD) to assist the refugees escaping the Russian military aggression against Ukraine”.⁸ In this way, 17 billion euros could be mobilised.

According to the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), by the end of August, just over 8.6 million refugees had entered the EU territory, of whom 4.2 million were registered for temporary protection and 24,800 as asylum seekers.⁹ Approximately 5 million Ukrainians had crossed the border back to their country of origin, highlighting the importance of circular movements.

The Directive has been implemented in different ways, depending on the institutional and socio-economic structure of the different member countries.¹⁰ See, for example, Figure 2 on monthly refugee benefits per country.

Figure 2. Monthly allocation for a single Ukrainian refugee in accommodation and GDP/capita, selected European countries.



Note: Data for Norway and Italy are for people in centres where meals are provided.

Source: OECD.

In general, it is relevant to emphasise the political importance of the unified EU response that has finally shown an ability to activate common internal measures with respect to the Ukrainian refugee crisis: "a homogeneously open attitude towards refugees is proving to be a key precondition for long invoked (but never achieved) 'EU strategic autonomy' and resilience to crises".¹¹ This unity of intent could therefore be a good precedent in the perspective of a common, solidary and responsible migration policy, also towards crises in other neighbouring countries and towards countries that use migration as a hybrid threat with blackmail capabilities (primarily Belarus and Russia, Turkey and Libya).

The migration profile, reception and integration scenarios and challenges

To understand not only the prospects and problems, but also the opportunities, that Ukrainian migration presents for the EU, it is necessary to analyse the **migration profile**. According to a recent UNHCR analysis, "the majority of refugees from Ukraine are women and children (90 per cent), with high levels of education and diverse professional skills among adults (77 per cent)".¹² 82% have separated from a family member who remained in Ukraine because of the war (usually the husband or a sibling, or the father). And as many as 23% of families have a person in a particularly vulnerable situation.

On the one hand, the majority have hopes of returning to their country of origin, but as many as 65% plan to stay in the host country. On the other hand, **the situation of uncertainty linked to the course of the war and the limits and opportunities of the current settlement make the refugees' mobility plans volatile: returning, staying, or moving to another country are open choices** (see more on possible scenarios, below).

What is certain is that with the continuation of the conflict and the need to ensure children's education, it is likely that the stabilisation of women in host countries will take place, with the associated need to find employment and housing.

According to the UNHCR analysis, a relative minority of female refugees intend to move to another European country, because they are currently in transit and/or staying in collective accommodation centres. The search for better stabilisation opportunities drives their mobility choices. In this sense:

Safety, family ties and access to employment were the main reasons for deciding to remain in the current host country or move to another host country. Germany was identified as the main intended destination for refugees reporting an intention to move on (33 per cent of respondents), followed by the Czech Republic (7 per cent) and Canada (5 per cent).¹³

16% of respondents intend to return to Ukraine but uncertainty predominates. Return is not seen as permanent, as it depends on the evolution of the war. The circularity of movements is an important option to keep the various possibilities of human security open. In this situation, family reunification and more generally the prospects for mobility depend fundamentally on the course of the war.

Three scenarios are possible:

1. The continuation of the war forces men to remain in Ukraine to fight, making family reunification impossible. Women and children have to stabilise in the host countries, and new refugee flows are possible. Circular

mobility to maintain relations with families of origin who remained in Ukraine and support the local war economy continues.

2. A positive resolution of the war in favour of Kyiv may encourage return to Ukraine and family reunification there.
3. Conversely, a negative outcome could lead to new refugee flows, including of men, and an increase in family reunification in the host countries.

The EU needs to prepare for these three scenarios.¹⁴

In the meantime, there are various **challenges concerning the reception and stabilisation of the refugees** that must be faced. They are more or less accentuated depending on the national and local conditions in EU member states. In particular, the UNHCR analysis highlights the following issues:

*The need to learn the local language was often identified as crucial to access the job market and educational opportunities by focus groups participants. Some refugees noted difficulties in finding reliable and up-to-date information on available services and employment opportunities. Participants also highlighted cases of persons who returned to Ukraine because they had run out of savings and were unable to find financial security.*¹⁵

A similar analysis conducted in Poland found that "In addition to various forms of immediate help, they are interested in actively looking for a job, place of residence, or the possibility of continuing education of children or caring for the youngest", while "Few of them were interested in travelling to another country". The top five concerns are, in descending order: "lack of

money"; "poor knowledge of the language of the host country"; "fear of how people will receive me"; "uncertainty about the fate of relatives who stayed at home"; "uncertainty about the possibility of returning home"; and, finally, "uncertainty about the future of Ukraine attacked by Russia". As can be seen, "The common denominator connecting all our interlocutors, regardless of their country of residence, is the **feeling of temporariness, uncertainty, and fear for their own and their loved ones' future**".¹⁶

Importantly, the reception was facilitated by a widespread Ukrainian **diaspora** in the EU hosting countries. Family members, relatives and acquaintances have opened their homes to the refugees, or facilitated their reception in the homes of local families and accommodation offered by civil-society associations and religious institutions. According to UNHCR analysis, as many as 72% of respondents are hosted by families or in rented houses. This seems to have allowed for a better initial reception, which, however, as outlined later, has problematic subsequent effects for both the refugees and the local populations hosting them in terms of increased pressure on social services and scarce resources such as housing.

Consequently, UNHCR advises host countries to: improve information on and availability of social services, paying particular attention to persons with specific vulnerabilities; and given the need for refugees to move from and to their homeland, it is crucial to ensure them mobility and protection as well as information on the situation in their areas of origin, without removing the possibility of movement following a decision to return. The EU migration policy response, given the conditions of uncertainty and possible future scenarios, can only be open and flexible.

Moreover, it is necessary to have a more

medium- to long-term vision, with respect to the prospects of integration and of maintaining the possibilities of mobility inside and outside the EU, as well as with respect to the fairness of conditions with other nationalities of refugees and asylum seekers, in order to **avoid discrimination and the application of double-standard policies**.¹⁷

Basic and medium-term integration issues

In the receiving EU member states, after the first humanitarian phase, some socio-economic inclusion issues¹⁸ are beginning to emerge that deserve an integrated and universal political response to avoid tensions between refugees and local populations, with the inevitable political instrumentalisation of sovereigntist and xenophobic parties.

The inclusion of children and young people in schools requires language and cultural mediation services, post-traumatic assistance and the expansion of classes, especially where their presence is particularly high, as in Poland.¹⁹ Mediation should be reciprocal: local pupils and families should also understand diversity. One opportunity to be explored concerns the possibility of integrating the educational offer with digital services. Numerous Ukrainian minors have been able to attend classes in connection with schools in their homeland. It is a question of **moving from an emergency phase to a new phase of cooperation between different national educational systems**. Similar problems also affect local health systems that are more stressed by the new needs. The increased demand for these services requires good monitoring at the local level to identify gaps and new investments to be made with adequate funding from the EU as a whole. The problem of housing has also become more acute. For example, in Poland, in "Warsaw and Krakow,

two major cities, indices indicated a significant increase in the rents since the beginning of the Russian invasion in both markets affected by the refugee shock".²⁰ The housing market requires not only new support measures at local level, in terms of helping to pay rents in the short term, but also more structural interventions in the public housing stock. The EU can play an important role here with the structural funds and for social cohesion.

Inclusion in the labour market is another important issue. The question here does not concern the legal aspect so much as the national and local market structures, and in particular the available job demand by gender, age and level of education. Apart from the difficulties, however significant, of language and recognition of qualifications, in general in the EU there was already, before the war, an important obstacle to fair inclusion:

*The majority of Ukrainian labour migrants engaging in employment in the EU take up low-paid, menial jobs, often involving manual labour and unsafe working conditions. Most of these labour migrants are men aged 26-35, working predominantly in administrative and support services, manufacturing and construction, or in the industrial, logistics, agriculture, hospitality or gastronomy sectors. These jobs – ranging from driver, berry picker, and waitress to receptionist – are predominantly carried out on work and residence permits of 3-5 months or 6-11 months in duration. Some countries, such as Italy, for example, attract a specific type of workforce: three out of four Ukrainians working in Italy are women employed as housekeepers, caregivers or babysitters.*²¹

In this context, the recent flow of refugees, made up largely of women, is likely to accentuate the

problem of labour inclusion. The experience of countries such as Italy and Spain shows how **the labour market is segmented and discriminatory**, and a clear problem of brain waste arises: Ukrainian women graduates find work mainly in care services with local families. Even in a country that is more attractive²² to the educated female gender, such as Germany, there are uncertainties:

*While the Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) in Nuremberg states that the refugees are highly qualified individuals, it remains unclear whether their swift integration into the labour market could alleviate the shortage of skilled labour in Germany.*²³

Analyses²⁴ indicate the importance of improving information services, training and support for integration into the labour market, with measures to protect migrant workers' rights; however, these may appear as palliative measures, without a real restructuring of labour markets by ensuring more social mobility between economic sectors. As the most serious problem is the segregation of migrants into low-value-added and highly exploitative jobs, the issue of social mobility is crucial. Measures should be taken on the one hand for the recognition of qualifications and training to enable mobility, and on the other hand for structural measures to combat segregation, ensuring a decent minimum wage and increasing the added value of weaker sectors by reducing oligopolies.

As is evident from the above-mentioned data, Ukrainian men and women workers are usually employed on short-term contracts and on a seasonal basis, conditions that tend to allow for a strong circular mobility. With the war, different scenarios open up, as seen above. In the case of a protracted war, a strong tendency

towards circularity would be maintained, but particularly women would still need more stable employment with better conditions, with the possibility of assuring secondary movement to other countries where they could find better social mobility, also beyond the emergency period.

The difficulties of inclusion in the labour market and competition with local workers for lower-paid jobs can generate **social tensions**. Before the war, there was xenophobia towards Ukrainians, especially in Central and Eastern European countries.²⁵ These negative feelings subsided with the solidarity and acceptance of refugees following the war with Russia. But as time goes by, empathy may wane and resolve into new manifestations of intolerance, despite the current political rhetoric in favour of Ukrainian refugees (but not of other nationalities). These manifestations have already been noted in some countries (Poland, Moldova, Hungary, Romania) and are also linked to disinformation campaigns that foment divisions.²⁶

Monitoring the dynamics underway, updating and redefining the possible scenarios and trying to anticipate social demands are some of the measures that need to be put in place in order to prevent social tensions. It is necessary to have a **risk-management policy** based on respect for human and social rights, that can combine better stabilisation with circular mobility.

The need for a risk-management policy on security, migration and social issues

More generally, a further underlying political consideration is necessary: the crises of the last 20 years, from Iraq to Afghanistan, to the so-called Arab springs and autumns (from Syria to Libya), show us how the **scenarios of protracted crises²⁷ and thus of protracted displacement** are prevalent. As crises fester, so-called durable

solutions (return, resettlement and integration) are not easily implemented.²⁸ A growing social stratification is therefore being created in several countries, inside and outside the EU. Within such stratified societies, refugees are increasingly marginalised, and their conditions are further worsened by the recurring and structural economic and social crises.²⁹

The EU must learn to live with such protracted crises, as new unforeseen and sudden crises, from Ukraine to displacements that will increasingly be caused by catastrophic weather/climate events, will break out within and without its borders. As already stated by some scholars,³⁰ the global-risk society is emerging: that is, a society in which global techno-financial capitalism generates transformations entailing growing and enduring risks that provoke local tensions and violent reactions. With globalisation, multipolarity and the growing power of technology, new global, multiple and interconnected risks are appearing, the incalculability³¹ and complexity of which, however, require predictive and decision-making systems for a risk-management policy.

In this context, **migration cannot be considered separately from social and economic, political and security dynamics, both internal and external.** We have recently seen how migration has become an element of so-called hybrid security, of its instrumentalisation as a weapon for purposes of blackmail and destabilisation against the EU (from the case of refugees in Erdogan's Turkey to that of Libya³² and recently of migrants on the border with Belarus³³). All this to the detriment of the migrants' human rights. The Ukrainian case should therefore be considered in this wider and more complex context, with reference to the different scenarios of protracted crises.³⁴

In this regard, the EU has activated a **Blueprint**

mechanism³⁵ to respond to crisis situations, but the approach is of an emergency nature, does not consider the human rights of migrants, and gives rise to differentiated and discriminatory responses, depending on the consensus of member states. And indeed, it has been pointed out by several critics that the EU has responded differently to the Ukraine case than to other crises, from Syria to Afghanistan. On the one hand, according to some authors, **the difference in response is unfair**, discriminatory, reveals a eurocentric vision or a limited regional geopolitical approach,³⁶ a reflection of a racist narrative of some political parties and some media, which has given rise to protests by African states.³⁷

On the other hand, the EU's land border with Ukraine makes it impossible to externalise migration management by supporting buffer states, as has been the case so far with the Western Balkan countries, Turkey, Libya and Morocco. Moreover, a financial issue arises: given the available resources, the Ukraine crisis is absorbing a lot of funds, and this may reduce the availability for other crises and for the reception of refugees of other nationalities,³⁸ as well as the social tensions between refugees and local populations requiring new social investments to foster inclusion without discrimination.

In the long term, migratory pressure may fuel new populist tensions, especially in Eastern European countries. It is important that the case of the Ukrainian refugees in the EU does not become an opportunity to blackmail for those member states that are more involved and less respecting of human rights: they could demand more financial solidarity and less EU pressure on domestic policy, even threatening to encourage secondary movements. We need to work for greater solidarity with respect for the human rights of all.

The Ukrainian crisis needs an effective response to safeguard the values of solidarity, to show that **human mobility can be welcomed, integrated and managed without creating tensions** and, on the contrary, by creating more opportunities for progress for all, and thus to move forward in defining a new European migration policy more anchored in human rights and more integrated in the social pillar and in a new external action policy to deal with protracted crises. It is a difficult path and one that needs constant dedication.

The negotiation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum should go in this direction. We need to build consensus among member countries and move forward in some enhanced cooperation to overcome the obstacle of unanimity. The unity of the EU's response to the Ukraine crisis was seized by tentative progress on solidarity among 21 member states for better planning of migrant relocation with the voluntary agreement of 22 June 2022.³⁹

In conclusion, some issues to be addressed for a progressive social and human mobility policy are summarised.

Proposals for a progressive social and human mobility policy

A progressive policy cannot fail to value the **multilateral commitment** to a just governance of human mobility, which is currently anchored in Agenda 2020 and the Global Compact on Migration and Refugees. Progressive forces must bind EU policy more and more into the breast of multilateralism: the Pact on Migration and Asylum makes a brief and rhetorical mention of multilateral engagement when instead the governance of refugees, from Ukrainian to Afghan and other nationalities, should be conceived as a coordinated and coherent effort of all governments to find the best cooperation in

solidarity and responsibility. The reception and support of Ukrainian refugees should be shared beyond the EU, considering also that several of them see Canada and other western countries as desirable destinations for integration.

Progressive forces should strive for all member states to **adhere to the Global Compact**. An adherence that is in line with the founding values of the EU. And all avenues must be pursued to foster a gradual convergence between national and EU policies: from voluntary agreements (such as the one of 22 June 2022 on relocation) to the use of **enhanced cooperation** between groups of member states, to a real EU policy such as the one decided on temporary protection for the Ukrainian case.

Being part of the EU and adopting its policies means adhering to founding values, respect for human and migrants' rights, fair and universal access to basic social services, and the full development of human dignity for all. These principles should always guide the negotiations of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, avoiding discrimination against nationality, gender and ethnicity. Temporary protection must respond to these principles that all governments must respect.

The **Pact on Migration and Asylum** should be improved to take the different scenarios of human mobility **in the context of protracted crises** more into account, as well as the uncertainty and complexity of events, and thus the need to adopt a new approach to risk-management policy – a policy that the EU has already partly touched upon with its focus on new measures to respond to crises and support resilience.⁴⁰ Yet, the EU's approach is still too fragmented and short term, focusing on the "whole-of-route and comprehensive approach"⁴¹ to migration in order to contain it in neighbouring countries. There is a lack of

integrated analysis on migration and protracted crises in geopolitical scenarios, on the links between crises, humanitarian interventions, development and peace.⁴² We need to enter into the complexity of the interrelationships between geopolitical, economic and social, environmental and climatic crises in order to understand how to manage growing risks to human security. And this requires a greater predictive capacity according to a holistic approach that is able to read the interaction between the different dynamics of crises, within which migration is situated, seeking a coherence of policies that is able to respond to root causes.

In this sense, progress should be made in the so-called **mainstreaming of migration** in different sectoral policies according to the whole-of-government approach, just as it is important to deepen the whole-of-society approach because the challenges of reception and integration can be tackled with strong cooperation between government, civil society and the private sector, as the Ukrainian case teaches us and as recognised and promoted by the EU Integration Plan.⁴³

Multilevel and multi-stakeholder cooperation within the EU for reception and integration should be supported, strengthening its social pillar. This means **more investment in universal welfare at the local level**, in education and health systems, in training and labour-market integration mechanisms, and in access to housing, especially in countries and cities where social pressure is greatest. The Ukrainian case highlighted the very important role played by diasporas and civil-society networks. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe also need to build integration policies, which have so far received little attention due to xenophobic drifts. The European social cohesion policy, now strengthened by the NextGenerationEU (NGEU), must proceed decisively, **supported by financial**

and fiscal policy to respond to social rights and overcome tensions and discrimination.⁴⁴

Moreover, territorial inequalities within the EU, the different opportunities of local systems, will continue to nurture human mobility of both European citizens and newcomers. Therefore, the structural issue of reducing polarisations for a **better territorial cohesion** remains. Refugees can represent new social forces for better equity between territories, but they need adequate national and local strategies.⁴⁵

Along with social cohesion, greater efforts are needed in communication to combat disinformation and political instrumentalisation, which is particularly dangerous in the case of refugee reception and integration issues.⁴⁶

With regard to human mobility, considering the temporary nature of the protection granted to Ukrainian refugees and the need to build a truly comprehensive and integrated policy, the Pact on Migration and Asylum must move forward by investing as much as possible in the construction of regular channels. The various channels – temporary protection, asylum, residence for work purposes and for family reunification – must be open and communicating with each other, so as to guarantee regularisation, stabilisation and secure access to social rights.

At the same time, it is necessary to move forward on measures to improve **solidarity between member states**, with planned relocations (strengthening the 22 June agreement), considering the revision of the Dublin regulation. Similarly, **cooperation on borders** and the Blueprint mechanism will have to be strengthened and improved to ensure circularity and fair treatment for asylum seekers and temporary protection.

Social and mobility policy will have to be made more coherent from internal to external dimensions. The governance of migration linked to protracted crises must be more balanced in terms of responsibilities and solidarity between **the EU and the countries of origin and transit**: the policy of delegating, externalising to neighbouring countries the responsibility for refugees produces a series of short-circuits, contradictions and hypocrisies that need to be remedied. The issue of mobility governance must be included in partnerships for sustainable development.

In the case of Ukraine, emigration posed issues of management and **sustainable development** before the war. The country has a sharp demographic decline (the UN baseline scenario predicts a reduction of the population from 45 million in 2015 to 35 million in 2050) and has lost significant human capital through migration, partially offset by a large volume of remittances,⁴⁷ the impact of which on local development is uncertain, depending on the

transformation of local economic structures.⁴⁸ With the war, the situation became much worse. The scenarios are uncertain, but there is a need to invest in resilience and recovery, and in this context for human mobility that can contribute to reconstruction.

The diasporas already contribute a lot with reception and humanitarian aid, for resilience and social change.⁴⁹ The EU and its member states, all the more so with the decision to **open up the path to Ukraine's accession**, are called upon to cooperate, from humanitarian aid to reconstruction, from cooperation in education and health, to labour cooperation with market recovery. This fosters integration between the internal and external dimensions in an attempt to guarantee the social rights of migrants. An integration that needs, finally, greater attention to **policy coherence for sustainable development** to address the root causes of forced migration.⁵⁰

Endnotes

- 1 "Ukraine refugee situation". Operational Data Portal (UNHCR) website.
- 2 Data taken from "Ukrainians in Europe", CReAM (Centre for Research & Analysis of Migration) website. The United Nations portal on migration indicates that "as of mid-year 2020, 6.1 million migrants from Ukraine resided abroad. While more than 53 per cent of them resided in the Russian Federation, other top destinations included the United States of America (6 per cent), Kazakhstan (5.8 per cent), Germany (4.7 per cent), Poland (4.4 per cent), Italy (4 per cent), Belarus (3.6 per cent), Czechia (2.1 per cent), Israel (2.1 per cent) and Uzbekistan (2 per cent)"; in "Migration overview", Migration Data Portal website.
- 3 "Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022". EUR-Lex website.
- 4 "Directive 55 of 2001 was adopted in the aftermath of the 1999 war in Kosovo, when a controversial NATO 'humanitarian' military intervention had precipitated mass expulsions of up to 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians by Yugoslav and Serb forces toward neighbouring countries. Directive 55, that was never activated during previous crises due to the lack of sufficient consensus among EU states, grants significant rights (entry and stay, work, family reunion) for up to three years for persons who reach the EU as part of a 'mass influx', defined as 'a large number of displaced persons, who come from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Community [*now Union*] was spontaneous or aided, for example through an evacuation programme". In Pastore, F. (2022) "Solidarity and strategic resilience: The EU facing the Ukrainian exodus", Aspenia Online website, 8 March.
- 5 "Communication from the Commission on Operational guidelines for the implementation of Council implementing Decision 2022/382", EUR-LEX website.
- 6 "EU solidarity with Ukraine", European Commission website.
- 7 "10-point plan for stronger European coordination on welcoming those fleeing Ukraine", European Website on Integration.
- 8 "Ukraine: €17 billion of EU funds to help refugees". Council of the EU press release, 4 April 2022.
- 9 "Ukraine crisis: Data and analysis", EUAA (European Union Agency for Asylum) website.
- 10 See OECD (2022) "Rights and support for Ukrainian refugees in receiving countries", OECD Publishing; see information collected by ECRE (2022) in Information sheet: Measures in response to the arrival of displaced people fleeing the war in Ukraine, ECRE (European Council on Exiles and Refugees website); see Aumayr-Pintar, C. and M. Cantero Guerrero (2022) "Policies to support refugees from Ukraine", Eurofound website, 5 July; and specific analysis on some EU countries, such as Fadda, R. (2022) "Reception systems in some EU member states during the Ukraine crisis: Solidarity and discriminations", FOCSIV, Faces of Migration project funded by the EU, June.
- 11 Pastore, F. (2022) "Solidarity and strategic resilience: The EU facing the Ukrainian exodus".
- 12 UNHCR, Regional Bureau for Europe (July 2022) "Lives on hold: Profiles and intentions of refugees from Ukraine". The analysis has been based on 4,900 interviews with refugees from Ukraine conducted by UNHCR and partners in the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania and Slovakia between mid-May and mid-June 2022, complemented with seven focus group discussions conducted in Poland and Romania. This regional report presents the main findings relating to refugees' profiles and intentions, aiming to establish a baseline which will be periodically updated to monitor and analyse trends and changes in the situation in a timely manner.
- 13 UNHCR, Regional Bureau for Europe (July 2022).
- 14 For more detailed scenario analysis, see Ohliger, R. (2022) "A new era for refugee and asylum policy? Policy recommendations for learning systems", Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH, May; Sie Dhian Ho, M., B. Deen and N. Drost, "Long-term protection in Europe needed for millions of Ukrainian refugees", Clingendael Alert, September 2022.
- 15 UNHCR, Regional Bureau for Europe (July 2022) "Lives on hold".
- 16 Isański J., M. A. Michalski, M. Nowak et al. (2022) "Social reception and inclusion of refugees from Ukraine". UKREF research report 1, 11 May.
- 17 "The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimated that there are more than 470,000 foreign nationals in Ukraine. Around 76,000 of them were international students, many of them from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. There have been disturbing cases of discrimination against foreigners leaving Ukraine, with especially black Africans being prevented from fleeing. This has rightly caused an international outcry, including from migrants' countries of origin, the United Nations, the African Union and Human Rights Watch. Useful guidelines exist for how to protect and where possible repatriate migrants caught up in crisis, namely the government-led Migration in Countries in Crisis (MICIC)

initiative, but there has been surprisingly little reference to it", in Frouws, B. (2022) "When war hit Ukraine. Reflections on what it might mean for refugee, asylum and migration policies in Europe", Mixed Migration Centre website, 9 March.

18 See indications by Katsiaficas, K. and J. Segeš Frelak (2022) "Integration of Ukrainian refugees: The road ahead", International Centre for Migration Policy Development, ICMPD Commentary, 9 March; and International Rescue Committee (2022) "Policy brief: As people continue to flee Ukraine, Europe must turn its promises of protection into a lasting reality", 8 March.

19 See Isański J., M. A. Michalski, M. Nowak et al. (2022) "Social reception and inclusion of refugees from Ukraine".

20 "[...] 16,5% in Krakow and 14% in Warsaw, while house prices in both cities rose much less (by about 4,0% in Krakow and 1% in Warsaw)", Trojanek, R. and M. Gluszak (2022) "The war in Ukraine, refugees, and the housing market in Poland", SSRN electronic journal, April.

21 Dubenko, L. and P. Kravchuk (2021) "Analytical report: Ukrainian labour migration to the EU. State of play, challenges and solutions", Prague Process Secretariat International and Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), funded by the European Union, March. The authors of the report underline that "In 2014, Ukraine concluded the landmark Association Agreement with the European Union. This step initiated the country's distancing from Russia, which had been the main destination for Ukrainian goods and migrant workers for several decades. As a result, many Ukrainians seeking employment abroad began looking to the West, especially after the outbreak of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. During the period 2014-2019, some 3,446,793 Ukrainian nationals received first-time residence permits for the EU-28. Of these permits, 83 per cent (2,847,830) were issued for remunerated activities".

22 "...high-skilled labour immigration, albeit in much smaller volumes, is also taking place. The high number of permits issued for 12 months or more in EU member states like Denmark and Germany, for example, suggests that Ukrainian nationals are possibly employed as high-skilled workers, including as doctors, nurses, engineers, data analysts, and IT specialists – all professions which are in high demand in the EU", Dubenko, L. and P. Kravchuk (2021) "Analytical report:".

23 Ohliger, R. (2022) "A new era for refugee and asylum policy?".

24 Dubenko, L. and P. Kravchuk (2021) "Analytical report: Ukrainian labour migration to the EU" and Ohliger, R. (2022) "A new era for refugee and asylum policy?".

25 "Compared to 2013, the level of sympathy towards Ukrainians among Poles, for example, has decreased by 20%. Indeed, 2019 saw a staggering increase in the number of xenophobic attacks against Ukrainians in Poland, from 30 to 1,906. In Hungary and, most recently, Romania, the situation is also worsening in this regard, with instances of xenophobia towards third-country nationals reported" (Dubenko, L. and P. Kravchuk (2021) "Analytical report: Ukrainian labour migration to the EU" and Ohliger, R. (2022) "A new era for refugee and asylum policy?".

26 According to an analysis by World Vision International, "Messaging that could stoke anti-refugee tensions is already being spread in Romania, Moldova, Poland and across Central and Eastern Europe. Whilst not a major issue yet, tensions are beginning to develop in some host countries. Children may face risks such as verbal and physical abuse between refugee and host communities, human trafficking and more as early as February 2023", in World Vision International (2022) "Warm welcomes, lurking tensions: Vital lessons from the global south for countries hosting refugees from Ukraine", World Vision website. See also Nikolov, K. and M. Hudac (2022) "Resentment for Ukrainian refugees grows in central and eastern Europe", Euractiv website, 12 May. On disinformation campaigns see Neidhardt, A.-H. (2022) "Disinformation about refugees from Ukraine: Start preparing today for the lies of tomorrow", European Policy Centre website, 23 March.

27 On the Ukraine crisis and protracted crisis see Zupi, M. (CeSPI) (2022) FOCUS Migrazioni internazionali, Osservatorio quadrimestrale n. 1/2022, January to April.

28 See Pastore, F. (FIERI) (2021) "Protracted displacement e dis-integrazione: un problema europeo", CeSPI website.

29 "In neighbouring countries, but increasingly also within the EU, 'protracted refugee situations' are established, in which entire communities of refugees are forced to live for long periods in marginal and precarious conditions". It is necessary to be "[...] aware of the expanding phenomenon of migrant masses for whom the way back is impractical, re-migration prohibited and integration on the ground unattainable. Irregular and submerged immigrants, due to economic crisis and social networks, essential but unrecognised, [...] This will transform us into a society even more hierarchised according to origin (perhaps not even their own, but their parents' or even grandparents') and skin colour. A society that, as a result, would end up being not only more unjust, but also far less dynamic and resilient", *ibid.*

30 See Beck, U. (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (Sage Publications); Ericson, R. V. and K. D. Haggerty (1997) *Policing the Risk Society* (University of Toronto Press); Caplan, P. (2000) "Introduction: Risk revisited", in P. Caplan (ed.), *Risk Revisited* (Pluto Press); Giddens, A. (2002) *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives* (Profile

Books); Klein, N. (2007) *The Shock Doctrine* (Penguin).

31 Beck, U. and E. Grande (2006) *L'Europa cosmopolita. Società e politica nella seconda modernità* (Carocci).

32 Some media outlets have denounced how Russian-linked Wagner group mercenaries are fomenting irregular migration from Libya to influence the political vote in Italy: Kilner, J. and N. Squires (2022) "Russian-linked Wagner mercenaries try to destabilise Italy with migrant influx", *Telegraph*, 30 July.

33 "[...] only a few months ago, Poland's imposition of a state of emergency, creating a no-go area along the border with Belarus, building a wall and reportedly pushing back refugees and migrants in response to the attempts of several thousand refugees and migrants from Asia and the Middle East to access the EU in a deliberate scheme by Belarusian President Lukashenko", in Frouws, B. (2022) "When war hit Ukraine. Reflections on what it might mean for refugee, asylum and migration policies in Europe".

34 "(...) we have to make sure not to forget about others: Afghanistan was a major focus not long ago after the Taliban take-over in August 2021; there is a devastating drought in the Horn of Africa (possibly even exacerbated directly by soaring wheat prices, as Ukraine is Europe's biggest wheat exporter); ongoing armed conflict in Yemen, South Sudan, Myanmar; the crisis in the Sahel or the Central African Republic. A fall in the focus on and funding for any of these crises, is likely to contribute to further instability and even more forced displacement originating from these areas", in Frouws, B. (2022) "When war hit Ukraine. Reflections on what it might mean for refugee, asylum and migration policies in Europe."

35 "Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/1366 of 23 September 2020 on an EU mechanism for preparedness and management of crises related to migration", EUR-Lex website.

36 "For years, the EU and many individual member states have taken a strong 'reception in the region' position, arguing refugees should be primarily hosted by neighbouring safe countries and discouraging and preventing onward movement. Ministers across Europe who are responsible for migration and asylum have now been consistent in this policy and made it explicit that in this crisis Europe is the region and as such they will accept and host Ukrainian refugees. However, one question will still be how far into Western Europe the concept of 'region' applies", in Frouws, B. (2022) "When war hit Ukraine. Reflections on what it might mean for refugee, asylum and migration policies in Europe".

37 See, for example: Pastore, F. (2022) "Solidarity and strategic resilience: The EU facing the Ukrainian exodus"; Frouws, B. (2022) "When war hit Ukraine. Reflections on what it might mean for refugee, asylum and migration policies in Europe"; Martín, I. (2022) "The war in Ukraine: A migration crisis like no other", Policy Center for the New South website, 11 March; Diab, J. L. (2022) "What Ukraine, Afghanistan and Syria have taught us about the political will behind international refugee law", Refugee Law Initiative, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 3 May; Global Detention Project (2022) "The Ukraine crisis double standards: Has Europe's response to refugees changed?", press release, 2 March; Pettrachin, A. and L. H. Abdou (2022) "Explaining the remarkable shift in European responses to refugees following Russia's invasion of Ukraine", LSE website, 9 March; "Poland/Belarus: New evidence of abuses highlights 'hypocrisy' of unequal treatment of asylum seekers", Amnesty International website, 11 April; and recently the investigation by CNN on the Roma people case: Kottasová, I. (2022) "Roma refugees fleeing war in Ukraine say they are suffering discrimination and prejudice", 7 August, CNN website.

38 "Future discussions on funding may see a decreased willingness from Europe to host any other refugees from other regions in the world, including through official resettlement. Crises persist beyond Ukraine, and so will forced displacement, and Europe's new reality could have serious consequences for many refugees around the world", in Frouws, B. (2022) "When war hit Ukraine. Reflections on what it might mean for refugee, asylum and migration policies in Europe".

39 See "First step in the gradual implementation of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum: modus operandi of a voluntary solidarity mechanism", French Presidency of the Council of the European Union website, 22 June 2022; see also some comments in *L'accordo volontario tra 21 paesi europei per la ricollocazione dei migranti*, FOCSIV website, 12 July 2022; and ANSA (2022) "Italy salutes 'first concrete step' on migrant relocation system", Info Migrants website, 8 August.

40 "How the EU responds to crises and builds resilience", European Council website.

41 European Council meeting (16 December 2021) – Conclusions.

42 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24010/nexus-st09383en17.pdf>.

43 Stocchiero, A. (2022) "Can the integration plan lead to greater coherence in EU migration policy?", *The Progressive Post*, 7 January.

44 "As early as mid-March, for example, Andrzej Wnuk, the Mayor of the eastern Polish city of Zamość which has been hit hard by the high numbers of refugees, warned that the country would see a dramatic drop in willingness to accept refugees if they were left to cope with the situation on their own without financial support", in Ohliger, R. (2022) "A new era for refugee and asylum policy?"

45 See as an example the Italian National Strategy for "Inner Areas".

46 See Dennison, J. (2021) "Strategic communication for migration policymakers: Lessons from the state of the science".

47 On Ukrainian demographic trends, migration and remittances, see Shnyrkov, O., V. Mazurenko and R. Stakanov (2021) "Labour migration from Ukraine under the global economic turbulence", *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies*, 7(2). In turn, Viacheslav Pylypenko highlights the loss of human capital, especially young people, the brain drain, the reduction of tax revenues and the deterioration of the pension fund, in Pylypenko, P. (2018) "Socio-economic consequences of labour migration in Ukraine", *International Journal of Innovative Technologies in Economy*. Regarding remittances, World Bank data indicate that they exceeded \$19 billion in 2021, or more than 8% GDP, while foreign direct investment, much more volatile over time, was \$6 billion, in Zupi, M. (CeSPI) (2022) "FOCUS Migrazioni internazionali"; remittances are even expected to increase in 2022 – war in fact mobilises diasporas in supporting the security of the population in the country of origin: "Remittances to reach \$630 billion in 2022 with record flows into Ukraine", press release, World Bank, 11 May 2022.

48 Shnyrkov, O., V. Mazurenko and R. Stakanov (2021) "Labour migration from Ukraine under the global economic turbulence". With regard to the economic and political structure, Iryna Lapshyna points out that the high degree of corruption and lack of trust in institutions is a contributing factor to emigration, in Lapshyna, I. (2014) "Corruption as a driver of migration aspirations: The case of Ukraine", *Economics and Sociology*, 7(4): 113-127.

49 See the growth of social mobilisation of diasporas in Poland even before the Russian invasion in 2022, in Fomina, J. (2017) "Economic migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: A view from Poland", in A. Pikulicka-Wilczewska and G. Uehling, *Migration and the Ukraine Crisis: A Two-Country Perspective* (Bristol: E-International Relations).

50 Regarding the concept of root causes, the following reflection by Bram Frouws (2022, "When war hit Ukraine. Reflections on what it might mean for refugee, asylum and migration policies in Europe") is worth quoting: "In recent years, there has been a strong focus on and narrative in EU and US policies on the so-called root causes of migration and displacement. As argued in an earlier Op-Ed, in addition to other issues, one problem with this focus is a certain dishonesty given that many of the real root causes are in fact conveniently forgotten or ignored. Arguably, the dependency of Western countries on oil and gas and the massive income this provides to exporting states, gives Western countries less manoeuvring space and is used by exporting states to finance conflict and war (for example in the case of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and now with Russia in Ukraine), causing forced displacement. There is now a strong push in the US, UK and the EU to reduce the dependency on Russian oil and gas. Perhaps this will create the momentum to more broadly and rapidly reduce the dependency on fossil fuels from all states involved in conflict and human rights violations, as such addressing a major root cause of displacement and speeding up investments in renewable energy sources, with a positive effect on the environment too".

About the author



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Andrea Stocchiero is senior researcher at CeSPI (the Study Centre for International Politics). He is an economist with 30 years of professional experience in development, migration and international economics. He has deepened the knowledge on the migration and development nexus and on European Union policies with countries of origin and transit. He has released several publications on development cooperation and migration. In 2021 he edited the CeSPI book *Italy and Europe Between Migratory Policies and Integration Processes* (Donzelli Editore).



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The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) is the think tank of the progressive political family at EU level. Its mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform progressive politics and policies across Europe.

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ABSTRACT

This policy brief sums up the main findings of an international roundtable to discuss the future of the European Union asylum policies after the war in Ukraine.

The roundtable took place in Como, Italy, from 7 to 9 October 2022. It was organised by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Italian Office, the Fondation Jean Jaures and the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), in conjunction with the German-Italian Centre for the European Dialogue, Villa Vigore.

The objective of the workshop was to promote an essential and timely debate on the political pathways through which the EU can shape its asylum and migration policies, avoiding previous imbalances and injustices.

Thanks also to a preliminary background paper, "War in Ukraine, refugees, inclusion and human mobility: The challenges for a progressive European Union policy" (A. Stochiero, September 2022, CeSPI), the high-level debate underlined different critical aspects and agreed upon some relevant recommendations in order to enrich a progressive policy agenda regarding the EU migration and asylum policies in the medium and long term.

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between objectivity and
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know a cycle of semi-automated
of an eye, a new generation of
during users to actively
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


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