




# COVID-19 CRISIS

## IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS FOR EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

COUNTRY STUDY

**FRANCE**

December 2022





# PREFACE

This country case study is an integral part of the project COVID-19 crisis: implications and lessons for European social democracy, which the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) conducted in collaboration with the Instituto Cattaneo in Bologna and successfully completed with the invaluable help of Kieskompas in Amsterdam. As a report, this is one of six documents supplementing a comparative study, completed to offer a detailed perspective on France.

At its inception in 2020, the founders' ambition was to investigate citizens' attitudes during and after the pandemic. As COVID-19 continued, the two waves of the survey put in the field by Dynata simply captured the opinions in two respective moments—December 2020/January 2021 and October/November 2021—showing how perspectives fluctuated during the profound crisis. All the partners involved in this project wanted to dive deep to gain a comprehensive picture; thus, the survey was comprised of 13 sociodemographic and 63 thematic questions. These allowed for the segmentation of the vast data, which was collected in a sample of 1,000 citizens twice in six countries (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden, and Poland). Thanks to cross-tabulations and analyses of the overlap of the vote propensity, it was possible to extract very specific answers regarding the trends among diverse groups. There was a special focus on the opinions held by the voters and sympathizers of the centre-left, of course. And, in this spirit, the next pages and the section entitled Key Findings are meant to serve as a piece of policy advice.

After the first wave, FEPS and FES took some time to discuss the initial results internally as well as with circles of experts from the six countries in question. The objective of these discussions was to put the findings in a country-specific context and explain both similarities and points of divergence when making an overall comparison. These debates took place during closed round tables consisting of Members of National Parliaments, Members of the European Parliaments, academics, trade unionists, civil society experts, party strategists and pollsters, youth representatives, and publicists. The organisers remain incredibly grateful to all these individuals for their time, enthusiasm, and input. It is not possible to name them all, as the total number surpassed 200. That said, we would like to mention our gratitude towards the organisations that helped with these events, especially the Centrum im. Ignacego Daszyńskiego, Olof Palme International Center, Foundation Pablo Iglesias, Foundation Rafael Campalans, as well as the respective FES regional Offices in Madrid, Stockholm, Warsaw, Paris, and Rome. The insights gained were invaluable and relevant for this country's case study and the comparative study.

With this in mind, we are eager to present you with this study, thanking again Instituto Cattaneo (including Salvatore Vassallo, Moreno Mancuso, and Federico Vegetti) for all the cooperation in designing the questionnaire and obtaining the data; Dynata for conducting the two waves of surveys; Kieskompas (including André Krouwel and Yordan Kutiyski) whose team engaged with us in several rounds and then completed these important documents. Finally, we would like to thank our colleagues, especially Celine Guedes (FEPS) and Adrianna Hornung (FES), who shouldered all the organizational load.

**Dr Ralf Hexel**  
*Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*

**Dr Ania Skrzypek**  
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
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# SUMMARY

## FATIGUE AND CRITICISM ON BOTH THE LEFT AND RIGHT



- 1) The COVID-19 pandemic has deepened political and societal divisions in Europe and France is no exception, as evidenced by the data analyses presented in this country report. It is notable that many respondents' opinions did not change substantially between 2020 and 2021.
- 2) While support for the anti-pandemic measures remained relatively stable, most French citizens grew more critical of the general handling of the pandemic, including public spending. There was no substantial erosion of institutional trust between 2020 and 2021; however, respondents perceived a deepening of social divisions and their concern about climate change increased.
- 3) The opinions of voters for specific parties and different demographic groups remained largely the same from one year to the other. On pandemic-related matters and overall satisfaction with governance, voters that support the governing party La République en marche (LREM), were joined by supporters of the Parti socialiste (PS) and Les Républicains parties in having the highest levels of satisfaction with the way the pandemic was handled, the highest degree of institutional trust, and the highest likelihood of following the recommendations of the government in relation to the pandemic.
- 4) Voters of the radical parties Rassemblement National (RN) and La France Insoumise (LFI) are particularly critical of the way the government has been handling the pandemic, as well as with French politics at large. While it is clear that RN voters have different, more conservative and government-critical, opinions compared to the rest of the electorate, it comes as a surprise that LFI voters hold very similar views to those of RN loyalists when it comes to the pandemic.
- 5) Another pattern that emerges from the findings is that many dissatisfied French citizens do not have a clear ideological persuasion: they identify with neither the left nor the right. This group of voters is predominantly represented within the RN and Les Verts electorate. Meanwhile, voters with centre-right or purely centrist orientations are much more likely to be supportive of government policies and the way society operates in general.
- 6) When it comes to demographics, the most cynical and politically distrustful respondents can be found among citizens with lower levels of education and income difficulties. Such respondents are much more distrustful, anti-immigration, anti-climate policy, and generally dissatisfied with governance than other demographic groups. Citizens in these groups are also more likely to be opposed to immigration, critical of the European Union, and doubtful that climate change will have a serious impact on future generations.
- 7) In terms of age, older generations reported being more severely and negatively impacted by the pandemic, specifically as related to deteriorating living and working conditions. Moreover, this age group also has a much higher degree of support for COVID-19 mitigation measures.
- 8) In sum, the data indicates that there are many different and often polarised opinions in France. The French public is growing increasingly critical of their government, has a relatively low degree of institutional trust, is divided regarding their country's membership in the EU, believes that immigrants are a benefit to society, and are concerned about climate change.

# DATA AND METHODS





This country report offers an in-depth overview of public opinion in France by comparing the stances of various demographic and political groups. Respondents were segmented by gender, age, educational attainment, economic well-being, and ideological orientation. Most importantly, voter groups were identified based on respondents' current vote intention. Comparing citizen categories allows policy-makers and political campaigners alike to make informed decisions when targeting specific population groups.

The results compare how the aforementioned groups of respondents answered the various closed-ended survey questions. Questions on the same topic (e.g., support for measures against the COVID-19 pandemic) that use a scale rather than ordinal answer categories were used to create indices after a reliability analysis was performed to confirm that they measure the same concept. For these indices, the mean scores for each respondent group were estimated; the groups were subsequently plotted on two-dimensional scatterplots comprised of two indices. Again, the average mean scores between the two waves were calculated for each voter group.

Two waves of survey data in six countries: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden, were collected by Dynata, in coordination with the Cattaneo institute, in December 2020/January 2021 and October/November 2021, respectively. In France, the first wave comprises a sample of 1,002 respondents, the second wave of 1,006 respondents, representative of the demographic composition and political preferences of the French population. The questionnaires used in both waves contained largely overlapping questions, allowing for an over-time comparison of public opinion on various socioeconomic issues. Given that there were very minor opinion differences between the two waves for items included in both survey iterations, the average percentage and mean scores for these questions are reported, with several exceptions. The following questions were only asked in the first wave of the survey and, therefore, only results from this wave are reported:

- There are different views on how the national government balanced, in the short run, protecting jobs and protecting public health when responding to the coronavirus pandemic.
- There are different views on how the national government balanced preserving public health and preserving individual freedom when responding to the coronavirus pandemic.
- Some hope to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as soon as possible, others believe that it would be risky to get vaccinated. If the health authorities provide you an opportunity to get vaccinated, how likely is it that you will do so?
- Have you installed the national contact tracing app TousAntiCOVID on your smartphone?

In addition, several questions were only included in the second wave of the questionnaire and, therefore, only results from this wave were reported:

- Some people argue that the COVID-19 vaccination should be mandatory for everyone to stop the pandemic, others that people should always be free to choose whether to get vaccinated or not.
- Compared to the end of 2020, do you think that your own economic situation...
- And thinking about the next 12 months, do you think that your own economic situation...

The indices measuring conspiracy belief, populist sentiments, and the question asking respondents to evaluate the "NextGenerationEU" plan were also included in the second wave only; therefore, only this second wave data is analyzed for these items.

# CHAPTER 1

## WOMEN, YOUNG PEOPLE AND LESS EDUCATED AMONG LESS LIKELY TO GET VACCINATED




**Likelihood of and Concern about Contracting the Virus**

Despite the danger posed by COVID-19, the majority of French citizens (69.6 per cent) did not think it likely that they would contract the virus. Voters of PS and Les Verts were the least likely to expect that they would contract the virus. Les Républicains and LFI voters were more likely to think they would get infected. Broken down by demographic

group, men and those of younger age, along with both higher educated and lower-income individuals, considered it more likely that they would contract the virus. When analysed by ideological group, right-wing and centrist voters were more likely than other groups to consider getting infected with SARS-CoV-2 a possibility. In general, there is little variation between the different demographic groups.


**Figure 1 / Q22 – In your opinion, how likely is it that you will contract COVID-19?**



When it comes to the dangers the virus would pose to individuals' health, it is clear that the majority of French citizens (nearly 80 per cent) are at least slightly concerned. However, voters of the populist RN party differ most from other respondents: less than 42 per cent are very or moderately concerned about the health risk posed by the COVID-19 infection. Over 20 per cent of populist voters are not

at all concerned, similar to other party supporters. Respondents who are female, of older age (particularly aged 55 and above), left-wing, or centrist are the most concerned about the health risks posed by COVID-19. Differences in income and education do not result in clear-cut opinion differences on this risk.

Figure 2 / Q23 – How concerned are you that a COVID infection might endanger your health?




**Evaluations of Government Policy against the Pandemic**

Less than half of French citizens deem the government response to the pandemic balanced (43.2 per cent). There is substantial criticism on the matter: more than 30 per cent of those surveyed think that government measures did not take protecting jobs sufficiently into account, while 25 per cent think that the government should have taken stronger measures to protect public health. Voters of moderate and left-wing parties are over-

whelmingly supportive of the government policies, while LFI, RN, and Les Verts voters are most critical of the government policy and think more should have been done to protect jobs. In terms of demographics, younger people, people with lower levels of education, and those struggling the most with their finances, who were arguably hardest hit by the pandemic, are most likely to think that the government should have put more focus on protecting jobs.

**Figure 3 / Q38 – Government balance – jobs or public health**

- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to protect public health instead of jobs
- They got the balance about right
- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to protect jobs instead of public health




A similar pattern emerges when looking at how citizens view the government response as a trade-off between preserving people's freedom and protecting public health: a sizable minority of 43.3 per cent of French respondents consider that the balance was about right, while nearly 30 per cent think freedoms were unduly restrictive. In contrast, 26 per cent think the restrictions should have been more

far-reaching. Again, moderate voters in the political centre and on the left are the most supportive of the restrictive measures, while those on the extremes, particularly RN and LFI voters, think that freedoms were unduly restricted. Younger citizens, people with lower levels of education, and those in more precarious financial situations were most likely to think that freedoms were unduly restricted.

Figure 4 / Q39 – Government balance – freedoms or public health

- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to contain the pandemic that unduly restricted people's freedom
- They got the balance about right
- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to preserve people's freedom that irresponsibly worsened the public health




**Likelihood of Getting Vaccinated**

At the time the survey was conducted, 42 per cent of the respondents stated that they would get vaccinated if health authorities offered them the opportunity to do so. This number is lower than the current vaccination rate in France, which stands at about 76 per cent. Similar to the trends reported above, voters for centrist and governing parties were the most likely to say that they would get vaccinated, while a clear majority of about 70 per cent of LFI

voters and slightly more than 60 per cent of RN voters stated they would not do so. Somewhat surprising, women were much less likely than men to say they would get vaccinated. More in line with previous findings, younger respondents are substantially less likely to say they would vaccinate than older generations. Similarly, respondents with lower levels of educational attainment, those with lower incomes, and those with no ideological persuasion were also more likely to say they would get vaccinated.

**Figure 5 / Q52 – Likelihood of getting vaccinated**




**The Impact of COVID-19 on Quality of Life and Working Conditions**

There is very little variation among the different population segments when it comes to the impact of the pandemic on the quality of people’s lives: nearly 70 per cent of French respondents report that they have been affected negatively. Still, Les Verts voters and LFI voters

have felt the most negative impact on their lives. Older people experienced a higher degree of life quality deterioration, along with those with lower incomes. Left-wing and right-wing citizens also report having been more negatively impacted by the pandemic compared to political moderates and those with centrist ideological persuasion.

**Figure 6 / Q74 – Overall - how would you assess the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the quality of your life?**






Many French respondents report that their working conditions were unaffected by the pandemic (48.9 per cent). Nevertheless, left-wing voters report a much more substantial deterioration of their working conditions compared to the

more centrist LREM and Les Républicains voters. Those reporting to have been most negatively affected by the pandemic are younger respondents, lower-income individuals, and those with higher levels of educational attainment.

Figure 7 / Q75 – How would you assess the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on your working conditions?




**COVID-19 Contact Tracing App**

A rather underwhelming proportion of respondents have installed France’s national contact tracing app (TousAntiCovid) – a mere 26.5 per cent. Voters of the governing party LREM and PS voters were the most likely to have installed the app

compared to other voter groups. LFI, RN, and smaller party voters, younger people, and those with precarious economic conditions were less likely to have installed the contact tracing app. Moreover, voters with no ideological orientation are the least likely to have installed the contact tracing app.

**Figure 8 / Q61 – Have you installed on your smartphone the national contact tracing app (TousAntiCovid)?**




### Mandatory Vaccination

When it comes to mandatory vaccinations, it is clear that the majority of the French population favours some sort of enforced vaccination. Still 40.6 per cent of respondents are opposed to any vaccination mandate. LFI, RN, and PS voters are the least supportive of mandatory vaccinations, while

LREM voters are most in favour. When it comes to demographics, men and older respondents are most supportive of mandatory vaccinations, while those with income difficulties and no political ideology are most opposed to any kind of vaccination mandate. There are no clear differences on the matter when it comes to different levels of education.

Figure 9 / Q21G – Mandatory vaccination

- COVID-19 vaccination should be mandatory for everyone
- COVID-19 vaccination should be mandatory to access public places and social activities
- People should be able to choose whether to get vaccinated against COVID-19 or not without consequences




**Public Perception, Institutional Trust, and Support for COVID-19 Measures**

The Support for COVID-19 Mitigation Measures Index comprises five separate questions; respondents were asked to evaluate the measures various institutions have taken to respond to the pandemic. The institutional trust index is generated from six separate questions that ask respondents to what extent they trust various national and international institutions on a 10-point scale, where 0 means “no trust at all” and 10 means “complete trust”. All questions used in the scatterplots are asked with a 10-point scale answer category. For all indices included in the country report, lower scores indicate a low level of support or agreement with what is measured, while higher scores account for a high level of support. In sum, a lower institutional trust index score signifies a lower degree of institu-

tional trust. The average values of numerous respondent groups are reported in a two-dimensional scatterplot with the various population segmentations based on age, gender, educational attainment, difficulty coping with income, political orientation, and party support.

There is a clear linear relationship between the two indices: the more institutionally trustful respondents are, the more likely they are to support COVID-19 mitigation measures. In particular, voters of the moderate centrist and the left-wing parties, those with higher levels of education, and those with higher incomes are most supportive of the measures against the pandemic and also have the highest levels of institutional trust, along with voters from the older generation. On the other hand, RN voters and the respondents in the most precarious economic situations

**Figure 10 – Support für Covid Measures**



have substantially lower degrees of trust and are less likely to support COVID-19 measures compared to voters of the left-wing parties and the LREM, the highly educated, and the financially well-off.

When it comes to perceptions of who has benefitted from public spending during the pandemic, it is clear that left-

wing respondents, LFI voters, and those on the lowest steps of the economic ladder perceive that the wealthiest have benefitted the most from public spending for economic recovery. Ideologically right-wing respondents and voters of LREM and Les Républicains are less likely to believe that public spending has benefitted the wealthiest. However, it is important to note that the question on the


Figure 11 – Beneficiaries of Public Spending



vertical axis is a 10-point scale and all respondent groups in the graph score above the mean of the scale. This suggests that the public is rather dissatisfied with the handling of public spending during the pandemic. There is a general and widespread perception that the pandemic increased existing societal inequalities.

When it comes to the perception that pandemic mitigation measures go against constitutional and democratic principles, it is clear that the French population is divided on the matter. Clearly, LFI voters are the outlier again, together with those struggling with their income, respondents aged 35 to 44, and those in the political centre. However, many

Figure 12 – Covid Measures and Constitutional Rules



respondent groups have a rather moderate position on the matter. Respondents older than 65, those comfortable with their income, people with higher levels of educational at-

tainment, as well as those that support the governing party are the least likely to think that the government's response to the pandemic was unconstitutional and anti-democratic.

Figure 13 – Covid and Divisions Among People





Figure 14





All respondent groups agree that the pandemic has deepened the divisions among people, evidenced by their higher than average score on the vertical axis. RN voters and respondents with economic difficulties are most likely to agree with the proposition, while LREM voters, those voting for moderate parties, and respondents on the ideological left are least likely to agree.

When it comes to the differences between the results in the two waves, we report how the mean values for each index changed for each sociodemographic respondent group. There is a clear pattern: more respondent groups

agreed more strongly in 2021 compared to 2020 that the pandemic has deepened divisions between people. Support for the COVID-19 measures also increased among nearly all voter groups, with the exception of respondents experiencing financial difficulties, whose support plummeted in a steep decline. Nevertheless, there was an increase in the degree of belief that the measures are undemocratic and that inequalities have increased. The decline of such perceptions is only among respondent groups who already had negative perceptions towards the anti-COVID-19 measures, such as LFI voters, and to a lesser degree, among centrists.

## KEY FINDINGS 1

- Although the majority of French respondents understand the COVID-19 pandemic has a serious impact on public health, society is rather polarized when it comes to the government's pandemic response and vaccination campaign.
- The vast majority of French respondents was concerned that the virus would endanger their health if they were to get sick, and many considered it likely that they would contract the virus. Voters of Les Républicains and LFI were the least likely to be concerned about the virus.
- About 40 per cent French respondents consider the government to have taken appropriate measures to protect public health, regardless of the impact these measures had on the economy and personal freedoms. Less educated respondents and those with economic difficulties, along with RN and LFI voters, were the most critical of the anti-pandemic measures.
- Despite of the relatively high vaccination rate in France, the results derived from the data indicate that most French respondents were not willing to get vaccinated. Only a majority of LREM, PS, and Les Républicains reported a willingness to vaccinate, while RN and LFI voters were least likely to say they would do so. When it comes to demographic groups, women, younger people, the lower educated and those with income difficulties and no political ideology are among the respondents less likely to get vaccinated.
- When it comes to deterioration of quality of life and working conditions in relation to the pandemic, the majority of the French public reported a negative effect, particularly on their quality of life. Meanwhile, less than half of respondents reported their working conditions remained largely the same. It is clear that the pandemic had a very negative impact on most French citizens. Both the lifestyle and work conditions deteriorated especially for younger respondents, those on the bottom of the economic ladder, as well as Les Verts and LFI voters.
- The majority of French respondents believe that there should be some form of mandatory vaccination, at least when it comes to accessing public events. LFI voters, younger respondents, and those with income difficulties are most likely to oppose mandatory vaccinations.
- The more institutionally trustful respondents are, the more likely they are to support COVID-19 mitigation measures. In particular, LREM voters and voters of the centre-right parties, those with centrist political ideologies, and people with higher incomes are most supportive of the measures against the pandemic and also have the highest levels of institutional trust.
- The perception that pandemic mitigation measures go against constitutional and democratic principles is a divisive matter. LFI and RN voters and those struggling with their income are most likely to believe that the government's pandemic response measures have taken democratic freedoms away.
- Nearly all respondent groups agreed to a larger extent in 2021 than in 2020 that the pandemic has deepened divisions between people.

## CHAPTER 2


# LFI AND RN VOTERS SUSCEPTIBLE TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES



The proposition stating that “the virus is a biological weapon intentionally released by China” has the largest degree of support among French respondents compared to other pandemic-related conspiracy theories: 41.5 per cent of those surveyed state that they believe in this theory. RN voters are most likely to agree with the proposi-

tion, while LREM and Les Verts voters are least likely to do so. Women, respondents aged 35 to 44, those with less education, those most precarious in terms of income, as well as respondents with right-wing ideologies are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory than other groups.


Figure 15 / Q57XB – “The virus is a biological weapon released by China”



Another conspiracy theory addressed in this survey is the proposition that “5G technology is causing the coronavirus to more quickly”. This theory has a low degree of support: 11.4 per cent of those surveyed state that they believe in the theory. LFI voters are most likely to agree with the proposition, while LREM and Les Républicains

voters are least likely to do so. Middle-aged respondents, those with less education, those least able to cope with their income, as well as respondents with left-wing ideologies are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory compared to respondents from other demographic groups.


Figure 16 / Q57XB – “5G technology is causing the coronavirus to spread more quickly”



The proposition stating that “the virus is a biological weapon intentionally released by China” has the largest degree of support among French respondents compared to other pandemic-related conspiracy theories: 41.5 per cent of those surveyed state that they believe in this theory. RN voters are most likely to agree with the proposi-

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
**Figure 17/Q57XB – “The virus has been spread by multinational pharmaceutical companies so they can make huge profits by selling the vaccine”**



The proposition stating that “the coronavirus is a hoax” has the lowest degree of support; only 10.3 per cent of those surveyed doubt that the virus is a genuine threat. LFI and PS voters and supporters of smaller parties are most likely to agree with the proposition, while LREM and Les Républicains voters are least likely to think that

COVID-19 is a hoax. Middle-aged respondents, those with lower levels of educational attainment, those having difficulty coping with their income, as well as respondents with left-wing ideologies are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory compared to other demographic groups.

Figure 18 / Q57XB – “The coronavirus is a hoax”



## KEY FINDINGS 2

- Given that conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic were prevalent during the first two years of the pandemic, it comes as no surprise that a large proportion of French citizens profess that certain conspiracy theories are true.
- LFI and RN party voters are notably more likely to believe in conspiracy theories than other voter groups, along with less educated respondents and those with income difficulties.
- Two conspiracy theories (that the virus was intentionally released by China and that it is spread by pharmaceutical corporations on purpose) have the largest degree of support among the French public: 42 and 32 per cent, respectively.
- A substantial number of respondents also agree with the two other conspiracy theories, even though one would expect otherwise, given their very unlikely propositions: 11 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that 5G technology helps the virus spread more quickly and 10 per cent agreed with the statement that the coronavirus is a hoax.
- Contrary to popular belief, the data suggests that there is a widespread belief in conspiracy theories in France. These findings could indicate that, in times of crisis, public opinion is more susceptible to suggestive messages disseminated by populists and organizations with potentially anti-democratic aims.

# CHAPTER 3

## YOUNG RESPONDENTS AMONG THE MOST PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ECONOMIC PROSPECTS





**Changes in Economic Situation between 2020 and 2021**


A large minority of French respondents (44.7 per cent) state that their economic situation has remained the same from 2020 to 2021. Understandably, only 16 per cent state that their situation has improved, while for about 39 per cent of respondents, their economic situation has deteriorated since 2020. People who experienced the largest degree of improvement tended to be PS voters, while the

opposite is true for LFI voters; accordingly, voters whose economic status remained largely stable from 2020 to 2021 were also often PS voters. The proportion of respondents with a deteriorating economic situation is similar among nearly all demographic groups, yet more prominent among older respondents, those with less education, those less comfortable with their incomes, and those with no political ideology.

**Figure 19 / Q27 – Changes in Economic Situation between 2020 and 2021**

Compared to the end of 2020, do you think that your own economic situation ...

■ Got a lot better   
 ■ Got a little better   
 ■ Stayed the same   
 ■ Got a little worse   
 ■ Got a lot worse



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Got a lot better	3,3%	2,2%
Got a little better	10,8%	8,8%
Stayed the same	47,0%	45,5%
Got a little worse	24,6%	26,8%
Got a lot worse	14,3%	16,7%

**Age**

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Got a lot better	6,9%	5,1%	2,0%	2,3%	2,6%	0,5%
Got a little better	16,1%	15,4%	12,4%	8,3%	4,0%	5,4%
Stayed the same	35,4%	44,9%	47,3%	46,4%	48,7%	49,7%
Got a little worse	31,6%	21,0%	22,8%	23,5%	27,8%	29,1%
Got a lot worse	10,0%	13,6%	15,5%	19,5%	17,0%	15,4%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Got a lot better	2,5%	2,5%	3,0%
Got a little better	6,9%	9,5%	11,8%
Stayed the same	44,0%	46,9%	47,2%
Got a little worse	28,0%	26,6%	23,3%
Got a lot worse	18,6%	14,5%	14,6%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Got a lot better	9,1%	1,9%	0,9%	1,1%
Got a little better	15,1%	11,3%	5,6%	3,9%
Stayed the same	53,9%	54,4%	33,5%	19,4%
Got a little worse	14,9%	22,3%	40,1%	22,3%
Got a lot worse	6,9%	10,1%	19,8%	53,2%

**Ideology**

	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Got a lot better	5,1%	2,2%	2,9%	1,6%
Got a little better	11,7%	13,5%	10,9%	6,9%
Stayed the same	46,8%	48,7%	47,3%	44,1%
Got a little worse	24,3%	23,2%	23,9%	28,6%
Got a lot worse	12,1%	12,4%	15,0%	18,8%

**Future Economic Outlook**


When it comes to their economic expectations for the next 12 months, 46.4 per cent of respondents expected that their economic situation would not change. More respondents are pessimistic (33.8 per cent) than optimistic (19.8 per cent). PS voters were the most positive when it

came to their expectations for the coming year, while RN voters were the most negative. Also, older respondents, those with less education, those with more precarious income situations, and left-wing and centrist respondents had the most negative economic expectations for the next 12 months.

**Figure 20 / Q28 – Economic outlook for the next 12 months**

And thinking about the next 12 months, do you think that your own economic situation ...

Will get a lot better   Will get a little better   Will stay the same   Will get a little worse   Will get a lot worse



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Will get a lot better	3,5%	3,4%
Will get a little better	15,5%	11,1%
Will stay the same	45,7%	49,2%
Will get a little worse	24,2%	24,9%
Will get a lot worse	11,2%	11,5%

**Age**

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Will get a lot better	8,0%	8,3%	2,4%	1,8%	0,7%	1,7%
Will get a little better	26,2%	23,5%	14,2%	12,7%	4,5%	4,3%
Will stay the same	43,1%	44,5%	49,6%	47,2%	51,0%	47,8%
Will get a little worse	17,5%	15,2%	21,7%	24,5%	30,2%	33,7%
Will get a lot worse	5,2%	8,6%	12,2%	13,9%	13,7%	12,4%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Will get a lot better	2,3%	3,9%	3,3%
Will get a little better	8,4%	12,6%	17,0%
Will stay the same	45,4%	51,0%	45,1%
Will get a little worse	28,3%	23,9%	23,0%
Will get a lot worse	15,6%	8,7%	11,5%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Will get a lot better	10,0%	2,0%	2,5%	2,4%
Will get a little better	21,0%	13,7%	10,5%	2,8%
Will stay the same	51,2%	53,3%	38,5%	29,0%
Will get a little worse	13,2%	24,2%	32,7%	24,7%
Will get a lot worse	4,6%	6,8%	15,9%	41,1%

**Ideology**


	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Will get a lot better	5,6%	4,5%	2,5%	2,4%
Will get a little better	12,8%	20,9%	13,0%	11,6%
Will stay the same	47,6%	44,9%	51,4%	45,0%
Will get a little worse	27,8%	25,4%	19,6%	26,4%
Will get a lot worse	6,2%	4,3%	13,5%	14,6%

**Working from Home**

The majority of French respondents (55.7 per cent) had not worked from home the week before the survey was administered in November 2020/November 2021. RN voters were least likely to have worked from home, while LFI

and Les Républicains voters had spent the most time working from home. Respondents who were male, younger, older, had high levels of comfort with their income, and had higher levels of educational attainment were more likely than other groups to work from home.

**Figure 21 / Q9 – “During the last week, how much time have you spent working from home?”**



**Income Situation**


The majority of French citizens (68.4 per cent) report that they live comfortably or cope well with their income. The voter groups experiencing the most economic difficulties are voters of RN and the smaller parties, while LREM, Les

Républicains, and PS voters predominantly reported being financially well-off. Women, respondents with lower levels of educational attainment, and respondents without ideology are the respondent groups most likely to experience economic difficulties.

**Figure 22 / Q12 – Income situation**

Which of these descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?

■ Living comfortably   
 ■ Coping   
 ■ Finding it difficult   
 ■ Finding it very difficult




**Homeownership**

When it comes to homeownership, it is clear that voters of President Macron's LREM and the environmentalist Les Verts are much more likely to own a home outright than voters of RN, PS, and especially LFI. PS voters also comprise the largest proportion of tenants renting from private land-

lords and mortgage homeowners. In terms of demographics, men, respondents aged 55 or older, and those with higher incomes are substantially more likely to own a home outright compared to other respondent groups. Respondents without a clear ideological orientation are substantially less likely to own a home compared to other ideological groups.

**Figure 23 / Q12B – Homeownership**



## KEY FINDINGS 3


- Nearly 70 per cent of French respondents report that their economic situation has stayed the same or improved from 2020 to 2021. LFI and RN voters, as well younger respondents and those with income difficulties are most likely to report a deterioration of their economic situation.
- Frenchmen are divided when it comes to their economic outlook for the upcoming year (2022). RN and LFI voters, older and lower educated respondents have the least positive expectations, whereas PS and LREM voters, along with younger respondents have the most negative expectations.
- When it comes to income, nearly 70 per cent of French respondents report that they live comfortably or at least cope with their current income. LREM and Les Républicains voters are the economically most comfortable voter groups, along with younger and higher educated respondents. RN voters and the voters of smaller parties are most likely to experience income difficulties.
- LREM and Les Verts voters are much more likely to own a home outright compared to other voter groups.
- Income is also a predictor of home ownership: the higher income a person has, the more likely they are to own a home.





## CHAPTER 4

APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION  
IS DEFINED BY VOTERS'  
RESPECTIVE IDEOLOGY, PARTY  
PREFERENCE AND GENDER





**EU Membership**


Less than half of French respondents consider their country's EU membership to be a good thing (41 per cent). Meanwhile, only 24.8 per cent perceive EU membership negatively. The results differ by vote choice, with LREM voters being most positive about France's EU membership.

ship. RN voters and supporters of smaller parties are most likely to think France's EU membership is a bad thing. In terms of demographics, men, the less educated, those with difficulties coping with their income, and right-wing respondents are most likely to perceive France's EU membership as a bad thing.

**Figure 24 / Q20 – Membership in the EU**

Generally speaking, do you think that your national's membership of the EU is ...?

■ A good thing   ■ A bad thing   ■ Neither good nor bad



**Economic Regulation by the State**


In what can be seen as good news for the (moderate) left, a clear majority (84 per cent) of French respondents agree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy. PS and LFI voters agree with this proposition the most; surprisingly, Les Verts voters and those voting for smaller parties agree the least. Men are notably more likely to disagree with the statement, while

women are more in favour of state intervention. Respondents who are younger and have higher levels of education are also more likely to disagree, although the differences between these and other groups are not substantial. Those with lower incomes and a centrist ideological orientation are also more likely to disagree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy.

**Figure 25 / Q41C – State regulation of the economy**

“The state should play a greater role in the regulation of the economy”

Agree strongly    Agree    Disagree    Disagree strongly



**Science Scepticism**


When it comes to distrust in science, a common sentiment among citizens critical of the way the COVID-19 pandemic is handled, there is a strong trend: more than 49 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement “people don’t realise just how flawed a lot of scientific research really is”, while

only 11 per cent disagreed. The proportion of respondents who agreed with the statement comprises a majority across all voter groups, with the largest proportion among LFI and RN voters and the lowest among LREM and again LFI voters. There are very few differences between the various demographic groups when it comes to this statement.

**Figure 26 / Q53 – Science Scepticism**

“People don’t realize how flawed a lot of scientific research really is”

Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Strongly disagree	3,6%	2,2%
Disagree	10,1%	6,5%
Neither agree nor disagree	38,0%	42,1%
Agree	32,6%	33,6%
Strongly agree	15,7%	15,6%

**Age**

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Strongly disagree	5,5%	5,9%	3,3%	4,4%	1,0%	1,3%
Disagree	7,3%	7,2%	6,3%	7,2%	9,8%	10,3%
Neither agree nor disagree	41,1%	35,1%	41,2%	40,2%	40,4%	42,2%
Agree	33,3%	36,4%	30,4%	33,5%	33,0%	32,9%
Strongly agree	12,8%	18,4%	18,8%	14,7%	15,8%	13,3%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Strongly disagree	3,0%	2,2%	3,5%
Disagree	6,8%	7,9%	9,8%
Neither agree nor disagree	43,8%	40,5%	36,8%
Agree	31,9%	34,5%	32,6%
Strongly agree	14,5%	14,9%	17,2%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Strongly disagree	4,9%	1,9%	2,6%	4,8%
Disagree	11,7%	8,8%	5,9%	5,2%
Neither agree nor disagree	38,6%	39,8%	39,0%	39,3%
Agree	30,3%	34,7%	36,3%	30,9%
Strongly agree	14,4%	14,8%	16,3%	19,8%


**Ideology**

	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Strongly disagree	4,9%	2,7%	3,7%	1,3%
Disagree	10,9%	7,7%	11,2%	4,4%
Neither agree nor disagree	38,4%	45,7%	34,4%	44,0%
Agree	32,2%	27,7%	34,5%	34,2%
Strongly agree	13,5%	16,2%	16,3%	16,1%

Many respondents are also concerned about the influence of scientists in society, although the proportion here is smaller: 40.4 per cent of those surveyed agree with the proposition compared to 25 per cent who disagree; about

35 per cent neither agree nor disagree with the proposition. The voters of RN, LFI, and smaller parties are more worried, while LREM and Les Républicains voters are least likely to be worried about the influence of scientists in society.

Figure 27 / Q53 – “I am concerned by the amount of influence that scientists have in society”




### Opinions on Gender Inequality

When it comes to traditional gender roles when jobs are scarce, there is overwhelming opposition to this proposition across the French public at large: 58 per cent of respondents (strongly) disagree with the proposition. Nevertheless, voters of the left-wing parties, PS and LFI, along with smaller party voters, are most likely to agree with prioritising

male over female employment. In terms of demographics, men, middle-aged respondents, younger respondents, and those with lower levels of education are more likely to agree with the statement. Interestingly, with regard to political orientation, left-wing voters seem very torn on the issue, with a relatively high proportion agreeing strongly in addition to a relatively high proportion disagreeing strongly!

Figure 28 / Q64 – “Men should have more right to work than women when jobs are scarce”




**Support for Immigration, Opinions on Climate Change, Populism, and the NextGenerationEU Program**

The Support for Immigration Index is comprised of two separate scales, which asked respondents whether immigrants are a benefit to the country’s economic development and whether they culturally enrich the country. The Institutional Trust Index is comprised of six separate questions that ask respondents to what extent they trust various national and international institutions (please see the

section on methodology for more information). The average values of numerous respondent groups are reported in a two-dimensional scatterplot.

Those most supportive of immigration in France are as follows: ideologically left-wing respondents; those without clear ideological orientation; voters of LFI, PS, LREM, and Les Verts; and young respondents. In contrast, RN voters, respondents in the ideological centre, and those most struggling with income are least supportive of immigration.


**Figure 29 – Support for Immigration**



A majority of French citizens are seriously concerned about climate change for future generations, as evidenced by the graph above: all respondent groups, including RN voters, score above the average on the scale of concern about climate change. LFI, REM, and Les Verts voters are

most concerned about climate change, as are voters of PS, ideological centrists, and left-wing respondents. Right-wing respondents, those without ideology, RN voters, those with lower educational attainment, and those struggling financially are least concerned about climate change.


Figure 30 – Impact of Climate Change



In terms of change over time, most respondent groups were more concerned about climate change in 2021 than in 2020. Notable exceptions where this concern declined were among centrist respondents and those with higher comfort with their incomes. Meanwhile, institutional trust

declined among many respondent groups, especially in older respondents and those with economic difficulties. Support for immigration has remained relatively stable, increasing among groups who already had a relatively low degree of support for immigration.

Figure 31





A substantial number of French respondents believe in at least one conspiracy theory, as measured by the high average scores (higher than 5 out of 10) on the Conspiracy Theory Belief Index among all respondent groups except for LREM voters. It comes as no surprise that RN voters are

most susceptible to conspiracy theories, along with respondents with income difficulties, no or right-wing ideologies, and rural voters. In contrast, left-wing and centrist respondents and moderate party voters are less likely to believe in conspiracies.


Figure 32 – Belief in Conspiracy Theories



When it comes to populism, as measured by anti-elitist sentiments, it is clear that RN and LFI voters, along with respondents with income difficulties, right-wing ideology, and those aged 65 and above are among the most populist respondent groups. Political centrists, LREM voters,

and respondents aged 18 to 24 are among the least populist demographic groups. Interestingly, PS voters score rather high on the scale, indicating that many PS voters are critical of the political elite.


Figure 33 – Followers of Populism



The 'NextGenerationEU' plan, designed by the European Commission as a strategy for transforming societies and economies in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, enjoys moderate support among the French public. LREM, Les Républicains, and PS voters, and respondents with a left-wing political orientation are the demographic groups

most supportive of the program. Conversely, RN voters, right-wing respondents, and those with economic difficulties and no political ideology are most critical of the plan. This could mean that economically vulnerable groups are concerned that the socioeconomic transformation will have a negative impact on their lives.

Figure 34 – Support NextGenerationEU Plan



## KEY FINDINGS 4


- Although relatively few French respondents perceive their country's EU membership negatively, a substantial proportion are ambivalent towards the EU. LREM and Les Verts voters are the most positive about France's EU membership, while RN and LFI voters and supporters of smaller parties are most likely to think that the country's EU membership is a bad thing.
- A clear majority (84 per cent) of French respondents agree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy. The proportion of those who agree with the statement is higher than 80 per cent for all voter groups, except for smaller party supporters.
- The results suggest that there is a worryingly widespread distrust in science. The voters of LFI and RN are the most distrustful, while LREM and PS voters are most likely to see science positively.
- A very small number of French respondents believe that men should have a job priority when employment positions are scarce. PS and smaller party voters are most likely to agree with the proposition, along with respondents aged 25 to 34.
- Party preference, ideology, and gender are the strongest predictors of support for immigration, with voters of left-wing parties, women, people on the left and those with no ideology being most positive towards immigrants. In contrast, RN voters, respondents with centrist ideology, and respondents who experience difficulty with their income are most likely to oppose immigration.
- All respondents are at least somewhat concerned about climate change, even those traditionally sceptical about the human influence on the climate, such as those with lower levels of educational attainment and right-wing respondents. Nevertheless, citizens are unlikely to accept measures against climate change that will directly impact their economic situation negatively, such as increasing energy prices.
- Belief in conspiracy theories (based on an index containing questions unrelated to the pandemic) is the most widespread among RN voters and respondents with no political ideology. Other demographic variables have little explanatory power for this index, as most demographic groups have a similar degree of conspiracy theory belief. LREM voters are an outlier and are the least likely to believe in conspiracy theories.
- The most populist respondent groups are RN and LFI voters, along with respondents with income difficulties and right-wing ideology. LREM voters, centrists, and younger respondents are the least populist respondent groups in France.
- When it comes to the 'NextGenerationEU' plan, it is clear that it is supported most by centrist and pro-European voters, while RN voters, as well as people with income difficulties, have a rather negative evaluation of the policy program.





## CHAPTER 5

PS AND LES VERTS VOTERS  
IN 2019 ARE AMONG THOSE,  
WHO WILL MOST LIKELY VOTE  
SOMEONE ELSE IN 2024



**Political Ideology**


A very logical and consistent pattern arises from data gathered connecting political orientation to party choice. A third of those with a left-leaning political orientation consider themselves centre-left; similarly, about a third of those with right-leaning political orientation also consider themselves

centre-right. The data also clearly shows that a large proportion of French respondents do not identify with a particular ideology (40 per cent). This is in sharp contrast to the dominant political discourse in which the extremes often dominate; yet, they are clearly a minority group! Interestingly, a relatively small proportion of French respondents (9 per

**Figure 35 / Q71 – Political ideology**

Consider the following labels. Which one best expresses the way you define yourself politically?

Radical Left Left Center-Left Center Center-Right Right Radical Right None of these



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Radical Left	2,9%	0,9%
Left	14,8%	12,2%
Center-Left	8,9%	6,4%
Center	9,6%	8,3%
Center-Right	11,3%	6,7%
Right	16,5%	11,5%
Radical Right	6,3%	4,5%
None of these	29,6%	49,4%

**Age**

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Radical Left	0,9%	3,4%	2,2%	2,5%	1,0%	0,7%
Left	11,8%	13,8%	12,3%	13,6%	18,7%	11,4%
Center-Left	8,3%	8,3%	4,4%	7,7%	7,7%	9,3%
Center	13,1%	11,0%	7,6%	7,1%	6,8%	9,7%
Center-Right	8,3%	5,2%	8,2%	7,7%	10,3%	12,8%
Right	5,7%	11,6%	12,9%	13,9%	16,1%	19,0%
Radical Right	2,6%	6,4%	7,1%	6,5%	4,5%	4,2%
None of these	49,3%	40,2%	45,2%	41,1%	35,0%	32,9%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Radical Left	2,4%	1,4%	2,4%
Left	14,6%	12,9%	13,4%
Center-Left	6,9%	6,8%	9,5%
Center	7,9%	9,8%	8,7%
Center-Right	5,1%	7,7%	12,9%
Right	11,4%	13,7%	15,8%
Radical Right	7,0%	5,3%	4,4%
None of these	44,7%	42,3%	32,9%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Radical Left	4,5%	1,5%	1,2%	1,9%
Left	9,6%	14,7%	13,8%	13,7%
Center-Left	12,6%	8,0%	5,8%	3,5%
Center	12,4%	9,8%	6,8%	7,0%
Center-Right	14,1%	10,2%	5,1%	4,8%
Right	17,6%	15,2%	12,0%	11,6%
Radical Right	3,5%	4,7%	7,2%	9,3%
None of these	25,8%	35,8%	48,1%	48,2%

**Ideology**


	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Radical Left	8,2%	-	-	-
Left	58,7%	-	-	-
Center-Left	33,1%	-	-	-
Center	-	100,0%	-	-
Center-Right	-	-	31,6%	-
Right	-	-	49,1%	-
Radical Right	-	-	19,3%	-
None of these	-	-	-	100,0%

cent) place themselves in the political centre. Those who place themselves on the radical left are primarily concentrated within the LFI electorate, with none aligning themselves with the PS. The largest proportion of centrist voters can be found within the LREM electorate, while the largest proportion of radical right respondents votes for RN. Nevertheless, Les Républicains are the party for which nearly 90 per cent of its voters are on the political right. While men, those aged 25 to 34, and those with economic difficulties are more likely to identify as right-wing, women, those aged 18 to 24, and people with lower levels of education are more likely to report having no ideological orientation.

**Vote Recall in the 2019 European Parliament Elections**

Most respondents who voted for a particular party in the 2019 European elections were still planning to vote for the same party if a national election was held at the time of data collection. RN voters are the most loyal ones to their party — 76.6 per cent of them were still planning to vote for the party in a national election, while only 29.6 per cent of PS voters stated they would do so. There appears to be a notable electoral exchange between PS and Les Verts.

**Figure 36 – Which party did you vote for at the European Election of 2019?**






### Vote Intention Changes from 2020 to 2021

Vote intention in France has remained relatively stable over time, with some minor variability. On the one hand, the governing LREM, Les Verts, Les Républicains, and PS all lost support from 2020 to 2021. On the other hand, RN,

LFI, and smaller parties have experienced a slight increase in support. The proportion of respondents who reported they would not vote and those who are not sure which party they would vote for also increased.

**Figure 37 – If there were a national general election tomorrow which party would you vote for?**



## KEY FINDINGS 5

- Respondents who identify with radical ideologies, on both the left and the right, comprise less than 8 per cent of the French electorate, while respondents with no political ideology are by far the biggest respondent group. LFI is the party which enjoys the support of most left-leaning voters, while Les Républicains voters are most likely to identify as right-wing.
- Most people who voted for a certain party in the 2019 European elections reported they would still likely

vote for the same party in a national election. RN was most likely to retain its voters, while people who voted for PS and Les Verts in 2019 were most likely to change their party preference.

- The reported changes in voting behaviour from 2020 to 2021 show that support for RN and LFI increased, whereas it has declined for LREM, LFI, Les Républicains, and Les Verts.

## CHAPTER 6

LESS THAN 15 PER CENT ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES REGULARLY, BUT THE LES REPUBLICAINS AND PS VOTERS DO IT MOST OFTEN




**Education**

In terms of education, Les Verts voters are the group with the largest proportion of highly educated respondents, while the groups with the smallest proportion of highly educated respondents are RN and PS voters. Those with

high incomes are more likely to be highly educated, suggesting that education is related to economic well-being. Middle-educated respondents are overrepresented among political centrists and those without clear ideological persuasion.

**Figure 38 – Education**



**Religious Service Attendance**


When it comes to religious service attendance, less than 20 per cent of French attend such services regularly. People who vote for RN and Les Verts are least likely to attend religious services, while Les Républicains voters are the

most likely to attend religious services every day. Note, however, that all parties have become parties of the 'secularised majority' that only attend religious services infrequently, such as on a holiday, or never attend a religious service.

**Figure 39 / Q11 – Religious Service Attendance**

In general, apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services?

- Every day
- More than once a week
- Once a week
- At least once a month
- Only on holidays
- Less often
- Never



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Every day	3,0%	1,7%
More than once a week	3,6%	1,9%
Once a week	5,6%	4,2%
At least once a month	5,7%	4,2%
Only on holidays	16,6%	16,7%
Less often	19,9%	22,0%
Never	45,6%	49,2%

**Age**

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Every day	7,1%	7,5%	1,2%	0,6%	-	0,9%
More than once a week	4,5%	5,2%	4,4%	1,5%	1,3%	0,7%
Once a week	5,6%	10,1%	6,2%	4,1%	2,0%	2,8%
At least once a month	10,6%	7,8%	7,2%	2,3%	2,6%	2,6%
Only on holidays	14,6%	12,3%	13,8%	19,7%	17,2%	19,4%
Less often	16,2%	15,3%	22,9%	19,6%	23,2%	25,3%
Never	41,4%	41,9%	44,4%	52,3%	53,6%	48,2%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Every day	2,9%	2,2%	2,1%
More than once a week	2,3%	2,7%	3,0%
Once a week	2,0%	5,4%	6,4%
At least once a month	4,3%	4,4%	6,2%
Only on holidays	14,6%	15,4%	19,5%
Less often	22,8%	21,2%	19,3%
Never	51,0%	48,7%	43,5%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Every day	7,0%	1,2%	1,9%	1,9%
More than once a week	3,2%	3,0%	1,8%	2,7%
Once a week	7,8%	5,1%	3,0%	5,0%
At least once a month	6,3%	4,9%	4,0%	5,4%
Only on holidays	19,1%	17,0%	16,0%	11,7%
Less often	16,8%	21,1%	23,0%	20,0%
Never	39,9%	47,6%	50,3%	53,4%

**Ideology**

	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Every day	4,3%	5,8%	1,8%	0,9%
More than once a week	2,3%	7,5%	2,9%	2,4%
Once a week	6,1%	7,1%	6,5%	2,4%
At least once a month	5,4%	6,1%	5,6%	3,9%
Only on holidays	15,8%	11,2%	21,8%	14,3%
Less often	18,1%	18,3%	21,3%	22,9%
Never	48,0%	44,0%	40,1%	53,1%

## KEY FINDINGS 6

- Education is usually a good predictor of party preference, with highly educated respondents voting for centrist parties and less educated respondents overrepresented among the far-right electorate. This is also the case in France, where voters for the centrist Les Verts, LREM, and Les Républicains are the most highly educated voter groups, whereas RN and LFI voters have broader support among people with less education.
- Religion has been increasingly losing its importance in Western democracies, including in France, where less than 15 per cent of respondents say they attend religious services regularly. Voters of the Les Républicains and PS attend religious services most often, while voters of Les Verts and, surprisingly, RN are least likely to ever attend such services.

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### **About Kieskompas (Election Compass)**

Kieskompas is an independent scientific research institute specialising in quantitative data analysis, opinion polling, and voter profiling. Founded by Dr André Krouwel in collaboration with the VU University Amsterdam in 2006, Kieskompas is a market leader in the development and innovation of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), used by more than 30 million people. Kieskompas is embedded in the academic community and is driven by a team of established researchers with a strong focus on political science, data science, and statistics. The company is best known for creating a methodology for visually displaying the positions of political parties in country-specific political landscapes in its VAAs. These online tools have been developed in collaboration with local academics in more than 40 countries, generating large-N datasets suitable for in-depth analyses.

### **André Krouwel**

André Krouwel teaches comparative political science and communication at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and is the founder of Kieskompas (Election Compass). He develops online Voting Advice Applications that collect data on party positions and voter opinions. Krouwel's research focuses on public opinion and politically relevant sentiments, voting behaviour, political parties, and social movements. Recent research has also resulted in publications on conspiracy beliefs, opinions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the vote determinants for European fringe parties and Euroscepticism.

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ISBN 978-3-98628-381-0

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This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Parliament.

