



COVID-19 CRISIS

IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS FOR EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

COUNTRY STUDY

POLAND

December 2022





PREFACE

This country case study is an integral part of the project COVID-19 crisis: implications and lessons for European social democracy, which the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) conducted in collaboration with the Instituto Cattaneo in Bologna and successfully completed with the invaluable help of Kieskompas in Amsterdam. As a report, this is one of six documents supplementing a comparative study, completed to offer a detailed perspective on Poland.

At its inception in 2020, the founders' ambition was to investigate citizens' attitudes during and after the pandemic. As COVID-19 continued, the two waves of the survey put in the field by Dynata simply captured the opinions in two respective moments—December 2020/January 2021 and October/November 2021—showing how perspectives fluctuated during the profound crisis. All the partners involved in this project wanted to dive deep to gain a comprehensive picture; thus, the survey was comprised of 13 sociodemographic and 63 thematic questions. These allowed for the segmentation of the vast data, which was collected in a sample of 1,000 citizens twice in six countries (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden, and Poland). Thanks to cross-tabulations and analyses of the overlap of the vote propensity, it was possible to extract very specific answers regarding the trends among diverse groups. There was a special focus on the opinions held by the voters and sympathizers of the centre-left, of course. And, in this spirit, the next pages and the section entitled Key Findings are meant to serve as a piece of policy advice.

After the first wave, FEPS and FES took some time to discuss the initial results internally as well as with circles of experts from the six countries in question. The objective of these discussions was to put the findings in a country-specific context and explain both similarities and points of divergence when making an overall comparison. These debates took place during closed round tables consisting of Members of National Parliaments, Members of the European Parliaments, academics, trade unionists, civil society experts, party strategists and pollsters, youth representatives, and publicists. The organisers remain incredibly grateful to all these individuals for their time, enthusiasm, and input. It is not possible to name them all, as the total number surpassed 200. That said, we would like to mention our gratitude towards the organisations that helped with these events, especially the Centrum im. Ignacego Daszyńskiego, Olof Palme International Center, Foundation Pablo Iglesias, Foundation Rafael Campalans, as well as the respective FES regional Offices in Madrid, Stockholm, Warsaw, Paris, and Rome. The insights gained were invaluable and relevant for this country's case study and the comparative study.

With this in mind, we are eager to present you with this study, thanking again Instituto Cattaneo (including Salvatore Vassallo, Moreno Mancuso, and Federico Vegetti) for all the cooperation in designing the questionnaire and obtaining the data; Dynata for conducting the two waves of surveys; Kieskompas (including André Krouwel and Yordan Kutiyski) whose team engaged with us in several rounds and then completed these important documents. Finally, we would like to thank our colleagues, especially Celine Guedes (FEPS) and Adrianna Hornung (FES), who shouldered all the organizational load.

Dr Ralf Hexel
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Dr Ania Skrzypek
Foundation for European Progressive Studies




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SUMMARY

POLARISED COUNTRY WITH HETEROGENOUS OPPOSITION



- 1) The COVID-19 pandemic has deepened political and societal divisions in Europe and Poland is no exception, as evidenced by the data analyses presented in this country report. It is notable that many respondents' opinions did not change substantially between 2020 and 2021.
- 2) Nevertheless, support for the anti-pandemic measures in this country is lower than in the other countries examined in this project. In Poland, a reversed pattern can be observed: respondents with right-wing ideology are the most supportive of pandemic mitigation measures, whereas centrists and left-wing respondents are highly critical. This can likely be explained by the fact that a staunchly right-wing party – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) – currently governs Poland while the opposition is comprised of left-wing and centrist parties.
- 3) The latter can be characterised as having low levels of overall satisfaction with governance, the way the pandemic has been handled, and lower levels of institutional trust. Nevertheless, the voters of another party on the right – Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (henceforth Konfederacja) – are the government's most staunch critics and hold the most radical stances regarding climate change and immigration. Konfederacja voters are also most likely to hold critical views towards science, oppose the country's EU membership and believe in conspiracy theories.
- 4) Voters of the main opposition parties, Koalicja Obywatelska (KO) and Nowa Lewica, on the other hand, are much different in their stances. These voters adopt positions that are aligned with moderate Western European parties. These voters are strongly concerned about climate change, have confidence in science, and believe that immigrants are an asset to Poland. These findings suggest that the government is pressed by a very heterogeneous opposition spanning the political spectrum.
- 5) When it comes to demographics, the most cynical and politically distrustful respondents can be found among citizens with lower levels of education and income difficulties. These respondents are much more distrustful, oppose climate-related policies, and are generally more dissatisfied with governance compared to other demographic groups. Such citizens are also more likely to be opposed to immigration, critical of the European Union, and doubtful that climate change will have a serious impact on future generations.
- 6) In terms of age, older generations tend to hold more progressive views than their younger peers — a pattern different from all other countries analysed in this project.
- 7) In sum, the data indicate that there are many different, often polarised, opinions in Poland. The country is more polarised than other European states, and the government and opposition supporters hold diametrically opposed views and values. Nevertheless, when it comes to issues such as climate change and immigration, most respondents are more concerned and permissive than is often reported in the news.

DATA AND METHOD



This country report offers an in-depth overview of public opinion in Poland by comparing the stances of various demographic and political groups. Respondents were segmented by gender, age, educational attainment, economic well-being, and ideological orientation. Most importantly, voter groups were identified based on respondents' current vote intention. Comparing citizen categories allows policy-makers and political campaigners alike to make informed decisions when targeting specific population groups.

The results compare how the aforementioned groups of respondents answered the various closed-ended survey questions. Questions on the same topic (e.g., support for measures against the COVID-19 pandemic) that use a scale rather than ordinal answer categories were used to create indices after a reliability analysis was performed to confirm that they measure the same concept. For these indices, the mean scores for each respondent group were estimated; the groups were subsequently plotted on two-dimensional scatterplots comprised of two indices. Again, the average mean scores between the two waves were calculated for each voter group.

Two waves of survey data in six countries: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden, were collected by Dynata, in coordination with the Cattaneo institute, in December 2020/January 2021 and October/November 2021, respectively. In Poland, each wave comprises a sample of 1,002 respondents, representative of the demographic composition and political preferences of the Polish population. The questionnaires used in both waves contained largely overlapping questions, allowing for an over-time comparison of public opinion on various socioeconomic issues. Given that there were very minor opinion differences between the two waves for items included in both survey iterations, the average percentage and mean scores for these questions are reported, with several exceptions. The following questions were only asked in the first wave of the survey and, therefore, only results from this wave are reported:

- There are different views on how the national government balanced, in the short run, protecting jobs and protecting public health when responding to the coronavirus pandemic.
- There are different views on how the national government balanced preserving public health and preserving individual freedom when responding to the coronavirus pandemic.
- Some hope to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as soon as possible, others believe that it would be risky to get vaccinated. If the health authorities provide you an opportunity to get vaccinated, how likely is it that you will do so?
- Have you installed the national contact tracing app STOP COVID on your smartphone?


In addition, several questions were only included in the second wave of the questionnaire and, therefore, only results from this wave were reported:

- Some people argue that the COVID-19 vaccination should be mandatory for everyone to stop the pandemic, others that people should always be free to choose whether to get vaccinated or not.
- Compared to the end of 2020, do you think that your own economic situation...
- And thinking about the next 12 months, do you think that your own economic situation ...

The indices measuring conspiracy belief, populist sentiments, and the question asking respondents to evaluate the "NextGenerationEU" plan were also included in the second wave only; therefore, only this second wave data is analyzed for these items.

CHAPTER 1

VACCINATIONS DEBATE EVOLVED AROUND THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS




Likelihood of and Concern about Contracting the Virus

A small majority of Polish citizens (52.7 per cent) thought it likely that they would contract the virus – a percentage higher than in all other countries studied. The voters of Polska 2050, KO, and PiS were the least likely to consider

that they would contract the virus, along with respondents without a clear ideological orientation. When it comes to demographics, younger respondents, highly educated respondents, and higher income individuals considered it less likely that they would contract the virus.


Figure 1 / Q22 – In your opinion, how likely is it that you will contract COVID-19?



When it comes to the dangers the virus could pose to individuals' health, most Polish citizens (nearly 80 per cent) are at least slightly concerned. Voters of the Konfederacja party differ most from other respondents; about half of them are not at all concerned about the health risks posed by the

COVID-19 infection, which is triple the proportion of other party supporters. Older (particularly those aged 55 and above), left-wing, and centrist respondents are the most concerned about the health risks posed by COVID-19, along with higher educated and low-income individuals.

Figure 2 / Q23 – How concerned are you that a COVID infection might endanger your health?




Evaluations of Governmental Policy against the Pandemic

More than half of Polish citizens are critical of the government's handling of the pandemic, deeming that more should have been done to protect jobs. Only 28.7 per cent of those surveyed think that the government's approach was balanced, while 17 per cent think that more should have been done to protect public health. Only PiS voters are overwhelmingly supportive of the government's poli-

cies. Meanwhile, there is little variation among opposition party voters: large majorities of all opposition party supporters believe that more should have been done to protect jobs. When broken down by demographic category, women, younger respondents, highly educated people, and those economically better off, as well as respondents of any non-right-wing ideological persuasion, consider the measures exaggerated.

Figure 3 / Q38 – Government balance – jobs or public health

- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to protect public health instead of jobs
- They got the balance about right
- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to protect jobs instead of public health




A similar pattern emerges when looking at how citizens view the government response as a trade-off between preserving people's freedom and protecting public health: a razor-thin majority of 51 per cent of Polish respondents consider their freedoms to have been unduly restricted. In comparison, nearly 29 per cent answered that the balance

was about right, and 20 per cent said the restrictions should have been more far-reaching. Again, all voters, apart from those loyal to the governing PiS, consider that more should have been done to protect jobs. Younger citizens, the highly educated, and those in better economic situations were most likely to think that freedoms were unduly restricted.

Figure 4 / Q39 – Government balance – freedom or public health

- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to contain the pandemic that unduly restricted people's freedom
- They got the balance about right
- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to preserve people's freedom that irresponsibly worsened the public health



Likelihood of Getting Vaccinated


At the time the survey was conducted, only 49.2 per cent of the respondents stated that they would get vaccinated if health authorities offered them to do so – a lower number compared to the other countries studied in this project. This number is lower than the current vaccination rate in Poland, which stands at about 58 per cent. Voters for centrist and left-wing parties KO and Nowa Lewica were most likely to say they would get vaccinated, along

with PiS voters, while a clear majority of about 82 per cent of Konfederacja voters and 75 per cent of Koalicja Polska voters said they would not do so. Women were slightly less likely than men to say they would get vaccinated. Younger respondents were substantially less likely to say they would get vaccinated than older generations. Similarly, more highly educated respondents, those with higher incomes, and those with no ideological persuasion were less likely to say they would get vaccinated.

Figure 5 / Q52 – Likelihood of getting vaccinated

If the health authorities provide you an opportunity to get vaccinated, how likely is it that you will do so?

Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely




The Impact of COVID-19 on Quality of Life and Working Conditions

There is very little variation among the different population segments in Poland regarding the impact of the pandemic on people’s quality of life: more than 75 per cent of respondents reported that they had been affected negatively. Still, KO and Polska 2050 voters have felt the most negative im-

pact on their lives. Women and younger people (ages 18 to 24) experienced more quality of life deterioration, along with the less educated and those with lower incomes. Left-wing and right-wing citizens also report to have been more negatively impacted by the pandemic compared to political moderates; moreover, the largest degree of dissatisfaction can be found among respondents with no ideology.


Figure 6 / Q74 – Overall, how would you assess the impact that the COVID-19 crisis has had on your quality of life?



A large minority of Polish respondents report that their working conditions were unaffected by the pandemic (49.6 per cent). Nevertheless, Koalicija Polska and Konfederacja voters reported the most substantial deterioration of their working conditions compared to the voters of the Nowa Lewica and KO parties. Those reporting

to have been most negatively affected by the pandemic are respondents younger than 55, those with lower levels of educational attainment, and lower-income individuals. Left-wing respondents and people without ideology are also more likely to have been negatively affected.

Figure 7 / Q75 – How would you assess the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on your working conditions?




COVID-19 Contact Tracing App

A rather underwhelming proportion of respondents reported having installed the national contact tracing app (STOP COVID) — a mere 8.7 per cent. This is lower than in the other countries analysed in this study. Voters of the governing PiS were most likely to have installed the app

compared to other voter groups, especially Nowa Lewica, Koalicja Polska, and smaller party voters. Younger people and those with less education and precarious economic conditions, along with left-wing and non-ideological respondents, were least likely to have installed the contact tracing app.

Figure 8 / Q61 – Have you installed the national contact tracing app (STOP COVID) on your smartphone?




Mandatory Vaccination

Less than 50 per cent of Polish respondents believe there should be some form of mandatory vaccination against COVID-19. This is less than in any other country in this study. Voters of the centrist and left-wing parties KO and Nowa Lewica are most supportive of mandatory vaccination, whereas Konfederacja and Koalicja Polska voters are most opposed. Men are much more likely than women to

support mandatory vaccination, along with older voters, those with higher incomes, and those with left-wing ideologies. It is worth noting that respondents comfortable with their incomes and those in the most precarious economic situation support mandatory vaccinations almost to the same extent. Likewise, highly educated respondents are more likely to be supportive of mandatory vaccination compared to other education categories.

Figure 9 / Q21G – Mandatory vaccination




Public Perception, Institutional Trust, and Support for COVID-19 Measures

The Support for COVID-19 Mitigation Measures Index is comprised of five separate questions asking respondents to evaluate the measures various institutions have taken to respond to the pandemic. The Institutional Trust Index contains six questions that ask respondents to what extent they trust various national and international institutions on a 10-point scale, where 0 means "no trust at all" and 10 means "complete trust". All questions used in the scatterplots are asked with a 10-point scale answer category. For all indices included in the country report, lower scores indicate a low level of support/agreement with what is measured, while higher scores account for a high level of support or agreement with the statement (e.g., a lower institutional trust index score signifies a low-

er degree of institutional trust). The average values of numerous respondent groups are reported in a two-dimensional scatterplot with the various population segmentations based on age, gender, educational attainment, difficulty coping with income, political orientation, and party support.

There is a clear linear relationship between the two indices: the more institutionally trustful respondents are, the more likely they are to support COVID-19 mitigation measures. However, it is worth noting that the level of support for COVID-19 measures is rather low for all voter groups. The voters of PiS and Koalicija Polska, those with right-wing or centrist ideologies, and people aged 65 or older are most supportive of the measures against the pandemic and also have the highest levels of institutional trust. On

Figure 10 – Support für Covid Measures



the other hand, Konfederacja voters and the respondents in the most precarious economic situations, respondents with no clear ideology, and the younger electorate all have substantially lower degrees of trust and are less likely to support COVID-19 mitigation measures.

When it comes to perceptions of who has benefitted from the public spending during the pandemic, it is clear that left-wing respondents, Nowa Lewica, Konfederacja and Polska 2050 voters and those with higher education perceive that the wealthiest have benefitted the most from

public spending for economic recovery. PiS voters, those aged 18 to 24, and those with lower education and comfortable incomes are less likely to believe that public spending has benefitted the wealthiest. However, it is important to note that the question on the vertical axis is a 10-point scale, meaning that all respondent groups in the graph above the scale's mean. This suggests that the public is overall rather dissatisfied with the handling of public spending during the pandemic. There is a general and widespread perception that the pandemic increased existing societal inequalities.


Figure 11 – Beneficiaries of Public Spending



It is clear that the vast majority of Polish respondents agree with the proposition that pandemic mitigation measures go against constitutional and democratic principles. This is demonstrated by the scores from all respondent groups, apart from PiS voters, being higher than average on this scale, making them outliers. Left-wing respondents, Nowa

Lewica supporters, and KO voters are likelier to believe the democratic rules were broken by the government's pandemic response. It is worth noting that the vast majority of Polish citizens fall between 6 and 7 points on the scale, meaning that they predominantly agree with the proposition.

Figure 12 – Covid Measures and Constitutional Rules



Most Polish respondents perceive the pandemic to have deepened the divisions among people. Moreover, Konfederacja and Polska 2050 voters and those on the ideological left are the most likely to agree with this proposition.

Figure 13 – Covid and Divisions Among People





Figure 14



When it comes to the differences between the results in the two waves, we report how the mean values for each index changed for each sociodemographic respondent group. There is a clear pattern: nearly all respondent groups agree more strongly in 2021 compared to 2020 that the pandemic has deepened divisions between people. Little has changed with regard to support for the COVID-19 measures; Koalicija Polska voters became substantially

more supportive, while economically vulnerable individuals became less supportive. The perception that pandemic mitigation measures were undemocratic also declined across nearly all voter groups, while the changes concerning the perception regarding the effect of the money spent during the pandemic also remained largely unchanged. In general, the opinions on this subject in Poland changed very little from 2020 to 2021.

KEY FINDINGS 1

- Although the majority of Polish respondents understand the COVID-19 pandemic has a serious impact of on public health, society is rather polarized when it comes to the pandemic mitigation measures taken by the government and the vaccination campaign.
- While the vast majority of the populace was concerned that the virus would endanger their health if they were to get sick, the majority did not consider it likely that they would contract the virus. Voters of the Konfederacija and Koalicija Polska parties were the least likely to be concerned about the virus.
- Less than a third of respondents consider the government to have taken appropriate measures to protect public health, with overwhelming majorities answering that the government took disproportionate measures, reduced people's freedoms, and did not adequately safeguard the economy. Parties across the political spectrum disapprove of how PiS handled the pandemic, with Nowa Lewica, KO, and Konfederacija voters being the most critical of the measures. Naturally, PiS voters are the most supportive of their party's pandemic response.
- Polish voters were nearly evenly split regarding their intention to get vaccinated. Most respondents reported they were not willing to get vaccinated. Specifically, Konfederacija and Koalicija Polska voters and with no political ideology were least likely to say they would get vaccinated against COVID-19.
- When it comes to deterioration of quality of life and working conditions in relation to the pandemic, the majority of the Polish public reported a negative effect, particularly on their quality of life. However, most respondents' working conditions remained largely the same. Nevertheless, it is clear that both the lifestyle and work of those at the bottom of the economic ladder, as well as Konfederacija voters, were most negatively affected by the pandemic.
- The majority of respondents believe that there should be no mandatory vaccination, and are instead in favour of letting citizens decide whether to get vaccinated or not. Konfederacija and Koalicija Polska voters, women, younger respondents, and those with no political ideology are most likely to oppose mandatory vaccination.
- The more institutionally trustful respondents are, the more likely they are to support COVID-19 mitigation measures. In particular, voters of the governing right-wing party PiS, Koalicija Polska supporters, and those with right-wing ideology are most supportive of the measures against the pandemic and also have the highest levels of institutional trust. Konfederacija voters are most critical of the measures and have the lowest degree of trust.
- The perception that pandemic mitigation measures go against constitutional and democratic principles is widespread among all voter and demographic groups in Poland. The only respondent group for which a majority disagrees with this proposition are PiS voters.
- Nearly all respondent groups agreed to a larger extent in 2021 than in 2020 that the pandemic has deepened divisions between people.

CHAPTER 2


RIGHT-WING MORE PRONE TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES



The proposition stating that “the virus is a biological weapon intentionally released by China” has the largest degree of support among the Polish populace compared to other conspiracy theories: 53 per cent of those surveyed state that they believe in this theory. PiS voters are most likely to agree with the proposition, while Polska 2050 voters and

smaller party supporters are the least likely to do so. Women, respondents aged 25 to 34, those with middle educational levels, those most precarious in terms of income, as well as respondents with right-wing or no ideology are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory than other groups.


Figure 15 / Q57XB – “The virus is a biological weapon released by China”



Another conspiracy theory addressed in this survey is the proposition that “5G technology is causing the coronavirus to spread more quickly”. This theory has a low degree of support: 11.5 per cent of those surveyed state that they believe in this theory. Koalicja Polska and PiS voters are most likely to agree with the proposition, while Nowa Le-

wica and smaller party voters are least likely to do so. Women, respondents aged 25 to 44, those struggling with their financial situation, and respondents with no ideology are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory compared to respondents from other demographic groups.


Figure 16 / Q57XB – “5G technology is causing the coronavirus to spread more quickly”



A rather high degree of agreement among the populace was found for the conspiracy theory “The virus has been spread by multinational pharmaceutical companies now ready to make huge profits by selling the vaccine” — 44 per cent of those surveyed stated that they believe in this theory. Konfederacja voters predominantly agree with

the proposition (71 per cent), while KO and Nowa Lewica voters are least likely to do so. Women, younger respondents (aged 25 to 44), the economically precarious, and people without ideology are more likely to believe that multinational pharmaceutical companies have spread the virus for their own economic gain.


Figure 17/Q57XB – “The virus has been spread by multinational pharmaceutical companies now ready to make huge profits by selling the vaccine”



The proposition stating that “the coronavirus is a hoax” has a low degree of support; only 17.6 per cent of those surveyed doubt that the virus is a genuine threat – more than any other country included in this project. The voters of smaller parties and Koalicja Polska are most likely to agree with the proposition, while PiS and KO voters are

least likely to think that Coronavirus is a hoax. Respondents aged between 25 and 44, those with higher education, those living comfortably with their income, as well as respondents with centrist ideology, are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory compared to other demographic groups.

Figure 18 / Q57XB – “The coronavirus is a hoax”



KEY FINDINGS 2

- Given that conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic were prevalent during the first two years of the pandemic, it comes as no surprise that a large proportion of Polish citizens profess that certain conspiracy theories are true.
- Konfederacja and PiS voters are notably more likely to believe in conspiracy theories than other voter groups, along with respondents who have income difficulties and no political ideology.
- Two conspiracy theories (that the virus was intentionally released by China and that it was spread by pharmaceutical corporations) have the largest degree of support among the Polish public: 53 and 44 per cent, respectively.
- A substantial number of respondents also agree with the two other conspiracy theories, even though one would expect otherwise, given their very unlikely propositions: 12 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that 5G technology helps the virus spread faster and 18 per cent agreed with the statement that the coronavirus is a hoax.
- Contrary to popular belief, the data suggests that there is a widespread conspiracy belief in Poland — more so than in other countries. These findings could indicate that, in times of crisis, public opinion is more susceptible to suggestive messages disseminated by populists and organizations with potentially anti-democratic aims.

CHAPTER 3

NOWA LEWICA AND SMALL PARTY VOTERS REPORTING DETERIORATION OF ECONOMIC SITUATION



Changes in Economic Situation between 2020 and 2021


A majority of Polish respondents (57.2 per cent) stated that their economic situation deteriorated from 2020 to 2021. Understandably, only 11.6 per cent stated that their situation had improved, while, for about 31.2 per cent of respondents, their economic situation remained the same. PiS voters reported having experienced the

most improvement, while the opposite is true for Nowa Lewica and smaller party voters. The proportion of respondents with deteriorating economic situations is similar among nearly all voter groups. Yet, the downward trend is less prominent among younger respondents, those with higher incomes, and those with a right-wing ideology.

Figure 19 / Q27 – Changes in Economic Situation between 2020 and 2021

Compared to the end of 2020, do you think that your own economic situation ...

■ Got a lot better
 ■ Got a little better
 ■ Stayed the same
 ■ Got a little worse
 ■ Got a lot worse



Gender

	Male	Female
Got a lot better	4,0%	1,2%
Got a little better	11,7%	13,4%
Stayed the same	34,4%	30,3%
Got a little worse	27,6%	29,9%
Got a lot worse	22,3%	25,2%

Age

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Got a lot better	2,5%	4,5%	5,0%	0,6%	1,2%	1,8%
Got a little better	21,2%	11,4%	7,5%	13,5%	14,4%	9,8%
Stayed the same	28,8%	36,3%	34,2%	31,2%	26,3%	34,8%
Got a little worse	24,6%	27,4%	30,4%	25,3%	33,5%	30,5%
Got a lot worse	22,9%	20,4%	23,0%	29,4%	24,6%	23,2%

Education

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Got a lot better	-	3,3%	1,8%
Got a little better	13,6%	12,0%	13,2%
Stayed the same	32,8%	32,2%	32,7%
Got a little worse	26,4%	29,7%	28,1%
Got a lot worse	27,2%	22,8%	24,2%

Income

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Got a lot better	6,9%	1,8%	0,9%	3,4%
Got a little better	18,8%	14,9%	6,8%	3,4%
Stayed the same	43,6%	33,9%	27,4%	18,6%
Got a little worse	17,8%	32,5%	27,9%	16,9%
Got a lot worse	12,9%	16,9%	37,0%	57,6%

Ideology

	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Got a lot better	1,7%	2,4%	5,1%	0,8%
Got a little better	9,6%	12,3%	17,1%	11,0%
Stayed the same	25,8%	37,0%	34,9%	31,4%
Got a little worse	32,8%	26,1%	27,6%	28,4%
Got a lot worse	30,1%	22,3%	15,3%	28,4%

Future Economic Outlook


When it comes to their economic expectations for the next 12 months, 32.9 per cent of respondents expected that their economic situation would not change. More voters were pessimistic (48.4 per cent) than optimistic (18.7 per cent). PiS vot-

ers were the most positive when it came to their expectations for the coming year, while KO voters were the most negative. Also, older respondents, those with more precarious income situations, as well as left-wing respondents have the most negative economic expectations for the next 12 months.

Figure 20 / Q28 – Economic outlook for the next 12 months

And thinking about the next 12 months, do you think that your own economic situation ...

■ Will get a lot better ■ Will get a little better ■ Will stay the same ■ Will get a little worse ■ Will get a lot worse




Working from Home

The majority of all voter groups, apart from Konfederacja voters, worked from home during the previous week at the time in which the data was collected (November 2020/2021). Nowa Lewica voters were most likely to have worked from

home, while Konfederacja, Koalicja Polska, and smaller party voters spent the least time working from home. Younger respondents (aged 18 to 34), those with higher levels of income, and those with more education were more likely than other groups to have recently worked from home.

Figure 21 / Q9 – “During the last week, how much time have you spent working from home?”



Income Situation


The majority of Polish citizens (74.3 per cent) report that they live comfortably or cope well with their income. The voter groups experiencing the most economic difficulties are voters of Koalicja Polska and the smaller parties, while

Nowa Lewica and Polska 2050 voters predominantly reported being financially well-off. Women, older respondents, and those with lower education levels are the respondent groups most likely to experience economic difficulties.

Figure 22 / Q12 – Income situation

Which of these descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?

Living comfortably Coping Finding it difficult Finding it very difficult




Homeownership

When it comes to homeownership, Poland is among the countries with the highest proportion of respondents who own a home — 57.9 per cent. It is clear that Koalicja Polska and Konfederacja voters are much more likely to own a home outright compared to other voter groups. Nowa Lewica, PiS, and smaller party voters are least likely to own a home outright. There are no considerable differences between men and women in terms of home ownership. How-

ever, it is surprising that respondents aged 18 to 34 are substantially more likely to own a home than their older counterparts. The data does not indicate a relationship between education and homeownership; however, income is a strong predictor. The higher a person's income in Poland, the more likely they are to own a home. There are no substantial differences when it comes to ideology, apart from the finding that respondents with a centrist political orientation are more likely to be homeowners compared to other voter groups.

Figure 23 / Q12B – Homeownership




KEY FINDINGS 3

- The vast majority of Polish report that their economic situation deteriorated from 2020 to 2021. Nowa Lewica and smaller party voters, as well as respondents with income difficulties and left-wing ideologies were most likely to report a deterioration of their economic situation.
- Most respondents had a negative economic outlook for the upcoming year (2022). PiS voters and respondents comfortable with their income had the most positive expectations, whereas KO and Nowa Lewica voters, along with people in a difficult economic situation, had the most negative expectations regarding their economic situation.
- When it comes to income, more than 70 per cent of Polish respondents report living comfortably or that they are at least able to cope with their current income. Nowa Lewica and Polska 2050 voters are the economically most comfortable voter groups, along with younger and higher educated respondents. Koalicija Polska voters and the voters of smaller parties are most likely to experience income difficulties.
- Far-right Konfederacja and Koalicija Polska voters are much more likely to own a home outright compared to other voter groups.
- Income is also a predictor of homeownership: the higher income a person has, the more likely they are to own a home.



CHAPTER 4

WORRYING WIDESPREAD DISTRUST IN SCIENCE



EU Membership


The Polish respondents are among the most EU-optimistic respondents out of the six countries included in this study. A vast majority of them (70.4 per cent) consider their country's EU membership to be a good thing, while only 7.4 per cent perceive EU membership negatively. The results differ by party choice, with KO, Nowa Lewica, and Polska 2050

voters being the most positive about Poland's EU membership, and Konfederacja voters and supporters of smaller parties the most likely to have a negative perception. There are very few differences between the respondent groups when broken down by demographic. Nevertheless, people with income difficulties and right-wing respondents tend to be most critical of Poland's EU membership.

Figure 24 / Q20 – Membership in the EU

Generally speaking, do you think that your national's membership in the EU is ...?

■ A good thing ■ A bad thing ■ Neither good nor bad



Economic Regulation by the State


In what can be seen as good news for the (moderate) left, a clear majority (68.4 per cent) of Polish respondents agree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy. Surprisingly, PiS voters agree with this statement the most, followed by Nowa Lewica voters — a rare instance of these two voter groups holding similar opinions. Even a

slight majority of Konfederacja and KO voters are in favour of this statement, despite the fact that these are the voter groups that disagree with one another the most. Notably, men are more likely to disagree with the statement than women, along with older generations and highly educated respondents. Surprisingly, voters who identify as left are less likely to agree with the statement than right-wing voters.

Figure 25 / Q41C – State regulation of the economy

“The state should play a greater role in the regulation of the economy”

Agree strongly Agree Disagree Disagree strongly



Gender

	Male	Female
Agree strongly	14,7%	21,7%
Agree	41,9%	58,7%
Disagree	28,5%	14,6%
Disagree strongly	14,9%	5,0%

Age

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Agree strongly	21,3%	19,2%	24,4%	14,3%	15,5%	15,6%
Agree	54,5%	54,3%	49,9%	49,7%	53,7%	41,5%
Disagree	18,7%	16,3%	17,1%	25,1%	20,9%	29,9%
Disagree strongly	5,5%	10,2%	8,6%	10,9%	9,8%	13,0%

Education

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Agree strongly	22,9%	20,0%	12,8%
Agree	55,4%	52,7%	43,4%
Disagree	14,4%	19,0%	29,3%
Disagree strongly	7,2%	8,3%	14,5%

Income

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Agree strongly	27,1%	16,1%	19,6%	18,3%
Agree	46,4%	50,6%	50,6%	55,8%
Disagree	16,2%	23,2%	20,8%	16,2%
Disagree strongly	10,4%	10,1%	9,0%	9,6%

Ideology


	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Agree strongly	16,1%	14,3%	19,6%	22,3%
Agree	43,5%	44,1%	53,9%	58,8%
Disagree	29,7%	26,8%	17,4%	12,6%
Disagree strongly	10,7%	14,8%	9,0%	6,3%

Science Scepticism

When it comes to distrust in science, a common sentiment among citizens critical of the way the COVID-19 pandemic is handled, there is a strong trend: more than 46 per cent of respondents agree with the statement “people don’t realise just how flawed a lot of scientific research really is”, while 29.2 per cent disagree. The proportion of respondents who agree with the statement is

larger than those who disagree across all voter groups except for Nowa Lewica and smaller party voters. Women, people with lower levels and higher levels of education, those who identify as right-wing, and those who have no clear ideology are all more likely to agree that science is more flawed than people realise, although the degree of agreement is relatively similar among all demographic groups.


Figure 26 / Q53 – Science Scepticism



Many respondents are also concerned about the influence of scientists in society, although the proportion here is relatively smaller: 28.5 per cent of those surveyed agree with the proposition compared to 33.8 per cent who disagree; 37.7 per cent neither agree nor disagree with the proposition. The voters of the Konfederacja and PiS parties are more worried about the influence scientists have

in society, while Nowa Lewica, KO, and Polska 2050 voters are the least likely to be worried about the influence of scientists. Younger respondents (aged 25 to 44), those with higher incomes, and those with a right-wing political orientation are more likely to be concerned about the influence of scientists in society compared to other demographic groups.

Figure 27 / Q53 – “I am concerned by the amount of influence that scientists have in society”




Opinions on Gender Inequality

When it comes to traditional gender roles when jobs are scarce, there is overwhelming opposition to this proposition across the Polish public at large. A significant 64.4 per cent of respondents strongly disagreed with the proposition. Nevertheless, voters of the smaller parties, Koalicja Polska, and PiS are most likely to agree that male

employment should be prioritised over female employment. In terms of demographics, younger respondents (aged 18 to 34), the less educated, and those comfortable with their income are more likely to agree with the statement. With regard to political orientation, right-wing voters agree with the proposition more than any other group.

Figure 28 / Q64 – “Men should have more right to work than women when jobs are scarce”



Support for Immigration, Opinions on Climate Change, Populism, and the NextGenerationEU Program

Our Index for Support of Immigration is comprised of two separate scales, which asked respondents whether immigrants are a benefit to the country’s economic development and whether they culturally enrich their country. The Institutional Trust Index is comprised of six separate questions that ask respondents to what extent they trust various national and international institutions (please see the section on methodology for more information). The average values of numerous respondent groups are reported in a two-dimensional scatterplot.

Support for immigration is a divisive issue in Poland, yet few groups score lower than the average score of the index, meaning that many groups of Polish citizens are rather supportive of immigration. The respondent groups most supportive of immigration include older, left-wing, and centrist respondents, KO and Nowa Lewica voters, and highly educated individuals. Konfederacja voters, people with income difficulties, people with lower levels of educational attainment, and those with no political ideology are the least supportive of immigration.

Figure 29 – Support for Immigration



A majority of Polish citizens are seriously concerned about the impact of climate change on future generations, as evidenced by the graph above: all respondent groups, including Konfederacja and PiS voters, score above the average on the scale of concern about climate change. Again, left-

wing and centrist voters, along with older citizens, are most likely to be concerned about climate change. Right-wing respondents, Konfederacja voters, those with lower levels of educational attainment, and those struggling financially are the least concerned about climate change.


Figure 30 – Impact of Climate Change



When looking at changes in opinion and concern over time, the differences between 2020 and 2021 are rather minor for Polish respondents. Unlike in other countries, the opinion shifts about climate change point that the concern among Polish citizens more broadly did not increase substantially. It has even declined significantly

among the youngest respondents and those with income difficulties. At the same time, institutional trust declined somewhat for nearly all respondent groups. Institutional trust only increased considerably among Koalicija Polska voters. Support for immigration also declined slightly from 2020 to 2021, but these changes are not very pronounced.

Figure 31



A substantial number of Polish respondents believe in several conspiracy theories, as measured by the high average scores (higher than 6 out of 10) on the Conspiracy Theory Belief Index among all respondent groups. Surprisingly, PiS voters are least likely to believe in a conspiracy theory despite the party's staunchly conservative profile. In

contrast, Konfederacja voters, respondents with no ideology, and those with income difficulties are the most susceptible to conspiracy theories. Older and more highly educated respondents, centrists, and Nowa Lewica voters are among the voter groups less likely to believe in conspiracies.

Figure 32 – Belief in Conspiracy Theories



When it comes to populism, measured here by anti-elitist sentiments, it is clear that Konfederacja, Nowa Lewica, and KO voters, along with left-wing respondents, those without income difficulties, and those with higher levels of education are among the most anti-elitist respondent groups. Since this study uses explicitly anti-elitist state-

ments to measure populism, it is understandable that respondents most opposed to the party currently in power would score highest on the Populism Index. This is also evidenced by the low populism score of PiS voters and right-wing respondents.

Figure 33 – Followers of Populism



The 'NextGenerationEU' plan, designed by the European Commission as a strategy for transforming societies and economies in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, enjoys moderate support among the Polish public. KO, Nowa Lewica, and Polska 2050 voters, those with a centrist or left-wing political orientation, and those aged 65 or older are the demographic groups most supportive of the program.

Conversely, Konfederacja voters, respondents with no ideology, respondents with economic difficulties, and those aged 24 or younger are the least supportive of the plan. In contrast with other countries, younger Polish respondents have more negative perceptions of the 'NextGenerationEU' plan.

Figure 34 – Support NextGenerationEU Plan



KEY FINDINGS 4


- Although very few in Poland perceive their country's EU membership negatively, there is a substantial proportion of respondents who are ambivalent towards the EU. KO and Lewica voters are most positive about Poland's EU membership, while Konfederacja and PiS voters and supporters of smaller parties are the most likely to think Poland's EU membership is a bad thing.
- A clear majority (68 per cent) of Polish respondents agree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy. Although a majority of all voter groups is in favour of this proposition, PiS voters are most likely to agree — a logical result since they are the governing party.
- The results suggest that there is a worryingly widespread distrust in science in Poland. The voters of Konfederacja, Koalicja Polska, and PiS are most distrustful, while Lewica and smaller party voters are the most likely to see science positively.
- A very small number of Poles believe that men should have job priority when employment positions are scarce. Koalicja Polska and smaller party voters are the most likely to agree with the proposition, along with younger and less educated respondents.
- Party preference and ideology are the strongest predictors of support for immigration, with voters of Nowa Lewica and KO, as well as left-wing respondents, being most positive towards immigrants. On the other hand, respondents with no ideology, income difficulties, or who vote for Konfederacja are the most likely to oppose immigration.
- All respondents are at least somewhat concerned about climate change, even those traditionally sceptical about the human influence on climate, such as respondents with less formal education, lower incomes, and right-wing ideologies. Nevertheless, citizens are unlikely to accept climate change mitigation measures that will directly impact their economic situation negatively, such as increasing energy prices.
- Belief in conspiracy theories (based on an index containing questions unrelated to the pandemic) is most widespread among Konfederacja voters, who are clearly an outlier compared to the rest of respondents. Respondents with income difficulties or no ideology are also susceptible to conspiracy theories, pointing to the overall cynical worldview of many respondents in these demographic categories. PiS voters and political centrists are the least likely to believe in conspiracy theories.
- The most populist respondent groups are supporters of the Konfederacja, KO, and Nowa Lewica parties, along with respondents with left-wing ideologies and those comfortable with their current income. Since the populism index contains several anti-elitism questions, it is understandable that the voters most critical of the government score highest on the populism index.
- When it comes to the 'NextGenerationEU' plan, it is clear that it is supported most by voters of the centrist and left-leaning parties, while Konfederacja voters, as well as people with no ideology and income difficulties have a rather negative evaluation of the policy program.





CHAPTER 5

GRAND SHIFT IN PARTY PREFERENCES IN BETWEEN THE EU ELECTIONS



Political Ideology


A logical and consistent pattern arises from the data gathered connecting political orientation to party choice. Nearly six-tenths of those with a left-leaning political orientation consider themselves centre-left, and four in ten people with a right-leaning political orientation consider themselves centre-right. Many Polish respondents see

themselves as moderate centrists (20.5 per cent). Coupled with the predominantly centrist respondents on the two sides of the political divide, this contrasts sharply with the political discourse in which often the extremes dominate, even though people with extreme ideologies are clearly in the minority. Only a very small proportion of Polish voters position themselves on the political extremes.

Figure 35 / Q71 – Political ideology

Consider the following labels. Which one best expresses the way you define yourself politically?

Radical Left Left Center-Left Center Center-Right Right Radical Right None of these



Gender

	Male	Female
Radical Left	1,0%	0,7%
Left	6,3%	11,9%
Center-Left	17,0%	12,7%
Center	24,6%	16,8%
Center-Right	13,8%	7,0%
Right	16,8%	13,3%
Radical Right	2,5%	1,2%
None of these	17,9%	36,5%

Age

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Radical Left	2,0%	-	0,6%	1,2%	1,2%	0,9%
Left	15,1%	7,0%	7,9%	6,1%	11,0%	10,4%
Center-Left	13,5%	10,9%	8,9%	16,2%	14,3%	25,4%
Center	15,5%	25,2%	20,2%	18,6%	15,7%	26,0%
Center-Right	5,6%	8,7%	8,6%	11,9%	13,1%	12,2%
Right	7,5%	13,6%	17,4%	19,1%	16,9%	13,4%
Radical Right	2,0%	0,7%	4,0%	1,5%	1,5%	1,5%
None of these	38,9%	33,7%	32,4%	25,5%	26,4%	10,1%

Education

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Radical Left	1,9%	0,7%	0,5%
Left	12,4%	9,2%	8,2%
Center-Left	6,8%	14,6%	19,0%
Center	15,8%	17,6%	29,3%
Center-Right	4,9%	11,6%	9,9%
Right	13,5%	15,5%	14,5%
Radical Right	-	2,3%	1,8%
None of these	44,7%	28,5%	16,9%

Income

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Radical Left	2,4%	0,7%	0,8%	1,8%
Left	14,0%	8,5%	8,8%	13,2%
Center-Left	16,0%	16,1%	13,7%	8,1%
Center	21,0%	22,0%	21,0%	10,6%
Center-Right	6,6%	10,7%	10,7%	16,3%
Right	16,1%	15,2%	14,1%	13,6%
Radical Right	1,9%	1,6%	2,1%	2,6%
None of these	22,0%	25,1%	28,8%	33,8%

Ideology


	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Radical Left	3,4%	-	-	-
Left	37,3%	-	-	-
Center-Left	59,4%	-	-	-
Center	-	100,0%	-	-
Center-Right	-	-	37,8%	-
Right	-	-	55,3%	-
Radical Right	-	-	6,8%	-
None of these	-	-	-	100,0%

Those considering themselves on the radical left primarily concentrated within the Nowa Lewica electorate, with very few aligning themselves with KO. In fact, a large proportion of the Nowa Lewica electorate considers themselves centre-left of pure centrists (especially KO). PiS voters are the respondent group with the largest proportion of right-wing voters, while the Konfederacja electorate has the largest proportion of radical right-wing respondents. Men, people aged 45 to 64, and those with the lowest incomes are more likely to identify as right-wing, while women and those with less education are more likely to report no ideological orientation.

Vote Recall in the 2019 European Parliament Elections

Most respondents who voted for a particular party in the 2019 European elections were still planning to vote for the same party at the time of data collection. PiS voters were the most loyal ones to their party — 94 per cent of those currently planning to vote for the party also did so in 2019. Of people intending to vote for Konfederacja in the near future, only 49 per cent voted for them in the last election. There appears to be a notable electoral exchange between Konfederacja and PiS.

Figure 36 – Which party did you vote for at the European Election of 2019?




Vote Intention Changes from 2020 to 2021

The reported changes in voting behaviour from the 2020 to 2021 survey iterations clearly demonstrate that the patterns of partisan support remain stable between 2020 and 2021. Both PiS and the main opposition coalition KO expe-

rienced a slight increase in support, whereas support for the smaller parties Polska 2050, Nowa Lewica, Konfederacja, and Koalicja Polska declined. The proportion of undecided voters also increased.

Figure 37 – If there were a national general election tomorrow which party would you vote for?



KEY FINDINGS 5

- Respondents who identify with radical ideologies, on both the left and the right, comprise less than 3 per cent of the Polish electorate, while respondents with no ideology are the biggest respondent group. Nowa Lewica is the party which enjoys the support of most left-leaning voters, while PiS voters are most likely to identify as right-wing.
- Many respondents who voted for a certain party in the 2019 European elections changed their vote inten-

tion when asked how they would vote in a national election. PiS and Konfederacja were most likely to retain their voters, while more than half of the respondents who voted for other parties in 2019 changed their party preference.

- The reported changes in voting behaviour from 2020 to 2021 show that support for PiS and KO has increased, whereas it has declined for Polska 2050, Nowa Lewica, and Konfederacja.



CHAPTER 6


40 PER CENT OF CITIZENS
ATTEND AT LEAST ONE RELIGIOUS
SERVICE PER MONTH



Education

In terms of education, the Koalicja Polska voters are the group with the largest proportion of highly educated respondents, while the groups with the smallest proportion of highly educated respondents are PiS and Konfederacja voters. Ideological centrists and those with good incomes are most likely to be higher educated.

Figure 38 – Education




Religious Service Attendance

When it comes to religious service attendance, the Polish are among the Europeans most likely to attend such events: 40 per cent do so more than once a month, a higher number compared to any other country analysed in this study. People who vote for Nowa Lewica and KO are least

likely to attend religious services, while PiS voters attend such services most frequently. Konfederacja voters and Koalicja Polska voters also attend religious services rather often. Unlike in other countries where the population is comprised of secularised majorities, the Polish case appears to be a different story.

Figure 39 / Q11 – Religious Service Attendance

In general, apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services?



Gender

	Male	Female
Every day	1,4%	0,7%
More than once a week	3,3%	4,6%
Once a week	26,6%	28,0%
At least once a month	11,0%	12,6%
Only on holidays	19,9%	22,1%
Less often	19,7%	17,2%
Never	18,0%	14,8%

Age

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Every day	2,5%	1,5%	2,5%	-	1,2%	0,6%
More than once a week	3,4%	3,5%	2,8%	6,2%	4,3%	4,2%
Once a week	24,7%	29,5%	30,4%	24,4%	27,1%	25,6%
At least once a month	10,2%	13,2%	13,9%	13,4%	12,2%	7,0%
Only on holidays	22,7%	25,0%	20,9%	19,4%	21,3%	16,9%
Less often	18,1%	14,8%	16,1%	22,9%	18,4%	19,6%
Never	18,4%	12,5%	13,3%	13,7%	15,4%	26,0%

Education

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Every day	0,8%	1,0%	1,3%
More than once a week	3,3%	4,4%	3,5%
Once a week	23,4%	28,3%	27,3%
At least once a month	10,6%	10,9%	14,5%
Only on holidays	22,2%	22,7%	17,3%
Less often	19,0%	18,3%	18,4%
Never	20,7%	14,5%	17,8%

Income

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Every day	2,8%	0,7%	1,7%	1,7%
More than once a week	4,7%	3,6%	4,9%	3,6%
Once a week	29,6%	28,8%	22,7%	18,0%
At least once a month	11,6%	11,9%	11,9%	11,1%
Only on holidays	17,0%	21,2%	24,6%	18,0%
Less often	13,8%	19,2%	18,8%	19,0%
Never	20,5%	14,6%	15,3%	28,7%

Ideology

	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Every day	-	2,0%	1,9%	1,2%
More than once a week	1,8%	2,8%	6,1%	4,1%
Once a week	16,0%	25,5%	41,2%	25,1%
At least once a month	8,8%	13,2%	14,4%	11,2%
Only on holidays	18,9%	25,6%	18,3%	22,0%
Less often	25,3%	17,8%	9,8%	21,2%
Never	29,1%	13,1%	8,3%	15,1%

KEY FINDINGS 6

- Education is usually a good predictor of party preference, with highly educated respondents voting for centrist parties and less educated respondents over-represented among the far-right electorate. This is also the case in Poland, where Koalicija Polska, KO, and Nowa Lewica voters are the most highly educated voter groups, whereas PiS and Konfederacja voters are most popular among middle educated respondents.
- Religion has been increasingly losing its importance in Western Democracies, yet in Poland more than 40 per cent of respondents report that they visit religious services at least once a month, a proportion higher than many other European countries. Voters of PiS and Konfederacja are attending religious services most often, while voters of Nowa Nowa Lewica are least likely to ever attend such services.

AUTHORS

About Kieskompas (Election Compass)

Kieskompas is an independent scientific research institute specialising in quantitative data analysis, opinion polling, and voter profiling. Founded by Dr André Krouwel in collaboration with the VU University Amsterdam in 2006, Kieskompas is a market leader in the development and innovation of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), used by more than 30 million people. Kieskompas is embedded in the academic community and is driven by a team of established researchers with a strong focus on political science, data science, and statistics. The company is best known for creating a methodology for visually displaying the positions of political parties in country-specific political landscapes in its VAAs. These online tools have been developed in collaboration with local academics in more than 40 countries, generating large-N datasets suitable for in-depth analyses.

André Krouwel

André Krouwel teaches comparative political science and communication at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and is the founder of Kieskompas (Election Compass). He develops online Voting Advice Applications that collect data on party positions and voter opinions. Krouwel's research focuses on public opinion and politically relevant sentiments, voting behaviour, political parties, and social movements. Recent research has also resulted in publications on conspiracy beliefs, opinions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the vote determinants for European fringe parties and Euroscepticism.

Yordan Kutiyiski

Yordan Kutiyiski is an MSc political science graduate from the VU University Amsterdam and holds a MA degree in Latin American studies from the Centre of Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA) at the University of Amsterdam. He is a quantitative researcher at Kieskompas. His research interests include voting behaviour and European and Latin American politics



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FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies

Avenue des Arts 46
1000 Brussels
Belgium
info@feps-europe.eu
www.feps-europe.eu

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e. V.

Godesberger Allee 149
53175 Bonn
Germany
info@fes.de
www.fes.de

Responsibility for content and editing at FEPS
Ania Skrzypek, Director for Research and Training

Responsibility for content and editing at FES:
Ralf Hexel | European Integration / Sovereign Europe

Contact / Orders:

Adriana.Hornung@fes.de
Celine.Guedes@feps-europe.eu

Design and Illustrations:

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