



# COVID-19 CRISIS

## IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS FOR EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

COUNTRY STUDY

**SWEDEN**

December 2022





# PREFACE

This country case study is an integral part of the project COVID-19 crisis: implications and lessons for European social democracy, which the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) conducted in collaboration with the Instituto Cattaneo in Bologna and successfully completed with the invaluable help of Kieskompas in Amsterdam. As a report, this is one of six documents supplementing a comparative study, completed to offer a detailed perspective on Sweden.

At its inception in 2020, the founders' ambition was to investigate citizens' attitudes during and after the pandemic. As COVID-19 continued, the two waves of the survey put in the field by Dynata simply captured the opinions in two respective moments—December 2020/January 2021 and October/November 2021—showing how perspectives fluctuated during the profound crisis. All the partners involved in this project wanted to dive deep to gain a comprehensive picture; thus, the survey was comprised of 13 sociodemographic and 63 thematic questions. These allowed for the segmentation of the vast data, which was collected in a sample of 1,000 citizens twice in six countries (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden, and Poland). Thanks to cross-tabulations and analyses of the overlap of the vote propensity, it was possible to extract very specific answers regarding the trends among diverse groups. There was a special focus on the opinions held by the voters and sympathizers of the centre-left, of course. And, in this spirit, the next pages and the section entitled Key Findings are meant to serve as a piece of policy advice.

After the first wave, FEPS and FES took some time to discuss the initial results internally as well as with circles of experts from the six countries in question. The objective of these discussions was to put the findings in a country-specific context and explain both similarities and points of divergence when making an overall comparison. These debates took place during closed round tables consisting of Members of National Parliaments, Members of the European Parliaments, academics, trade unionists, civil society experts, party strategists and pollsters, youth representatives, and publicists. The organisers remain incredibly grateful to all these individuals for their time, enthusiasm, and input. It is not possible to name them all, as the total number surpassed 200. That said, we would like to mention our gratitude towards the organisations that helped with these events, especially the Centrum im. Ignacego Daszyńskiego, Olof Palme International Center, Foundation Pablo Iglesias, Foundation Rafael Campalans, as well as the respective FES regional Offices in Madrid, Stockholm, Warsaw, Paris, and Rome. The insights gained were invaluable and relevant for this country's case study and the comparative study.

With this in mind, we are eager to present you with this study, thanking again Instituto Cattaneo (including Salvatore Vassallo, Moreno Mancuso, and Federico Vegetti) for all the cooperation in designing the questionnaire and obtaining the data; Dynata for conducting the two waves of surveys; Kieskompas (including André Krouwel and Yordan Kutiyski) whose team engaged with us in several rounds and then completed these important documents. Finally, we would like to thank our colleagues, especially Celine Guedes (FEPS) and Adrianna Hornung (FES), who shouldered all the organizational load.

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
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# SUMMARY

## SWEDISH WOULD HAVE PREFERRED EVEN STRICTER MEASURES



- 1) The COVID-19 pandemic has deepened political and societal divisions in Europe; however, Sweden appears to be a unique case, as evidenced by the data analyses presented in this country report. While many Swedish citizens are critical of the government's policies toward curbing the pandemic, Sweden stands out because their criticism is mainly driven by a preference for stricter measures rather than more individual freedoms.
- 2) It is notable that, for a large part, respondents' opinions did not change substantially from 2020 to 2021. Rather, the substantial changes that did occur indicate that, despite the increased support for COVID-19 mitigation measures among most demographic groups, most Swedes also grew more dissatisfied with the way public funds were allocated.
- 3) Moreover, there was an increase in the perception that the measures against the pandemic were anti-democratic. This increase in criticism coincided with an erosion of institutional trust and an increased concern about climate change. Nevertheless, perceptions of deepening social divisions were much less prevalent than in other countries.
- 4) The opinions of voters for specific parties and different demographic groups remained largely the same from one year to the other: when it comes to pandemic-related matters and overall satisfaction with governance, voters that support the parties of the previous government – particularly Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti (SAP), Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP), and Centerpartiet (C) can be characterised as having the highest levels of satisfaction with the way the pandemic was handled, the highest degree of institutional trust, and the highest likelihood of following the government's pandemic recommendations.
- 5) Voters of the right-wing parties Kristdemokraterna (KD), Liberalerna (L), and Sverigedemokraterna (SD) are most concerned with the pandemic and more likely be critical of the government's policies, arguing that stricter measures are necessary to protect public health.
- 6) On the other hand, the voters of SAP, Vänsterpartiet (V), and C are most supportive of how the pandemic has been handled.
- 7) While it is clear that SD voters have different, more conservative and government-critical, opinions compared to the rest of the electorate, it comes as a surprise that L voters hold very similar views to those of SD loyalists when it comes to the pandemic.
- 8) Another pattern that emerges from the findings is that many dissatisfied Swedish citizens do not have a clear ideological persuasion: they identify with neither the left nor the right. This group of voters is predominantly represented within the SD and MP electorates. Such respondents tend to be critical of pandemic-related policies, less supportive of immigration, and less concerned about climate change than most other demographic groups.
- 9) In contrast, voters with a left-wing orientation are much more likely to be supportive of the government's policies and the way society operates in general.
- 10) Respondents who identify as right-wing often have critical stances similar to voters without political ideology, but even to a larger degree than the latter.
- 11) When it comes to demographics, the most cynical and politically distrustful respondents can be found among citizens with lower levels of education and those with income difficulties. These respondents are much more distrustful, have an anti-immigration and anti-climate policy orientation, and are generally dissatisfied with governance. Such citizens are also more likely to be opposed to immigration, critical of the European Union, and doubtful that climate change will have a serious impact on future generations.
- 12) In terms of age, older generations reported being less severely impacted by the negative effect of the pandemic, particularly related to deteriorating living and work conditions. This explains the much higher degree of support older generations have towards anti-COVID-19 measures.
- 13) In sum, the data indicate that, even though there are many different and often polarised opinions in Sweden, the majority of Swedish citizens are politically moderate, have relatively high confidence in their government, have a high degree of institutional trust, believe that immigrants are a benefit to society, and are concerned about climate change. Nevertheless, a substantial group of respondents is opposed to the country's membership in the EU.



# DATA AND METHODS





This country report offers an in-depth overview of public opinion in Sweden by comparing the stances of various demographic and political groups. Respondents were segmented by gender, age, educational attainment, economic well-being, and ideological orientation. Most importantly, voter groups were identified based on respondents' current vote intention. Comparing citizen categories allows policy-makers and political campaigners alike to make informed decisions when targeting specific population groups.

The results compare how the aforementioned groups of respondents answered the various closed-ended survey questions. Questions on the same topic (e.g., support for measures against the COVID-19 pandemic) that use a scale rather than ordinal answer categories were used to create indices after a reliability analysis was performed to confirm that they measure the same concept. For these indices, the mean scores for each respondent group were estimated; the groups were subsequently plotted on two-dimensional scatterplots comprised of two indices. Again, the average mean scores between the two waves were calculated for each voter group.

Two waves of survey data in six countries: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden, were collected by Dynata, in coordination with the Cattaneo institute, in December 2020/January 2021 and October/November 2021, respectively. In Sweden, the first wave comprises a sample of 1,005 respondents, the second wave a sample of 1,009 respondents, representative of the demographic composition and political preferences of the Swedish population. The questionnaires used in both waves contained largely overlapping questions, allowing for an over-time comparison of public opinion on various socioeconomic issues. Given that there were very minor opinion differences between the two waves for items included in both survey iterations, the average percentage and mean scores for these questions are reported, with several exceptions. The following questions were only asked in the first wave of the survey and, therefore, only results from this wave are reported:

- There are different views on how the national government balanced, in the short run, protecting jobs and protecting public health when responding to the coronavirus pandemic.
- There are different views on how the national government balanced preserving public health and preserving individual freedom when responding to the coronavirus pandemic.
- Some hope to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as soon as possible, others believe that it would be risky to get vaccinated. If the health authorities provide you an opportunity to get vaccinated, how likely is it that you will do so?
- Have you installed the COVID Symptom Tracker on your smartphone?

In addition, several questions were only included in the second wave of the questionnaire and, therefore, only results from this wave were reported:

- Some people argue that the COVID-19 vaccination should be mandatory for everyone to stop the pandemic, others that people should always be free to choose whether to get vaccinated or not.
- Compared to the end of 2020, do you think that your own economic situation...
- And thinking about the next 12 months, do you think that your own economic situation...

The indices measuring conspiracy belief, populist sentiments, and the question asking respondents to evaluate the "NextGenerationEU" plan were also included in the second wave only; therefore, only this second wave data is analyzed for these items.



# CHAPTER 1

## MAJORITY OF SWEDES REPORTED THEIR WORKING CONDITIONS LARGELY UNAFFECTED




**Likelihood of and Concern about Contracting the Virus**

Despite the danger posed by COVID-19, the majority of Swedish citizens (67.1 per cent) did not think it likely that they would contract the virus. KD voters were most likely to consider that they would contract the virus, while SAP and SD voters were less likely to think they would get infected. When

it comes to demographics, respondents who are women, younger, highly educated, and lower-income considered it less likely that they would contract the virus. Broken down by ideological orientation, people with no ideological orientation thought it less likely that they would contract the virus compared to those aligned with the left or right.


**Figure 1 / Q22 – In your opinion, how likely is it that you will contract COVID-19?**



When it comes to the dangers the virus would pose to individuals' health, it is clear that the majority of Swedish citizens (nearly 80 per cent) are at least slightly concerned. Voters of the left-wing parties SAP and V, along with smaller party voters, are least likely to be concerned with the health risk posed by the COVID-19 infection. In contrast to the oth-

er countries in this study, populist SD voters are among the respondents most strongly concerned about the virus. Women, respondents aged 35 to 64, centrist, and less educated respondents are most concerned about the health risks posed by COVID-19, while differences in income do not result in clear-cut opinion differences on this risk perception.

Figure 2 / Q23 – How concerned are you that a COVID infection might endanger your health?




**Evaluations of Government Policy against the Pandemic**

While about half of Swedish citizens reported that they thought the government’s response to the pandemic was balanced, there were substantial critical voices on the matter. While about 14 per cent of those surveyed think that government measures did not take protecting jobs sufficiently into account, 38 per cent answered that the government should have taken stronger measures to protect public health. This differs from other countries, where citizens were mostly concerned with job protection. Voters of

centrist and left-wing parties are all overwhelmingly supportive of the government policies, while right-wing and liberal voters are most critical of the government policy and think more should have been done to protect public health. In terms of demographics, women, older respondents, the less educated, and those with the most difficult economic situations are most likely to think that the government should have focused on protecting public health. Unlike the other five countries in this study, right-wing respondents are most critical of the government’s measures.

**Figure 3 / Q38 – Government balance – jobs or public health**


- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to protect public health instead of jobs
- They got the balance about right
- The government has taken exaggerated precautions to protect jobs instead of public health



A similar pattern emerges when looking at how citizens view the government response as a trade-off between preserving people's freedom and protecting public health: a minority of 44.2 per cent of Swedish respondents consider the balance to be about right, while about 12 per cent think freedoms were unduly restricted. Finally, 44 per cent think the restrictions should have been more

far-reaching. Again, left-wing and centrist voters are most supportive of the restrictive measures, while those on the right, particularly SD and M voters, think that additional measures should have been taken. Women and older respondents are more likely than other demographic groups to consider that additional measures should have been taken.

Figure 4 / Q39 – Government balance – freedoms or public health




**Likelihood of Getting Vaccinated**

When the survey was conducted in November 2020, 67.1 per cent of the respondents stated that they would get vaccinated if health authorities offered them the opportunity to do so. This number is much lower than the current vaccination rate in Sweden, which stands at about 84 per cent. Voters for centrist and left-wing parties were most likely to say they would get vaccinated, while more than 40 per cent

of L and SD voters and a clear majority of about 70 per cent of smaller party voters reported they would not do so. Men were more likely than women to say they would get vaccinated, while younger respondents were substantially less likely to say they would get vaccinated than older generations; similarly, respondents with less education, those with lower incomes, and those with no ideological persuasion were less likely to say they would get vaccinated.

**Figure 5 / Q52 – Likelihood of getting vaccinated**




**The Impact of COVID-19 on Quality of Life and Working Conditions**

There is very little variation among the different population segments when it comes to the impact of the pandemic on people's quality of life: nearly 70 per cent of Swedes report that they have been affected negatively.

Still, L and V voters have felt the most negative impact on their lives. Women and younger people experienced a higher degree of quality of life deterioration, along with those with lower incomes. There are no clear differences in how seriously people were affected when it comes to ideology.

**Figure 6 / Q74 – Overall, how would you assess the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the quality of your life?**






Most Swedish respondents report that their working conditions were unaffected by the pandemic (58.5 per cent). Nevertheless, on both sides of the political spectrum, L and MP voters report a much more substantial deterioration of their working conditions compared to voters of

centrist and radical parties on both the left and the right. Those reporting being most negatively affected by the pandemic are younger respondents, those with higher educational attainment, no ideological persuasion, and lower-income individuals.

Figure 7 / Q75 – How would you assess the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on your working conditions?




**COVID-19 Contact Tracing App**

A rather underwhelming proportion of respondents have installed the national contact tracing app (Covid Symptom Tracker) — a mere 10.4 per cent. Voters of L and MP were more likely to have installed the app than other voter

groups, especially M, SD, and smaller party voters. Younger people, those with low and high levels of education, left-wing respondents, and politically centrist respondents were most likely to have installed the application, although this percentage is very low among all respondent groups.

**Figure 8 / Q61 – Have you installed on your smartphone the national contact tracing app (Covid Symptom Tracker)?**




**Mandatory Vaccination**

Nearly 70 per cent of Swedish respondents believe there should be some form of mandatory vaccination against COVID-19. Voters SAP, C, and L are most supportive of mandatory vaccination, whereas SD and smaller party voters are most opposed, although the level of support for mandatory vaccination is similar among all voter groups. Men are more likely than women to support mandatory

vaccinations, along with older voters, those with higher incomes, and those with left-wing ideologies (although the latter are much more supportive of vaccine mandates for accessing public spaces). Likewise, highly educated respondents are more likely to be supportive of requesting vaccine proof for public space access. Respondents with no political ideology are most opposed to mandatory vaccination.

**Figure 9 / Q21G – Mandatory vaccination**




**Institutional Trust, Support for COVID Measures and Public Perceptions of the Pandemic**

The Support for COVID-19 Mitigation Measures Index comprises five separate questions; respondents were asked to evaluate the measures various institutions have taken to respond to the pandemic. The Institutional Trust Index is generated from six separate questions that ask respondents to what extent they trust various national and international institutions on a 10-point scale, where 0 means “no trust at all” and 10 means “complete trust”. All questions used in the scatterplots are asked with a 10-point scale answer category. For all indices included in the country report, lower scores indicate a low level of support or agreement with what is measured, while higher scores account for a high level of support. In sum, a lower institu-

tional trust index score signifies a lower degree of institutional trust. The average values of numerous respondent groups are reported in a two-dimensional scatterplot with the various population segmentations based on age, gender, educational attainment, difficulty coping with income, political orientation, and party support.

There is a clear linear relationship between the two indices: the more institutionally trustful respondents are, the more likely they are to support COVID-19 measures. In particular, voters of the moderate, centrist, and left-wing parties (with the exception of V voters), those with higher levels of education, those with higher incomes, and people aged 65 and above are most supportive of the measures against the pandemic and also have the highest levels of institutional

**Figure 10 – Support für Covid Measures**



trust. On the other hand, SD voters, those without clear political ideology, and the respondents in the most precarious economic situations have substantially lower degrees of trust and are less likely to support COVID-19 measures compared to ideologically left-wing respondents, the highly educated, and the economically well-off.

When it comes to perceptions of who has benefitted from the public spending during the pandemic, it is clear that V voters, people struggling to cope with their income, and SD voters think that the wealthiest have benefitted the most

from the public spending for economic recovery. Less educated respondents, those aged 18 to 24, those with higher incomes, urban respondents, and M and L voters are less likely to believe that public spending has benefitted the wealthiest. However, it is important to note that the question on the vertical axis is a 10-point scale, meaning that all respondent groups in the graph score above the mean of the scale. This suggests that the public is rather dissatisfied with the handling of public spending during the pandemic. There is a general and widespread perception that the pandemic exacerbated existing societal inequalities.


Figure 11 – Beneficiaries of Public Spending



When it comes to the perception that measures against the pandemic go against constitutional and democratic principles, it is clear that Swedes are divided on the matter. Nevertheless, Sweden is less divided than the other countries included in this comparative study. On average, SD and MP voters, those aged 25 to 34, and people without

clear ideology are more likely to think the government actions went against the constitution. Respondents older than 55, those with left-wing orientation, and Liberal voters are least likely to think that the governmental actions to face the pandemic were unconstitutional and anti-democratic.

Figure 12 – Covid Measures and Constitutional Rules




Most Swedish respondents agree that the pandemic has deepened the divisions among people, although the degree of agreement is lower than in other countries. The perception that divisions have deepened in Sweden decreased from 2020 to 2021; this is the only country where

this happened of the six where data was collected. SD and KD voters, respondents with income difficulties, and those without a political ideology are most likely to agree with the proposition.

Figure 13 – Covid and Divisions Among People



Figure 14





When it comes to the differences between the results in the two waves, we report how the mean values for each index changed for each sociodemographic respondent group. Respondents' perceptions that the pandemic has deepened divisions are mixed: notable opinion shifts have occurred among KD and L voters. For KD voters, perceptions of deepened divisions have increased, whereas for L voters, they have declined. At the same time, support for COVID-19 measures increased slightly among nearly all voter groups. Negative perceptions towards the handling of the pandemic also increased, as shown by the increased perceptions that the measures are non-democratic, and that money spent during the pandemic exacerbated inequalities among nearly all respondent groups.

## KEY FINDINGS 1

- Although the majority of Swedish respondents understand the COVID-19 pandemic has a serious impact of on public health, society is rather polarized when it comes to the government's anti-pandemic response and vaccination campaign.
- While the vast majority of Swedes are concerned that the virus would endanger their health if they were to get sick, a majority did not consider it is likely that they would contract the virus. Voters of SAP and SD were least likely to think they would contract the virus.
- More than 40 per cent of Swedes consider the government to have taken appropriate measures to protect public health, regardless of the impact these measures had on the economy and personal freedoms. Respondents with economic difficulties, along with SD and M voters and those who identify as right-wing, were most critical of the anti-pandemic measures.
- The vast majority of respondents reported their willingness to get vaccinated. However, SD, L, and smaller party voters, as well respondents with income difficulties, were less likely to say they would get vaccinated compared to the average Swede.
- When it comes to deterioration of quality of life and working conditions because of the pandemic, the majority of the Swedish public reports a negative effect, particularly on their life quality, while most Swedes' working conditions remained largely unaffected. Nevertheless, it is clear that both the lifestyle and work of those on the bottom of the economic ladder, as well as of Liberal party voters were most negatively affected by the pandemic.
- The majority of Swedes believe that there should be some form of mandatory vaccination, at least when it comes to accessing public events. SD voters, respondents with income difficulties and those without political ideology are most likely to oppose mandatory vaccinations.
- The more institutionally trustful respondents are, the more likely they are to support COVID-19 measures. In particular, voters of the governing coalition parties, those with higher level of education and with higher incomes are most supportive of the measures against the pandemic and also have the highest levels of institutional trust.
- The perception that measures against the pandemic go against constitutional and democratic principles is a divisive matter. SD voters, those struggling with their income, those aged 25 to 34 and those with no political ideology are most likely to believe that the measures have taken democratic freedoms away.

## CHAPTER 2


TWO IN TEN BELIEVE THAT  
COVID WAS INTENTIONALLY  
RELEASED BY CHINA



When it comes to belief in conspiracy theories, the proposition stating that “the virus is a biological weapon intentionally released by China” has the largest degree of support among Swedes (26 per cent of those surveyed state that they believe in this theory) compared to the other conspiracy theories in this study. SD voters are most likely

to agree with the proposition, while V and C voters are least likely to do so. Younger respondents, those with less education, those most precarious in terms of income, as well as respondents with right-wing or no ideology are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory than other respondent groups.


Figure 15 / Q57XB – “The virus is a biological weapon released by China”



The proposition stating that “5G technology is causing the coronavirus to spread more quickly” has a low degree of support — 11 per cent of those surveyed state that they believe in the theory. MP voters are most likely to agree with the proposition, while KD and V voters are least likely to do

so. Younger respondents, those with less education, those least able to cope with their income, as well as respondents with centrist or no ideology, are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory compared to other demographic groups.


Figure 16 / Q57XB – “5G technology is causing the coronavirus to spread more quickly”



A rather high degree of agreement among the populace was found for the conspiracy theory “The virus has been spread by multinational pharmaceutical companies now ready to make huge profits by selling the vaccine” has a rather high degree of agreement – 19.6 per cent of those surveyed stated that they believe in the theory. L and KD

voters are most likely to agree with the proposition, while MP and M voters are least likely to do so. Younger respondents, the less educated, the economically precarious, and political centrists are more likely to believe that multinational pharmaceutical companies have spread the virus for their own economic gain.


**Figure 17/Q57XB – “The virus has been spread by multinational pharmaceutical companies so they can make huge profits by selling the vaccine”**



The proposition stating that “the coronavirus is a hoax” has the lowest degree of support; only 7.8 per cent of those surveyed doubt that the virus is a genuine threat. L voters and supporters of smaller parties are most likely to agree with the proposition, while V and M voters are

least likely to think that COVID-19 is a hoax. Younger respondents, the less educated, the economically precarious, and political centrists are more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory compared to other demographic groups.

Figure 18 / Q57XB – “The coronavirus is a hoax”



## KEY FINDINGS 2

- Given that conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic were prevalent during the first two years of the pandemic, it comes as no surprise that a large proportion of Swedish citizens profess that some conspiracy theories are true — more than 2 in 10 people believe that the virus has been intentionally released by China.
- SD and L voters are notably more likely to profess belief in conspiracy theories than other voter groups, along with less educated, younger respondents, and those with income difficulties.
- Two conspiracy theories (that the virus was intentionally released by China and spread intentionally by pharmaceutical corporations) have the largest degree of support among the Swedish public: 26 and 20 per cent, respectively.
- A substantial number of respondents also agree the two other conspiracy theories, even though one would expect otherwise, given their very unlikely propositions: 11 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that 5G technology helps the virus spread more quickly, while 8 per cent agreed with the statement that the coronavirus is a hoax.
- The data suggests that there is a widespread belief in conspiracy theories in Sweden. These findings could indicate that at times of crisis, public opinion is more susceptible to suggestive messages disseminated by populists and organizations with potentially anti-democratic aims.

# CHAPTER 3

## YOUNG VOTERS HAVE POSITIVE EXPECTATIONS REGARDING ECONOMY IN 2022





**Changes in Economic Situation between 2020 and 2021**


A small majority of Swedish respondents (55.3 per cent) state that their economic situation remained the same from 2020 to 2021. Understandably, only 19.6 per cent stated that their situation improved, while, for 25.1 per cent of respondents, their economic situation deteriorated after 2020. L voters reported experiencing the largest degree of improve-

ment, while the opposite is the case for SAP voters. SAP and M voters are the voter groups whose economic situation remained largely unchanged compared to 2020. The proportion of respondents with a deteriorating economic situation is similar among nearly all voter groups; however, it is less prominent among older respondents, those with higher levels of education, and those comfortable with their income.

**Figure 19 / Q27 – Changes in Economic Situation between 2020 and 2021**

Compared to the end of 2020, do you think that your own economic situation ...

■ Got a lot better   
 ■ Got a little better   
 ■ Stayed the same   
 ■ Got a little worse   
 ■ Got a lot worse



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Got a lot better	6,5%	3,2%
Got a little better	17,5%	14,9%
Stayed the same	55,9%	60,2%
Got a little worse	12,8%	14,5%
Got a lot worse	7,3%	7,2%

**Age**

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Got a lot better	7,8%	8,5%	7,8%	3,1%	0,1%	2,9%
Got a little better	27,6%	20,9%	18,1%	12,9%	10,4%	12,6%
Stayed the same	33,6%	51,0%	47,0%	63,2%	68,8%	71,1%
Got a little worse	25,0%	15,0%	14,5%	11,7%	9,7%	10,5%
Got a lot worse	6,0%	4,6%	12,7%	9,2%	9,7%	2,9%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Got a lot better	5,9%	3,7%	5,8%
Got a little better	11,2%	17,4%	17,8%
Stayed the same	59,5%	57,0%	58,1%
Got a little worse	10,7%	15,2%	13,5%
Got a lot worse	12,7%	6,8%	4,8%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Got a lot better	9,5%	2,5%	0,8%	-
Got a little better	22,9%	12,4%	11,9%	6,6%
Stayed the same	61,0%	62,2%	45,8%	32,8%
Got a little worse	5,7%	19,4%	26,3%	13,1%
Got a lot worse	0,9%	3,5%	15,3%	47,5%

**Ideology**

	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Got a lot better	5,2%	7,7%	5,1%	0,6%
Got a little better	18,2%	11,9%	15,7%	17,9%
Stayed the same	56,5%	59,5%	60,8%	53,6%
Got a little worse	12,7%	17,3%	13,3%	13,1%
Got a lot worse	7,4%	3,6%	5,1%	14,9%

**Future Economic Outlook**


When it comes to their economic expectations for the next 12 months, 50.5 per cent of respondents expected their economic situation to stay the same. More voters are optimistic (30.2 per cent) than pessimistic (18.2 per cent). MP and L voters were the most positive when it came to

their expectations for the coming year, while SD voters were the most negative. Also, those in more precarious income situations, as well as respondents with no ideology, had the most negative economic expectations for the next 12 months.

**Figure 20 / Q28 – Economic outlook for the next 12 months**

And thinking about the next 12 months, do you think that your own economic situation ...

Will get a lot better   Will get a little better   Will stay the same   Will get a little worse   Will get a lot worse



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Will get a lot better	10,3%	7,2%
Will get a little better	27,2%	24,8%
Will stay the same	47,4%	54,3%
Will get a little worse	11,3%	10,5%
Will get a lot worse	3,7%	3,1%

**Age**

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Will get a lot better	25,0%	13,2%	9,8%	5,1%	3,4%	2,5%
Will get a little better	37,9%	37,7%	36,0%	24,4%	16,2%	13,1%
Will stay the same	29,3%	41,1%	37,8%	55,1%	63,5%	66,2%
Will get a little worse	6,0%	6,0%	10,4%	9,6%	14,9%	15,6%
Will get a lot worse	1,7%	2,0%	6,1%	5,8%	2,0%	2,5%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Will get a lot better	8,6%	8,3%	9,2%
Will get a little better	23,4%	27,3%	25,9%
Will stay the same	53,8%	50,1%	50,1%
Will get a little worse	9,6%	11,5%	11,3%
Will get a lot worse	4,6%	2,8%	3,5%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Will get a lot better	14,9%	4,2%	2,6%	6,8%
Will get a little better	26,2%	26,5%	28,1%	23,7%
Will stay the same	52,6%	53,1%	43,0%	37,3%
Will get a little worse	5,3%	14,9%	18,4%	11,9%
Will get a lot worse	1,0%	1,3%	7,9%	20,3%

**Ideology**


	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Will get a lot better	6,6%	12,0%	9,8%	7,6%
Will get a little better	27,0%	28,3%	22,9%	28,5%
Will stay the same	57,1%	44,0%	51,8%	42,4%
Will get a little worse	7,2%	12,7%	11,9%	15,8%
Will get a lot worse	2,2%	3,0%	3,7%	5,7%

**Working from Home**

The majority of all voter groups, apart from SAP and smaller party voters, worked from home during the previous week at the time in which the data was collected (November 2020/2021). SAP and SD voters were least likely to have

worked from home, while L, MP, and KD voters spent the most time working from home. Younger respondents (aged 18 to 44), those with higher incomes, those with higher levels of educational attainment, and centrists were more likely than other groups to work from home.

**Figure 21 / Q9 – “During the last week, how much time have you spent working from home?”**



**Income Situation**


The majority of Swedish citizens (80 per cent) report that they live comfortably or cope well with their income. The voter groups experiencing the most economic difficulties are voters of C and the smaller parties, while L, V, and M voters predominantly report being well-off economically.

Women, respondents aged 35 to 54, the less educated, those without ideology, and centrists Women, respondents aged 35 to 54, the less educated, those without ideology, and centrists are considerably less likely to report that they live comfortably with their income than other demographic groups.

**Figure 22 / Q12 – Income situation**

Which of these descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?

■ Living comfortably  
 ■ Coping  
 ■ Finding it difficult  
 ■ Finding it very difficult




**Homeownership**

When it comes to homeownership, it is a notable finding that the proportion of respondents who own a home in Sweden outright is the lowest among the countries included in the analyses — only 15.9 per cent. Nevertheless, there is a considerable proportion of respondents who own a home with a mortgage. When the combined proportion of homeownership is considered, KD and M voters are considerably more likely to own a home than other voter groups. Men are considerably more likely than wom-

en to own a home, while the degree of homeownership with a mortgage is similar among all age groups. Education is clearly related to home ownership, as evidenced by the finding that those with high levels of education are much more likely to own a home compared to other education categories. Income is also a predictor of home ownership: the higher income a person has, the more likely they are to own a home. When it comes to ideology, right-wing respondents are more likely to own a home than other ideological groups.

**Figure 23 / Q12B – Homeownership**




## KEY FINDINGS 3

- The vast majority of Swedes reported that their economic situation stayed the same or improved from 2020 to 2021. SD and L voters, as well as respondents with income difficulties and no political ideology, are most likely to report a deterioration of their economic situation.
- Most Swedes have a positive economic outlook for the upcoming year (2022) or expect things to stay the same. L and MP voters, younger respondents, and those with high incomes have the most positive expectations, whereas SAP and SD voters, along with people in a difficult economic situation, have the most negative expectations.
- When it comes to income, more than 80 per cent of Swedes report that they live comfortably or at least are able to cope with their current income. L, V, and MP voters are the economically most comfortable voter groups, along with respondents who have higher levels of education or are right-wing. C voters and the voters of smaller parties are most likely to experience income difficulties.
- Centre-right KD and M voters are much more likely to own a home compared to other voter groups.
- Income and education are also predictors of homeownership: the higher income and education a person has, the more likely they are to own a home.



# CHAPTER 4

## SWEDISH VOTERS STILL HAVE A LOT OF TRUST IN SCIENCE





**EU Membership**


Less than half of Swedish respondents (46.7 per cent) consider their country's EU membership to be a good thing, and 23.6 per cent perceive EU membership negatively. The low support for EU membership in Sweden might be explained by the fact that Nordic citizens view the EU differently than other Europeans. For them, the EU is seen more as a trading block than anything else. Nevertheless, the approval of EU membership has been

steadily rising in Sweden. The results differ per vote choice, with L, MP, and C voters being the most positive about Sweden's EU membership, while SD voters and supporters of smaller parties are most likely to think Sweden's EU membership is a bad thing. In terms of demographics, older respondents, the less educated, those with income difficulties, and right-wing respondents are most likely to perceive Sweden's EU membership as a bad thing.

**Figure 24 / Q20 – Membership in the EU**

Generally speaking, do you think that your national's membership of the EU is ...?

■ A good thing   ■ A bad thing   ■ Neither good nor bad



**Economic Regulation by the State**


In what can be seen as good news for the (moderate) left, a clear majority (68.1 per cent) of Swedish respondents agree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy. MP, SAP, and V voters agree with this proposition the most. A slight majority of SD and L voters are in favour of this statement, while voters for smaller

parties disagree the most. Men are notably more likely to disagree with the statement (showing the gender gap with women who are more in favour of state intervention), along with older generations, higher and middle educated respondents. Unsurprisingly, those with right-wing ideological orientation are more likely to disagree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy.

**Figure 25 / Q41C – State regulation of the economy**

“The state should play a greater role in the regulation of the economy”

Agree strongly    Agree    Disagree    Disagree strongly




**Science Scepticism**

When it comes to distrust in science, a common sentiment among citizens critical of the way the COVID-19 pandemic is handled, Swedish respondents are evenly split: more than 34.9 per cent of respondents agree with the statement “people don’t realise just how flawed a lot of scientific research really is”, while 34.1 per cent disagree. The proportion of respondents who agree with the state-

ment makes up a majority of smaller party voters. The proportion of those in agreement is the lowest among V and SAP voters. In contrast, voters of SD and L are most likely to agree with the statement. Respondents aged 25 to 44, those with higher levels of education, those with income difficulties, and respondents who identify as right-wing or as centrists are all more likely to agree that science is more flawed than people realise.


**Figure 26 / Q53 – Science Scepticism**



Many respondents are also concerned with the influence of scientists in society, although the proportion here is relatively smaller: 21.1 per cent of those surveyed (strongly) agree with the proposition compared to 50 per cent who disagree; 28.9 per cent neither agree nor disagree. The voters of the KD, L, and SD parties are more worried about

the influence of scientists in society, while V, C, M, and SAP voters are least likely to worry about the influence of scientists. Younger respondents, those in economically precarious situations, people with no ideology, and centrists are more likely to be concerned with the influence of scientists in society compared to other demographic groups.

Figure 27 / Q53 – “I am concerned by the amount of influence that scientists have in society”




**Opinions on Gender Inequality**

When it comes to traditional gender roles when jobs are scarce, there is an overwhelming opposition regarding this proposition across the Swedish public at large, with 58 per cent of respondents (strongly) disagreeing with the

proposition. Nevertheless, some voters of KD, L, and the smaller parties agree with prioritising male employment over female employment. In terms of demographics, men, younger respondents, and ideological centrists are more likely to agree with the statement than other groups.

**Figure 28 / Q64 – “Men should have more right to work than women when jobs are scarce”**




**Support for Immigration, Opinions on Climate Change, Populism, and the NextGenerationEU Program**

The Support for Immigration Index is comprised of two separate scales, which asked respondents whether immigrants are a benefit to the country’s economic development and whether they culturally enrich the country. The Institutional Trust Index is comprised of six separate questions that ask respondents to what extent they trust various national and international institutions (please see the section on methodology for more information). The average values of numerous respondent groups are reported in a two-dimensional scatterplot.

Ideologically left-wing respondents, voters of SAP, MP, L, C, and V, as well as those with the highest incomes and levels of education, are most supportive of immigration in Sweden. On the other hand, SD voters, respondents with no ideological persuasion, and those most struggling with their income are least supportive. This suggests that citizens in the most precarious economic situations feel the most threatened by immigration. Contrary to the findings in other countries, respondents aged 65 or older are the age group most supportive of immigration in Sweden.


**Figure 29 – Support for Immigration**



The majority of Swedish citizens are seriously concerned about the impact of climate change on future generations, as evidenced by the graph above: all respondent groups, including SD voters, score above the average on the scale of concern about climate change. As was to be expected, MP voters are most concerned with climate

change, as are voters of the other left-wing and centrist parties. Right-wing respondents and people without an ideological persuasion, SD voters, those with lower levels of educational attainment, and those struggling financially are least concerned about climate change.


Figure 30 – Impact of Climate Change



In terms of change over time, most voter groups are now more concerned about climate change, with those aged 35 to 44 and respondents coping with their income having a marked increase. Meanwhile, the degree of institutional trust declined among nearly all respondent groups, espe-

cially respondents with no ideological orientation and income difficulties. The changes in support for immigration are mixed, with support increasing particularly among centrist and older respondents and declining further among KD voters and respondents without political ideology.

Figure 31





A substantial number of Swedish respondents believe in at least one conspiracy theory, as measured by the high average scores (higher than 5 out of 10) of the Conspiracy Theory Belief Index among all respondent groups except for Liberal party voters. It comes as no surprise that SD voters are most susceptible to conspiracy theories, along

with respondents with income difficulties, no ideology, right-wing ideology, and rural voters. In contrast, left-wing and centrist party voters, those comfortable with their incomes, the highly educated, and older respondents are less likely to believe in conspiracies.


Figure 32 – Belief in Conspiracy Theories



When it comes to populism, as measured by anti-elitist sentiments, it is clear that SD voters, along with respondents with income difficulties, right-wing or no ideology, those aged 35 to 54, and the less educated are among the most populist respondent groups. SAP, C, and L voters,

those comfortable with their income, and those aged 65 or older are the least populist demographic groups in Sweden. There are no considerable differences between the other demographic groups.

Figure 33 – Followers of Populism



The 'NextGenerationEU' plan, designed by the European Commission as a strategy for transforming societies and economies in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, enjoys a larger degree of support among the Swedish public than it does in other countries. MP, SAP, L, and C voters, along with those with a left-wing political orientation, younger respondents, and those comfortable with

their income are the demographic groups most supportive of the program. Conversely, SD voters, those with no ideology, and those with economic difficulties are least supportive of the plan. This could mean that economically vulnerable groups are concerned that the socioeconomic transformation will have a negative impact on their lives.

Figure 34 – Support NextGenerationEU Plan



## KEY FINDINGS 4


- Although relatively few Swedes perceive their country's EU membership negatively, nearly a third of respondents are ambivalent about the EU. L, MP, and C voters are most positive about Sweden's EU membership, while SD voters and supporters of smaller parties are most likely to think their country's EU membership is a bad thing.
- A clear majority (70 per cent) of Swedish respondents agree that the state should play a greater role in regulating the economy. Even among L and M voters, the proportion of those who agree is higher than 50 per cent.
- The results suggest that the Swedish public still has a lot of trust in science. The voters of SD, KD, and smaller parties are the most distrustful, while MP, SAP, and V voters are most likely to see science positively.
- A very small number of Swedes believe that men should have a job priority when employment positions are scarce. KD and smaller party voters are most likely to agree with the proposition, along with men, younger, less educated respondents, and ideologically centrist respondents.
- Party preference, age, education, and income situation are the strongest predictors of support for immigration, with respondents who vote for left-wing parties, have higher incomes, are highly educated, or are older being most positive towards immigrants. On the other hand, SD voters, respondents with no political ideology, and those struggling with their income are more likely to oppose immigration.
- All respondents are at least somewhat concerned about climate change, even those traditionally sceptical about the human influence on climate, such as respondents who have lower levels of education or right-wing ideologies. Nevertheless, citizens are unlikely to accept measures against climate change that will directly impact their economic situation negatively, such as increasing energy prices.
- Belief in conspiracy theories (based on an index containing questions unrelated to the pandemic) is most widespread among SD voters, people without an ideology, and people with income difficulties, pointing to the overall cynical worldview of many respondents in these demographic categories. L, SAP, and V voters, as well as left-wing respondents, are least likely to believe in conspiracy theories.
- The most populist respondent groups are SD voters, along with respondents with income difficulties. SAP, C, and L voters are the least populist demographic groups in Sweden.
- When it comes to the 'NextGenerationEU' plan, it is clear that it is supported most by centrist and left-leaning parties, while SD voters, people with no ideology, and people with income difficulties have a rather negative evaluation of the policy program.





## CHAPTER 5

THE SUPPORT FOR SD, V AND M  
CLEARLY INCREASED ON THE COST  
OF OTHER PARTIES



**Political Ideology**


A very logical and consistent pattern arises from data gathered connecting political orientation to party choice. Nearly 6 in 10 of those with a left-leaning political orientation consider themselves centre-left; on the right, it is about 5 in 10. Clearly, most Swedish think of themselves as

political moderates. This is in sharp contrast to the political discourse in which often the extremes dominate; yet, they are clearly a minority. In Sweden, 15,4 per cent of respondents place themselves in the political centre. Only very small proportions of Swedish voters position themselves on the political extremes.

**Figure 35 / Q71 – Political ideology**

Consider the following labels. Which one best expresses the way you define yourself politically?

Radical Left Left Center-Left Center Center-Right Right Radical Right None of these



**Gender**

	Male	Female
Radical Left	1,7%	0,7%
Left	12,6%	12,8%
Center-Left	19,0%	19,4%
Center	13,6%	17,2%
Center-Right	21,7%	14,9%
Right	18,8%	12,8%
Radical Right	2,2%	0,9%
None of these	10,4%	21,3%

**Age**

	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Radical Left	1,2%	2,5%	2,1%	0,9%	0,006410256	0,4%
Left	13,6%	14,9%	13,3%	11,1%	15,4%	9,9%
Center-Left	16,9%	14,3%	20,6%	15,0%	21,5%	23,9%
Center	17,5%	19,0%	15,3%	16,2%	13,1%	12,4%
Center-Right	13,6%	16,5%	13,6%	20,7%	14,4%	25,6%
Right	10,7%	11,1%	13,0%	19,5%	18,3%	19,3%
Radical Right	2,5%	3,8%	1,8%	0,9%	1,3%	0,6%
None of these	24,0%	17,8%	20,4%	15,6%	15,4%	8,0%

**Education**

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Radical Left	1,2%	1,0%	1,5%
Left	12,7%	13,6%	11,8%
Center-Left	21,2%	18,1%	19,6%
Center	13,7%	16,5%	15,5%
Center-Right	13,9%	18,4%	20,5%
Right	13,7%	15,8%	17,1%
Radical Right	1,2%	1,0%	2,2%
None of these	22,3%	15,7%	11,9%

**Income**

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Radical Left	1,0%	1,4%	1,6%	–
Left	11,1%	13,1%	14,3%	14,0%
Center-Left	21,1%	19,5%	17,5%	13,7%
Center	13,4%	16,1%	20,1%	19,9%
Center-Right	21,9%	19,6%	7,7%	15,1%
Right	18,0%	15,2%	14,6%	14,8%
Radical Right	2,1%	1,1%	1,6%	1,7%
None of these	11,4%	14,0%	22,6%	20,7%

**Ideology**


	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Radical Left	3,6%	–	–	–
Left	38,4%	–	–	–
Center-Left	58,0%	–	–	–
Center	–	100,0%	–	–
Center-Right	–	–	51,4%	–
Right	–	–	44,3%	–
Radical Right	–	–	4,3%	–
None of these	–	–	–	100,0%

Those considering themselves radical leftists are primarily concentrated within the V electorate, with very few aligning themselves with SAP. In fact, large majorities of the SAP and MP electorate consider themselves centre-left of pure centrists. The largest proportion of right-wing voters is within the M electorate. Surprisingly, the largest proportion of radical right voters is to be found within the L electorate and not SD (this may be an artefact of the very low number of respondents). The largest proportion of centrist voters can be found within the MP electorate. While men and those aged 18 to 24 are more likely to identify as right-wing, women, the less educated, and those with economic difficulties are more likely to report no ideological orientation.

**Vote Recall in the 2019 European Parliament Elections**

Most respondents who voted for a particular party in the 2019 European elections were still planning to vote for the same party if a national election was held at the time of data collection. SAP voters are the most loyal ones to their party — 77.8 per cent of them were still planning to vote for the party in a national election, while only 38.5 per cent of L voters stated they would do so. There appears to be a notable electoral withdrawal of voters from the smaller parties to L, KD, and C.

**Figure 36 – Which party did you vote for at the European Election of 2019?**






### Vote Intention Changes from 2020 to 2021

This study reports only minor shifts in electoral support from 2020 to 2021 in Sweden. Support for the governing social democrats and the parties that supported the gov-

ernment of former prime minister Stefan Löfven (C, MP, and L) declined slightly, whereas support for M, SD, and V increased. The proportion of respondents who do not know which party they would vote for also increased.

Figure 37 – If there were a national general election tomorrow which party would you vote for?



## KEY FINDINGS 5

- Respondents who identify with radical ideologies, on both the left and the right, comprise less than 3 per cent of the Swedish electorate. In contrast, left and left-of-centre respondents are a larger respondent group than their (centre-) right counterparts. V is the party which enjoys the support of most left-leaning voters, while M voters are most likely to identify as right-wing.
- Most people who voted for a certain party in the 2019 European elections reported that they would still likely vote for the same party in a national election. V and SD were most likely to retain their voters, while KD, C, and L were most likely to lose voters.
- The reported changes in voting behaviour from 2020 to 2021 show that support for SD and V and M has slightly increased, whereas it has declined for the other parties. Surprisingly, SD is the largest party in both waves. However, undecided voters could change this pattern.

## CHAPTER 6

SD AND V VOTERS HAVE THE LARGEST PROPORTION OF MIDDLE AND LESS EDUCATED VOTERS




**Education**

In terms of education, MP voters and supporters of smaller parties are the voter groups with the largest proportion of highly educated respondents. The groups with the smallest proportion of higher educated respondents are SD and V voters. The SAP voter base is also largely less educated, a

pattern different from other countries where social democratic voters are predominantly highly educated. The data suggests there are very few respondents with lower education among M and KD voters. The largest group of middle-educated respondents can be found among V and C voters.

**Figure 38 – Education**



### Religious Service Attendance


When it comes to religious service attendance, about 20 per cent of Swedes attend such services regularly. People who vote for SD, V, or smaller parties are least likely to attend religious services, while KD voters are most likely to attend religious services daily. When all categories of at-

tendance are combined, KD voters are most likely to attend religious services, as could be expected from a Christian-democratic political party. Notably, however, all other parties have become parties of the 'secularised majority' that only attend religious services infrequently, only on holidays, or never attend a religious service.

Figure 39 / Q11 – Religious Service Attendance

In general, apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services?

- Every day
- More than once a week
- Once a week
- At least once a month
- Only on holidays
- Less often
- Never



#### Gender

	Male	Female
Every day	7,3%	6,7%
More than once a week	4,2%	4,6%
Once a week	5,3%	3,7%
At least once a month	5,6%	5,4%
Only on holidays	9,2%	9,7%
Less often	22,3%	25,4%
Never	46,3%	44,5%

#### Age

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Every day	7,3%	13,8%	5,1%	5,4%	7,0%	4,9%
More than once a week	5,9%	7,0%	5,1%	3,2%	1,0%	4,5%
Once a week	7,3%	8,5%	7,4%	2,2%	2,1%	2,4%
At least once a month	7,8%	10,2%	4,8%	6,0%	4,5%	1,9%
Only on holidays	8,3%	8,1%	10,9%	12,4%	8,4%	8,5%
Less often	16,1%	16,5%	20,5%	26,1%	28,0%	29,7%
Never	47,3%	35,9%	46,2%	44,6%	49,0%	48,1%

#### Education

	Low education	Middle education	High education
Every day	4,9%	6,4%	8,7%
More than once a week	3,0%	4,0%	5,2%
Once a week	2,4%	4,6%	5,5%
At least once a month	4,3%	6,3%	5,2%
Only on holidays	9,5%	8,7%	10,2%
Less often	28,1%	22,4%	23,3%
Never	47,8%	47,7%	41,9%

#### Income

	Comfortable with income	Coping with income	Difficult with income	Very difficult with income
Every day	8,2%	6,1%	6,8%	4,5%
More than once a week	4,3%	4,4%	5,1%	2,6%
Once a week	4,1%	4,2%	7,2%	5,2%
At least once a month	4,9%	5,3%	7,9%	5,6%
Only on holidays	9,4%	10,2%	7,5%	11,6%
Less often	23,2%	25,6%	22,0%	21,8%
Never	45,9%	44,2%	43,6%	48,6%

#### Ideology

	Left	Centrist	Right	No ideology
Every day	6,5%	5,6%	8,0%	6,1%
More than once a week	5,2%	6,3%	3,6%	3,0%
Once a week	3,7%	9,6%	3,8%	3,5%
At least once a month	5,6%	8,1%	4,8%	4,2%
Only on holidays	9,3%	11,0%	10,2%	7,2%
Less often	24,1%	20,6%	24,7%	23,9%
Never	45,7%	38,8%	44,9%	52,1%

## KEY FINDINGS 6

- Education is usually a good predictor of party preference, with highly educated respondents voting for centrist parties and less educated respondents over-represented among the populist electorate. This is also the case in Sweden, where SD and V voters have the largest proportion of middle and less educated voters. On the other hand, more than half of MP, L, and smaller party voters are higher educated.
- Religion has been increasingly losing its importance in Western Democracies, including in Sweden, where about 20 per cent of respondents say they attend such services regularly. Voters of the Christian-democratic KD and the environmental MP attend religious services most often, while voters of SD, V, and smaller parties are least likely to ever attend such services.

## AUTHORS

### **About Kieskompas (Election Compass)**

Kieskompas is an independent scientific research institute specialising in quantitative data analysis, opinion polling, and voter profiling. Founded by Dr André Krouwel in collaboration with the VU University Amsterdam in 2006, Kieskompas is a market leader in the development and innovation of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), used by more than 30 million people. Kieskompas is embedded in the academic community and is driven by a team of established researchers with a strong focus on political science, data science, and statistics. The company is best known for creating a methodology for visually displaying the positions of political parties in country-specific political landscapes in its VAAs. These online tools have been developed in collaboration with local academics in more than 40 countries, generating large-N datasets suitable for in-depth analyses.

### **André Krouwel**

André Krouwel teaches comparative political science and communication at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and is the founder of Kieskompas (Election Compass). He develops online Voting Advice Applications that collect data on party positions and voter opinions. Krouwel's research focuses on public opinion and politically relevant sentiments, voting behaviour, political parties, and social movements. Recent research has also resulted in publications on conspiracy beliefs, opinions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the vote determinants for European fringe parties and Euroscepticism.

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pertext, Berlin | www.pertext.de

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ISBN 978-3-98628-384-1

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This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Parliament.

