







Project EqualiZe

Interrogating the Gen Z Gender Divide:
Divergence in Political Ideology and Support
for Safeguarding Women's Empowerment


Amy Alexander, Associate Professor Nicholas Charron, Professor

Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg, Sweden

FEPS FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE STUDIES


Aren't the young supposed to be the most progressive?

 Lots of theory & evidence to suggest younger generations are more progressive than previous ones...




Gen Z more likely than other generations to want an activist government

% saying government ...



Gen Z, Millennials, most likely to say climate change is due to human activity

% saying ...



The puzzle: is there a Gen Z, gender divide on politics? Are young women more le



Are young women more left wing than men - and, if so, why?

23 August 2025

BB



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
Opinion Data Points

A new global gender divide is emerging

Young men and young women's world views are pulling apart. The consequences could be far-reaching

A wide ideology gap is opening up between young men and women in countries across the world

Political ideology of 18-29s (% liberal minus % conservative), by sex



Imaan Asim BBC News

Why more young men in Germany are turning to the far right

February 2025

Jessica Parker Berlin Correspondent and Kristina Volk

в в с

Gen Z men, women have a deep political divide. It's made dating a nightmare

CHARLES TREPANY USA TODAY

POLITICS

Why are men so much more right-wing than women now?

Vox

How young men are changing what conservatism looks like in Canada



Gen-Z is heading in opposite directions politically: women turning left, while men go right

Source: Financial Times (2024) A new global gender divide is emerging



Interrogating the Literature: Why expect a growing divide?

- Why -Differing perceptions of threat or opportunity under progressive societal change (Alexander et al. 2025; Campbell and Cowper-Coles 2025; Grasso and Shorrocks 2025; Off et al. 2022).
 - Societal progress in diversity, equity and inclusion has generated a stark difference in improvement in resources, opportunities and autonomy for young women relative to their mothers/grandmothers compared to young men relative to their fathers/grandfathers.
 - The youngest generation of women has bypassed young men in higher education, on average, thus signalling real potential to dominate the labour market for the first time in their societies.
 - Young men may be more vulnerable to perceptions of progressive societal change as threatening and stagnate in their progressivism, or move in more conservative directions.
 - Young women may see opportunity in progressive societal change and move left to safeguard/advance this.



Interrogating the Literature: Why expect a growing divide?

Why (Part 2)

 Right-wing parties/influencers politicise gender by presenting women's advancements as threatening and target and mobilise young men through social media

(Abou-Chadi et al. 2021; Baker et al. 2024; Bernardez-Rodal et al. 2020; Renström and Bäck 2024)

 The younger generation of women is aware of the pervasiveness of sexual discrimination post #MeToo movements

(Anduiza and Rico 2022; Hoffman 2021; Horeck et al. 2024)



Interrogating the Literature: Where do we see evidence?

• Voting Behaviour (Abou-Chadi 2024; Off et al. 2025)

• Left-Right Placement (Nennstiel and Hudde 2025)


• Attitudes towards gender equality (Off et al. 2022, 2025; Kim and Kweon 2022; Alexander et al. 2025).

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Interrogating the Literature: Where do we see evidence?

- Young men are significantly more likely than older men and women of any age group to indicate a high likelihood that they would ever vote for a far-right party in their countries.
- Analysis of the 2024, 2019 and 2004 waves of the European Election Study (EES) based on European Parliament Elections. The analysis includes 13 countries and over 80 elections.

Figure 4: Predicted probability of having the radical right in the consideration set conditional on age and gender



Source: Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2024. 'A Gendered Far-Right Wave among Young Voters in Western Europe?' European Journal of Politics and Gender (Bristol, UK), December 13, 1–6.

Interrogating the Literature: Where do we see evidence?



To examine the development of left-right self-placement Nennstiel and Hudde (2025) utilize data from the Euro Barometers covering 466,089 individuals aged 20–29 years from 32 European countries over the years 1990–2023.

In six countries, they find a widening gap (shaded dark orange) with young men recently moving (slightly) further to the right and/or women moving further to the left.

In five countries (shaded light orange), they find that the gap grows because men are either stable in their ideological left-right self-placement or moving further left, but women are moving at a faster pace to the left.




Figure 3 Countries classified by the development of gender gaps in left-right self-placement over time. Source: World Country Polygons, EB (1990–2023), our own calculations.

Source: Nennstiel and Hudde. 2025. 'Is There a Growing Gender Divide among Young Adults in Regard to Ideological Left–Right Self-Placement? Evidence from 32 European Countries'. European Sociological Review, June 13, jcaf021. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaf021

Interrogating the Literature: Where do we see evidence?



Off et al (2022) find that young men are most likely to perceive advances in women's rights as a threat to men's opportunities, particularly if they reside in regions with recent increases in unemployment.

ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Polit. Sci., 15 August 2022 Sec. Political Participation Volume 4 - 2022 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.909811 This article is part of the Research Topic Mind the Backlash: Gender Discrimination and Sexism in Contemporary Societies

View all 11 articles >


Who perceives women's rights as threatening to men and boys? Explaining modern sexism among young men in Europe



Nicholas Charron



Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden



Analysis of data from responses to a new question in the 2021 EQI survey, capturing 32,469 individuals nested in 208 NUTS 2 regions in 27 European Union countries.




Empirical Evidence

i. Exit polls from recent elections

Young gender divide in elections: FEPS POUND GENERAL PROGRESSIVE STUDIES






Young gender divide in elections: US 2024 exit poll in vote for Trump



The largest gender gap among the young in Trump support



Young gender divide in elections: German 2025 exit poll in vote for AfD &



AfD most popular among young men,

Die Linke by far most popular among young women


Younger German voters are turning to the Left and AfD

Vote share among 18 to 24-year-olds, %


Bundestagswahl 2025

Source: Tagesschau.de via Infratest DIMAP

Die Linke



BUT – a clear gender gap in which party young people preferred!




Source: Bayrisches Landesamt für Statistik 2025

Young gender divide in elections: Norwegian 2025 exit poll in vote for left parties & Frp



Partifordeling – Unge og eldre, menn og kvinner



& likewise, Younger women are far more likely to vote Rødt, SV, MDG Young gender divide in elections:


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Polish 2025 exit poll in vote for Sławomir Mentzen (Konfed.)



Turnout under 30 with a record high (>73%), a demographic Mentzen won during the election (also those under 30-39), particularly men

*(extrapolated estimates from IPSOS exit poll)





In sum

- Recent exit poll evidence shows a Gen Z gender divide in voting behaviour, with young men more likely to prefer the far right and young women more likely to pick the far left.
 - In the UK (2024), young men are twice as likely to vote 'Reform', and young women are nearly twice as likely to vote Green.
 - In the US (2024), the largest gender gap among the young is in Trump support.
 - In Germany (2025), young men prefer AfD, and young women prefer Die Linke.
 - Norway (2025) compared with younger women, Younger men are far more likely to vote for the Progress Party (Frp).
 - Poland (2025) young men preferred Mentzen.



ii. European Social Survey

- Round 11 Available EU countries + UK + Norway +
 Switzerland = 25 countries
- N = 42,805
- Published in November 2024, latest version in June 2025
- We also use the full ESS time series in some cases to check trends.
- Young age group: 15-29 ('Gen Z')

^{*}regression models control for mother's tertiary education

Available sample in ESS 2024 & FEPS PROGRESSIVE STUDIES 5 select countries for deep dive







Variables of interest

Left-right ideology (0-10)



What's driving this divide?

For all countries

We check attitudes on

- Immigration
- the environment
- same-sex marriage
- redistribution

Gender equality attitudes


- Agreement: Women are treated unfairly in hiring/pay/promotions
- In favour vs. against: Dividing parliamentary seats equally by gender
- How often do women exaggerate sexual harassment claims
- In favour vs. against: Dividing parental leave equally


In select five countries:

- Far-right voting
- Green/left voting
- Social democratvoting
- Centre-right voting

Trends in Europe on a whole: leftright self placement (ESS data, 2002-2023)










Left-right self-placement, all countries



A caveat: significant undersampling of far-right voters in many countries



Sweden's SD voters under-sampled by roughly 3-fold

Germany AfD voters under-sampled by roughly 4-fold (i.e. compared with 21% in election)

Party voted for in last national election 2, Germany	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Christian Democratic Union/Christian So	434	26.58	26.58
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	399	24.43	51.01
The Left (Die Linke)	90	5.51	56.52
Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die	396	24.25	80.77
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	165	10.10	90.88
Alternative for Germany (AFD)	88	5.39	96.26
Free Voters (Freie Wähler)	21	1.29	97.55
Grassroots Democratic Party of Germany	4	0.24	97.80
Party for Labour, Rule of Law, Animal P	12	0.73	98.53
Other	24	1.47	100.00
Total	1,633	100.00	

Cum.	Percent	Freq.	Party voted for in last national election, Sweden
9.55	9.55	103	Centern
15.21 /	5.66	61	Kristdemokraterna
19.67	4.45	48	Liberalerna
25.88	6.22	67	Miljöpartiet de gröna
45.36	19.48	210	4oderata samlingspartiet
80.71	35.34	381	Socialdemokraterna
88.68	7.98	86	Sverigedemokraterna
98.70	10.02	108	Vänsterpartiet
100.00	1.30	14	Annat parti
	100.00	1,078	Total

Spain's Vox voters under-sampled by roughly 2-fold

	Party voted for in last national election, Spain	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
4	PP	319	29.21	29.21
		313	23.21	
	PSOE	414	37.91	67.12
	VOX	74	6.78	73.90
	SUMAR	117	10.71	84.62
	EDC	25	2 20	06.00
	ERC	25	2.29	86.90

to adjust for this in our select-5 country sample, we add partisan weights to the ESS analytical weights



What's driving this divide?


Political attitudes in general?


e.g. Immigration, environment, same-sex marriage, tax/redistribution, etc.

Gender issues?



Immigration? Full sample







OLS regression, country fixed effects, mother's education control, survey weights, standard errors clustered at the country level.



Same-sex marriage






OLS regression, country fixed effects, mother's education control, survey weights, standard errors clustered at the country level.





Government redistribution





Satisfaction with democracy





OLS regression, country fixed effects, mother's education control, survey weights, standard errors clustered at the country level.



In sum


- Current/growing left-right & voting divide among young does not seem to be explained by attitudes on:
- immigration,
- same-sex marriage,
- redistribution
- satisfaction with democracy

Gender equality attitudes



All countries: Gender equality (workplace)






Probit regression, country fixed effects, mother's education control, survey weights, standard errors clustered at the country level.

All countries: Gender equality (sexual harrasment)


weights, standard errors clustered at the country level.





All countries: Gender equality (equal pay)







In sum

- Data from the ESS suggest that young men are less likely to acknowledge that women are treated unfairly in hiring and promotion, women experience sexual harassment at work, and it is good for their country's economy if women receive equal pay.
- To the contrary, young women are more likely to acknowledge all of this.


Voting Patterns (sample 18+)



5 country cases: voting for social FEEF POLICE STREET POLI democratic parties




 *Party coded as 'social democrat' if it belongs to Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in EP parliament




5 country cases: voting for center right parties



 *Party coded as 'center right' if it belongs to European People's Party Group (EPP) in EP parliament




5 country cases: left/green voting Gressive Studies | Green voting Gressive Studies | Green voting Gressive Studies | Green voting Gree



Summary: A Gen Z Gender Divide?





Gen Z gender divide: Evident - Somewhat - Not evident



Project EqualiZe is a FEPS project in cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and ETERON











This event is produced with the financial support of the European Parliament. It does not represent the views of the European Parliament.



Sources

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