



SHARED INSTABILITY, DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

EXPLAINING SWEDEN'S GEN Z GENDER DIVIDE

ABSTRACT

This policy brief on Sweden forms part of the Equalize project, a comparative investigation into whether, and if so why, gender divides in political opinion and voting patterns are emerging across Europe. The study draws on European Social Survey data, complemented by focus group interviews with over 100 participants in Germany, Greece, Poland, Spain and Sweden. The results show that Sweden, despite being one of the world's most gender-equal countries, exhibits one of Europe's sharpest gender divides among generation Z. The divide does not stem from fundamentally different social realities. Rather, young women and men interpret shared experiences of instability differently, leading them to support different political solutions. This policy brief argues that addressing this divide requires policies that restore material security and rebuild trust in democratic institutions and the welfare state. Strengthening social cohesion further depends on visible political action, the promotion of inclusive gender norms and policies that bridge structural conditions with individuals' lived experiences of instability.



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Introduction

There is a growing divide in Europe on a range of political issues between generation Z (Gen Z) men and women, or those aged 15-29. Public debate increasingly portrays young women as moving in a more progressive direction, while young men are said to be turning more conservative or even towards the far right. The empirical results demonstrate a more nuanced reality: while gender differences among young people exist, they vary by issue across countries.¹

Sweden exhibits the most pronounced Gen Z gender divide analysed in the Equalize project, which this policy brief is a part of. This is because the divide is the most consistent across all examined indicators among the five countries studied. Despite being recognised as Europe's most gender-equal nation by the European Institute for Gender Equality, the findings suggest that the widening divide is driven both by a marked leftward shift among young women and a rightward shift among young men, relative to earlier generations.² In other words, even though young men's views are internally divided, we see that young men identify as more right wing than older men, while young women show a clearer and more consistent alignment with progressive politics than older women. Sweden presents a paradox: it is the EU's top-ranked country for gender equality, yet it exhibits one of Europe's steepest Gen Z gender divides.

The following sections of this policy brief will disentangle this paradox by closely analysing the Swedish case, drawing on the analysis of European Social Survey (ESS) data and focus group interviews. The findings show how young women and men in Sweden interpret shared experiences of instability differently, leading them to support different political solutions. For policymakers, understanding the dynamics driving Sweden's Gen Z gender divide is crucial in developing more effective and inclusive policy responses.

Methods

This policy brief is based on the Equalize project's mixed-methods analysis, using quantitative data from the ESS and qualitative data from 17 focus groups with 100+ participants aged 18-29 in Germany, Greece, Poland, Spain and Sweden.³ The research enables an analysis of broad European patterns and individual youth experiences, with ESS data from 2002 to 2024 covering all 27 EU countries plus Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and the UK. Respondents answered questions on politics, social attitudes, confidence and demographics. This policy brief focuses on these data in relation to Sweden's case study. The particular focus is on the focus groups conducted in Stockholm in October 2025, each with six or seven participants in 90-minute sessions. Sessions included mixed-gender, women-only and men-only groups, guided by a semi-structured interview on daily concerns and gender equality in Sweden and the EU. Participants were recruited by Sago under d|part supervision, ensuring social diversity in age, occupation, residence and party preference, excluding inner-city districts and including participants with caregiving responsibilities. Ethical and data-protection procedures were followed, with responses pseudonymised.


Sweden's Gen Z gender divide

Following the Equalize project's research design, the results from the ESS quantitative data are analysed in this section. This data demonstrates the broad patterns of Gen Z's gender divide in Sweden, as reflected in left-right ideological self-placement, voting patterns and attitudes toward gender equality. By examining these trends, the findings describe the broad patterns across Gen Z men and women in Sweden. These data thereby serve as a foundation for the subsequent qualitative analysis, which explores the underlying individual experiences that help to explain these quantitative patterns.

Left-right ideological self-placement

The analysis explores trends and gender gaps in left-right ideological self-placement in Sweden (Figure 1). Men generally report more right-leaning ideological positions than women across all ages, with the gap most evident among 15-29 year olds and narrowing with age. Young Swedish men are positioned further to the right than both young Swedish women and older men, indicating that ideological polarisation is concentrated among younger generations. Convergence between genders increases in older cohorts, especially those aged 65 and above. Compared to other European countries in the Equalize project, Sweden displays a notable generational gender gap, with young Swedish men among the most right-leaning.

Figure 1. Left-right ideological self-placement in Sweden, 2024.



Voting patterns


The analysis examines voting patterns by gender and age across party families. It finds no significant gender differences among young voters for mainstream social-democratic or centre-right parties. The ESS sample lacks sufficient young men supporting the Sweden Democrats to reliably assess far-right support. However, data suggests that young Swedish men are more likely than young Swedish women to support Green/left parties, in contrast to 2022 exit surveys, in which young women showed stronger support. This discrepancy may result from sample limitations, so the findings should be interpreted with caution. Compared to other countries in the Equalize project, Swedish voting behaviour is less clear-cut. While young Swedish men lean further right ideologically, the ESS data does not show equally strong gender differences in support for the main right-leaning parties. Other data sources paint a clearer picture. The European Election Survey, which compared voting across all EU member states following the 2024 European

elections, found that in Sweden 2.2 young men voted for far-right parties for every young woman who did so – placing Sweden at the higher, though not highest, end of the voting gender gap spectrum in this dataset.⁴

Gender-equality attitudes

Finally, the analysis turns to three measures of gender-equality attitudes: perceptions of workplace discrimination against women in hiring, pay and promotion; whether equal pay for men and women is perceived as beneficial for the national economy; and the extent to which respondents believe women exaggerate claims of workplace sexual harassment.⁵ Across all three measures, Sweden exhibits the most pronounced Gen Z gender divide compared with both older age groups and the four other countries included in the Equalize project. The divide is particularly pronounced in perceptions of workplace discrimination (see Figure 2), where young Swedish men and women differ more strongly than in any other country included in the analysis.


Figure 2. Perceptions of workplace discrimination by age and gender in Sweden, 2024.



Sweden also shows a substantial gender divide in attitudes towards equal pay. However, young Swedish men display relatively high variation in their responses, suggesting greater disagreement within this group regarding whether equal pay benefits the national economy. There is also a pronounced youth gender divide in Sweden regarding perceptions of sexual harassment (see Figure 3). Young Swedish men are more likely than young Swedish women to

agree that women exaggerate claims of workplace sexual harassment, suggesting differing perceptions of the prevalence and seriousness of gender-based inequalities and vulnerabilities. This finding points not only to attitudinal differences regarding gender equality, but also to broader divergences in how young men and women interpret experiences of discrimination, safety and institutional recognition.

Figure 3. Perceptions of how often women exaggerate sexual harassment in Sweden, 2024.



Unlike the more varied results on voting habits, Sweden shows the most distinct and stable gender gap among youth across all three gender-equality indicators in the Equalize project. This means that, compared with Germany, Greece, Poland and Spain, the differences between young Swedish men and women are more pronounced in perceptions of workplace discrimination, attitudes towards equal pay and views on sexual harassment. To gain a deeper understanding of these statistics, the next

three sections examine young men’s and women’s experiences, perspectives and politics in their own words.



*It feels like **we** are **becoming** more **like the USA** now; **you have to take care of your own needs**. It wasn't like that in the past.*



Shared reality: A generation shaped by instability

To more deeply understand the Gen Z gender divide, focus group interviews were designed to encourage the discussion of participants' perspectives and experiences in Sweden and to prompt reflection on who is responsible for societal stability. Building further on the Equalize project's research design, the results from the qualitative data are analysed in this and the next two sections. This data demonstrates individual daily experiences of Gen Z's challenges and political perspectives.

Young men and women describe Sweden as being on the global frontline, superior to and more developed than other countries. Yet, across all groups, they rarely discuss Sweden's international politics in relation to global issues, such as the climate crisis. Instead, young people describe a remarkably consistent set of domestic political concerns: housing shortages and affordability; labour market precarity; healthcare system failure; economic problems; crime; and a lack of social cohesion. When discussing these issues, participants repeatedly report a sense of instability in their immediate lives and uncertainty about their future expectations. Ella (female, 26, mixed group) said,

*I don't have a very positive image of the future. We have grown up with the climate crisis, and everybody talked about what would happen if we don't do something about it, as if the entire world would collapse. They started working on it, but now we have ended up in this current situation, where it feels unstable on a personal level regarding jobs, the economy, etc. The housing market is also unbelievable! **How are we supposed to survive? More stability on a***

personal level would make it easier to cope with the major issues going on in the world.

The underlying pattern is that young people share a common perception of growing instability across multiple domains of life.

Across all groups, participants express a desire to remain optimistic, despite difficult conditions, but also see it as a challenge. Many of them relate this to frequent exposure to these problems while reading the news, watching television and using social media. Leon (male, 22, mixed group) said, *"It's a steady flow of such posts on **TikTok, Instagram and other feeds. It's a part of our lives.** This can also have a negative impact..."*. This is such a significant force that some participants in each group report they no longer use social media because it has a negative psychological impact on them. Hilda (female, 26, mixed group) said, *"When something bad happens [...] you just shrug your shoulders and move on"*. She explains, *"We have **so much bad news right now** that each issue is overshadowing the others. It's sad, but that is how I have experienced it"*. Participants consistently explain that social media and the news reinforce instability and division across groups.

Most young adults in the focus groups demonstrate a high degree of political attentiveness and exhibit a pronounced awareness of multiple crises when evaluating Swedish society. Many show distinct familiarity with specific political debates, politicians, political parties, societal issues and policies. Notably, they consistently reflect on Sweden's problems in relation to how it has been in the past and how it is in other countries. Linus (male, 25, male group) said, *"It feels like **we** are **becoming** more **like the USA** now; **you have to take care of your own needs**. It wasn't like that in the past"*. The assertion that Sweden

increasingly resembles the USA is shared by various participants across different focus groups as an indication of the country's decline. However, the relational comparison is also used to highlight Sweden's progress relative to others. Participants often discount their frustrations, saying it would likely be worse if they were from another country. Taken together, Gen Z participants simultaneously express appreciation for being Swedish and pessimistic uncertainty about Sweden's future trajectory. This reveals a shared tension across all groups between international and internalised perceptions of Swedish national identity and the participants' lived experiences.

In every focus group, participants describe Sweden as lacking social cohesion and being politically polarised. Ebba (female, 22, female group) said,

*We have a divided society. **A divided society will never work.** I think **inclusion** is what actually creates a well-working society [...] We see too much hate between people; we don't respect each other. We have a lot of problems with segregation. I think 'exclusion' might be the biggest issue in Sweden right now.*

Given these social conditions, young men and women express a strong distrust of political institutions and leadership. The majority argue that politicians simply want to be re-elected and make many promises they do not keep to achieve their goal. In short, focus group participants said that politics often feels performative rather than responsive to people's real concerns.

Participants often mention the interplay between these societal conditions and personal trajectories. In every group, they note social inequalities caused

by class and racism. Jonathan (male, 21, male group) said, "**We all have very different possibilities based on where you live, who your parents are, the people you know, and your friends**". For some, this has incited them to want to live or work outside of Sweden. Selma (female, 21, female group) said, "*I hope it will get better, but I am not sure about my own situation. I don't see a future in Sweden; I see a future somewhere abroad*". Yet a wholly pessimistic view remained the exception. For the majority, pessimism about societal conditions in Sweden coexists with relative optimism about their personal futures. This creates an important political dynamic of distrust in institutions, but continued belief in individual advancement. Overall, it is apparent that the Gen Z gender divide does not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it is rooted in a shared experience of instability.

Diverging interpretations: Where the gender divide emerges

The emergence of the Gen Z gender divide is rooted in shared experiences of instability within the Swedish welfare state, including housing shortages and affordability, labour market precarity, economic issues, crime and social segregation. However, young men and women interpret these issues differently, giving them different meanings. Across themes, young men more frequently interpret social problems in terms of individual responsibility, the language of order and the need for meritocracy, whereas young women tend to emphasise the roles of exclusion, discrimination and structural inequality.

The divide emerges in relation to left-right ideological self-placement when, for instance, discussing social cohesion; all men refer to integration, whereas all women refer to segregation. Axel (male, 21, mixed group) notices this nuance in his own language,

“

We all have very different possibilities based on where you live, who your parents are, the people you know, and your friends.

”



*There is a reason why those info-ads for the women's helpline are hanging inside the public restrooms, because **many women are subjected to violence and crime, mostly within their own homes.***



saying, "I would actually like to replace 'integration' with 'segregation'". He explains this by saying, "**Integration has been rather problematic, and this has resulted in segregation today**". Still, however, he highlights the role of integration in contrast with women across groups who emphasised the need for inclusion instead. A general pattern is that, while all participants highlight similar issues, their interpretations of these issues are politically divided along gendered lines.

Tied to the issue of social cohesion in connection to either integration or segregation, complex connections are made across issues. Where young men perceive crime as a failure of integration and highlight it as a consequence of the government's inability to maintain control and order through punishment. Young women, in contrast, are more likely to link problems of social cohesion to racial and class inequalities that weakened institutions fail to prevent, which leads to social exclusion and discrimination. This creates tensions between young men's security framing and young women's social justice framing of social segregation in relation to migration and crime.

The divide in attitudes toward gender equality emerges similarly. Across all groups, participants broadly support gender equality and describe Sweden as comparatively gender-equal by international standards. Yet several issues that are often central to contemporary gender-equality debates do not feature prominently in discussions among young men or women. While there was broad agreement that non-binary people face significant discrimination and social vulnerability, LGBTQIA+ rights received little attention. Beyond strong support for consensual sex and the right to abortion

across young men and women, the topic of gender inequalities in reproductive labour was largely absent. Most notably, however, the gender divide is evident in understandings of gender equality and in the extent to which gender inequality persists in Sweden.

Young men generally understood gender equality in line with the literal meaning of the Swedish concept *jämställdhet*: men and women should be on equal footing.⁶ However, a recurring theme among young men was uncertainty about what gender equality should mean in practice, especially given biological differences. Niklas (male, 22, mixed group) said, "I actually don't think you can achieve perfect gender equality, because there are differences between genders". For this reason, many young men argued that complete gender equality was seen as neither fully possible nor necessarily desirable. Fabian (male, 22, male group) said, "Should we have a 50/50 split in every single business sector, at every workplace? At every single restaurant? **Where should we draw the line?**" Discussions among young men framed Sweden as already highly equal, which they attributed to Sweden's gender-equality goals, while often adding that it would be difficult to improve this legislation.

Young women, in contrast, argued that Sweden is a patriarchal society and that gender inequalities fundamentally shape everyday life. Rather than focusing primarily on the technical meaning of gender equality or their legal rights, young women described lived and embodied experiences, including workplace discrimination, sexual harassment, unequal domestic labour, healthcare systems designed around male norms, online misogyny and the threat of men's violence against women.

Maja (female, 25, female group) said, “There is a reason why those info-ads for the women’s helpline are hanging inside the public restrooms, because **many women are subjected to violence and crime, mostly within their own homes**”. Young women give gender equality meaning through their daily lived and embodied experiences of gender inequalities. This suggests that embodied differences in lived experience between young men and women shape their differing interpretations of their shared instability.

Support for gender equality does not translate into support for feminism. Rather, most young men associated feminism with extremism, misandry or “man-hating”. For this reason, the majority of men’s support of gender equality can be seen as depoliticised and fundamentally decoupled from feminist movements and politics. Young women recognise the commonality of this perspective, and for many, it is the first thing that comes to mind when they hear the word. Livia (female, 26, female group) said,

*Often when you ask men, but also women, whether they are feminists, they usually say: ‘No, I wouldn’t call myself a feminist.’ ‘Why? You don’t want gender equality?’ ‘Yes, I do. But, I **don’t believe in feminism because that is about man-hate.**’*

However, all women argue adamantly that feminism is not about hating men. Hilda (female, 26, mixed group) says, “I see feminism as a method in order to achieve gender equality”. She and most young women argue that the goal is to establish the same rights for women as for men.

The Gen Z gender divide: Different political solutions to shared problems

Recognising many of the same social problems but interpreting them differently leads young men and women to imagine different political responses. The divide, therefore, emerges not only in how instability is interpreted but also in who is considered responsible for addressing it and what role the state,

welfare institutions and individuals should play in doing so.

Young men consistently framed insecurity through questions of order, governance and individual responsibility. Discussions focused on the need for stronger state capacity to manage inflation, unemployment, crime, integration, housing and national security. Proposed solutions frequently emphasised discipline, labour market participation, punishment and individuals’ ability to navigate increasingly insecure social and economic conditions independently. Ali (male, 22, male group) said,

*You have to study; you have to get a real job! This is why people are attracted to crime, because they see the money. It’s rather easy to become rich when engaging in criminal activities. This may be a consequence of bad integration, a consequence of being unemployed; there could be many different reasons, but this is why criminals are attracted to crime – **they want to make money, while the society doesn’t give them any opportunities to do so.***

Across themes, instability was often understood as a problem of weakened control, declining social cohesion or insufficient integration.

Young women, by contrast, more often framed instability through experiences of institutional failure, exclusion and unequal vulnerability. Discussions centred on healthcare, mental health support, care work for children and the elderly, discrimination, housing insecurity, and social exclusion. Rather than emphasising individuals’ responsibility to adapt to instability, young women more frequently argued that welfare institutions are failing to adequately protect people from increasingly precarious conditions. Many of the women describe doing unpaid care work, such as attending older family members’ doctors’ appointments or cleaning their homes, since welfare services have not provided support. Their proposed solutions, therefore, focused more strongly on collective responsibility, social protection, inclusion and care infrastructures.

Different understandings of vulnerability shaped these political differences. Young men tended to frame vulnerability in terms of unemployment, failed integration, and difficulties navigating increasingly competitive social and labour-market conditions. Young women, comparatively, more often described vulnerability relationally, emphasising safety and emotional wellbeing. Young women across groups frequently expressed solidarity with groups whose experiences differed from their own, often relating other people's experiences of exclusion or insecurity to challenges they had encountered themselves. As Maja (female, 25, female group) explained: *"I can get very upset about issues that are personally affecting me, but I can also get upset about things that other people are affected by"*.

The findings suggest that dominant gender norms continue to shape how young men and women understand responsibility, citizenship, vulnerability and the role of institutions, even in highly gender-equal Sweden. Shared experiences of instability, therefore, generate different political expectations regarding what individuals, governments and welfare institutions should do in response.

Conclusion and recommendations: Addressing the Gen Z gender divide

Sweden's Gen Z gender divide does not reflect fundamentally different realities, but different interpretations of shared instability and, as a result, different solutions to political problems. Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data from the Equalize project suggests a greater focus on strengthening material security, restoring institutional trust and responsiveness, reducing social exclusion, and developing inclusive public narratives that bridge divergent interpretations of shared social conditions.

1. Rebuilding material security and future stability

Economic instability and uncertainty about the future shaped discussions across all focus groups. Consequently, strengthening the material security

of young people's lives is essential for establishing future stability.

Policy responses may benefit from focusing on the structural conditions that shape young people's opportunities and life chances, particularly regarding affordable housing, high-quality education, employment and economic security. Measures that reduce precarity and expand access to stable and predictable pathways into adulthood may help strengthen confidence in the future and foster a greater sense of social and economic stability.

2. Restoring institutional trust and welfare legitimacy

Many participants described declining trust in welfare institutions, particularly in relation to healthcare. Young women, in particular, frequently linked institutional shortcomings to everyday experiences of vulnerability, mental health issues, exclusion and unequal access to healthcare.

Strengthening trust in welfare institutions requires ensuring that public services are accessible, responsive, reliable and perceived as fair in everyday interactions. Policy responses should focus on improving the capacity of welfare institutions to meet people's needs, while reducing barriers to access and addressing experiences of exclusion and unequal treatment. The welfare sector is also a very important employer, especially for women. Research shows that marketisation and privatisation in Nordic countries have worsened working conditions and widened care disparities.⁷

3. Addressing social fragmentation together

Concerns about deteriorating social cohesion related to migration and crime were widespread across groups, though they were interpreted differently by young men and women. Addressing these issues requires avoiding both their denial and polarising "us versus them" framings.

Policy responses should recognise that perceptions of security, belonging and social cohesion are closely interconnected. Efforts to strengthen social cohesion should therefore address racism and classism as underlying social and economic inequalities, experiences of exclusion, and barriers to participation that can contribute to mistrust and division. Promoting equal treatment, inclusion and a shared sense of belonging is essential for fostering cohesive and resilient societies. Racial and class discrimination, inclusion, and security should be addressed as interconnected issues rather than as separate priorities by developing clearer and more explicit policy language.

4. Reframing gender equality to better challenge gendered power asymmetry

Findings show broad support for gender equality in principle, but there is growing disagreement over its meaning and politicisation. Most young men who participated in focus groups argued that gender equality should no longer be a prioritised issue and saw feminism as extreme and linked to misogyny. All young women dismissed this, emphasising feminism's role in politicising gender equality needed to support equal rights.

Political communication should not frame gender equality as a matter of individual attitude. Rather, gender equality⁸ should be framed as the pursuit of democratic inclusion and collective wellbeing. This can be done by explicitly addressing gendered power asymmetry. Gender-mainstreaming efforts, such as gender-equality work across all levels of the educational system, should work norm critically, not only by identifying gender norms, but by problematising how they reproduce power asymmetries.

5. Rebuilding trust in democracy and political leadership

Many participants described the current state of politics in Sweden as divided, performative and disconnected from everyday concerns. Division was often criticised less for ideological disagreement

itself and more for being seen as preventing effective governance.

Reducing political division depends partly on showing that democratic processes and politicians can deliver practical improvements. Restoring trust requires policies that increase the transparency of democratic processes and provide equal access to political participation to rebuild confidence, especially among young women.

6. Bridging individual and structural understandings of instability

A recurring finding across the focus groups was the tension between recognising structural problems and framing solutions in highly individualised terms. While many participants acknowledged broader inequalities and institutional failures, they also frequently emphasised personal responsibility, self-management and individual adaptation.

Policy responses and communications from progressive political actors should frame issues like housing insecurity, economic precarity and rising living costs as collective social and political challenges rooted in broader structural conditions, rather than as matters of individual responsibility.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Alexander, A., E. Avramovska, N. Charron et al. (2026) "Equalize: Gender differences in political opinion and voting among Generation Z". Policy study. Foundation for European Progressive Studies, April.
- 2 "Gender Equality Index: Sweden". European Institute for Gender Equality, 2025.
- 3 For a more detailed description of the methods, see the project's primary text: Alexander, A., E. Avramovska, N. Charron et al. (2026) "Equalize: Gender differences in political opinion and voting among Generation Z".
- 4 Carbonell, J. (2026) "Beware of neoliberal feminism: Why Spanish young people are less sexist but more antifeminist". Policy study. Foundation for European Progressive Studies, April, pp. 17-18.
- 5 The indicators of gender equality attitudes are from the ESS 2024 survey and based on the following questions: (1) agreement: women are treated unfairly in hiring/ pay/promotions ("0" = no, "1" = yes); (2) it is good or bad for [country's] economy if women and men are paid equally (1-7 scale, 1 = "very bad" to 7 = "very good"); and (3) how often do women exaggerate sexual harassment claims (1-5 scale, never to always).
- 6 Hirdman, Y. (2014) *Vad bör göras? Jämställdhet och politik under femtio år* (Stockholm: Ordfront Förlag).
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- 8 "Mål för jämställdhet". Swedish Government, 6 October 2025.

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THERE MUST BE AN ALTERNATIVE

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POLICY BRIEF
March 2026

FOUNDATIONS FOR EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE STUDIES

COUNTERING THE FAR RIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EXPLORING PROGRESSIVE STRATEGIES IN THE AGE OF FAR-RIGHT NORMALISATION

ABSTRACT

This policy brief examines the growing normalisation of the far right in the 2004-2029 European Parliament (EP) and offers a set of practical recommendations to guide progressive strategies in this evolving landscape. Part 1 defines the far right and maps its influence through three threat scenarios: full alignment between the European People's Party (EPP) and all far-right groups; EPP cooperation with the European Conservatives and Reformists but not with other far-right groups; and cooperation between far-right groups without EPP involvement. Part 2 assesses strategic responses, drawing on national case studies and findings from the academic literature.

IN PART 2, THE POLICY BRIEF PROPOSES THREE SETS OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRESSIVE ACTORS:

- First, maintain the remaining elements of the *cordon sanitaire* while developing complementary approaches to address the normalisation of radical-right positions and limit their symbolic influence.
- Second, strengthen cooperation among democratic, pro-European forces by building issue-based coalitions, enhancing coordination between national parties and their EP delegations, and further splitting the far right on divisive issues.
- Third, reject far-right narratives on migration and instead prioritise positive, solution-oriented messaging on social and economic issues that offer credible, policy-specific alternatives capable of resonating with voters.

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