The Progressive Post
A Strong Mandate Amid Falling Participation
On 3 October, Latvians elected a new parliament. Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs’ regionalist, green and conservative United List (Latvian: Apvienotais saraksts, AS) more than doubled its seats, from 15 to 41. The answer to the question, however, whether the country ‘woke up to a new reality’ after these elections is both no and yes.
No, because our government will apparently be almost the same as it was before the election. Yes, because, for the first time in many years, one party has secured such a substantial lead that it can form a coalition with virtually any other political force elected to the 15th Saeima, the Latvian parliament, except the liberal-conservative ‘New Unity’ alliance. A three-party coalition would now be needed for building a broad and balanced coalition government.
The unusually strong mandate given to a single party suggests that Latvian society has shifted towards a preference for strong leadership. This is characteristic of post-Soviet countries, although the Baltic states have generally stood apart in this respect. Arguably, this is the first time since the restoration of independence that power has become dangerously concentrated on one side of the political spectrum – and that side is clearly right-wing conservative and national-conservative.
But let us take things in order.
The players and the dynamics
The overall election results were as follows: Kulbergs’ United List, won 35.3 per cent of the vote and 41 of the 100 seats. This is the largest parliamentary group in the history of the Saeima. The other parties trailed far behind: Ainārs Šlesers’ Latvia First (LPV) won 13.1 per cent and 17 seats; Jūlija Stepaņenko’s Sovereign Power/ Alliance of Young Latvians (SV/AJ), 11.7 per cent and 15 seats; the National Alliance (NA), 8.9 per cent and 10 seats; the Progressives, 7.9 per cent and 10 seats; and New Unity (JV), 6.4 per cent and 7 seats.
For the first time in its 24-year history, the Union of Greens and Farmers failed to or pass the 5 per cent threshold to enter parliament, receiving 4.4 per cent. Also left out were We Are Changing the Rules (3.4 per cent), For Latvia’s Development (2.2 per cent), For Stability! (2.0 per cent), and Harmony Centre (0.8 per cent).
The defining development of this election came in May, when former Prime Minister Evika Siliņa’s government collapsed, and the Saeima approved a cabinet headed by the new prime minister, Kulbergs. At that point, his party was polling below 10 per cent. The advantage of holding the premiership, which had seemed questionable in July, became an instrument he used skilfully, aided by his personal charisma. Most likely, he captured nearly the entire electorate of the Union of Greens and Farmers, drew votes from Unity and the Progressives, and won over many undecided voters.
The arithmetic is straightforward. A majority in the Saeima requires 51 seats. AS has 41. A coalition with the National Alliance or the Progressives would produce exactly 51. A coalition with New Unity as well as the National Alliance would have 58 seats. The latter is a highly plausible scenario, as it would essentially reproduce the previous coalition.
The next government’s stability would rest on the fact that AS can form a majority with almost any party in parliament. Its leader, therefore, has room to manoeuvre if his potential partners resort to blackmail or become too demanding. The Progressives, for example, now serve as an alternative to keep the National Alliance in check. Everyone understands that the leading party can manage without them.
One further numerical point deserves attention. The conservative forces in this Saeima – AS, NA, LPV and SV/AJ – together hold 83 seats. Amendments to the constitution are always considered in three readings. At least two-thirds of MPs (not less than 67 MPs) must be present. Amendments to the constitution are adopted by not less than a two‑thirds majority vote of the MPs present.
That means that, in the extreme scenario, the constitution could be amended with 45 votes. This creates an immediate risk of a radical conservative change. Meanwhile, LPV and SV/AJ, which could cooperate closely in opposition and who also belong to the conservative camp, hold, together, 32 seats. They therefore are two seats short of the blocking one-third that, under the constitution’s article, allows a law to be suspended and put to a referendum.
Four campaign themes
The first theme of the electoral campaign was the question who, actually, is capable of governing the country? Criticism had accumulated, and there was demand for change. Yet voters ultimately distributed their votes in a way that leaves those who have already governed in charge once again. The second campaign theme, in policy terms, theme framed all other policy debates: security. Russia’s war against Ukraine shaped discussion on NATO, defence spending and geopolitical alignment.
The third theme was the most down-to-earth: prices, taxes, healthcare and the gap between Riga and the regions. Unfortunately, it was also the least developed, because it requires expertise that the leading figures of various parties simply lack.
A fourth issue ran through all three previous themes: the Russian-speaking electorate. ‘De-Russification’ initiatives, language restrictions across many areas of life, the effective ban on Russian-language TV programs produced by Latvian public broadcaster and the general attitude that ‘the tougher you are, the more patriotic you are’. All of this divided the electorate into ‘Latvians’ and ‘Russians’. Yet only LPV, SV/AJ, Harmony and For Stability!, a Eurosceptic populist party appealing to Russian-speaking voters, competed for Russian-speaking voters. The establishment parties refused, as a matter of principle, to compete for this electorate and drew red lines against parties that engaged with these voters as political actors in their own right.
Finally, ‘family values’, with the Istanbul Convention emerging as a clear dividing line, was a core topic of the election campaign.
Participation and electoral integrity
By the morning of election day, the State Security Service had received 13 reports of possible vote-buying and pressure on voters. None was substantiated. Isolated attempts to spread disinformation against parties supporting Ukraine were recorded, and possible links to Russia are being investigated. There were concerns before the election about possible foreign interference. Isolated attempts to spread disinformation were recorded, but the available information does not establish that a large-scale, coordinated campaign took place. This does not rule out interference that went undetected.
The turnout, down to 51.7 per cent from 59.4 in 2022, became one of the major problems of this election. It was the lowest in a parliamentary election since the restoration of independence. There is a growing public sense to stop believing that people’s participation makes any difference. This is a very dangerous trend: the marginalisation of the political process.
The ‘Russian question’ deserves separate attention, as it is usually framed as a matter of ‘pro-Russian parties’. LPV and SV/AJ, together, won 32 seats. Harmony Centre – the party that Russian-speaking voters supported in large numbers for decades – won 31 seats in 2011 but received just 0.8 perc cent of the vote, falling short the threshold and winning no seats.
There are several reasons why Russian-speaking voters have become less willing to participate in elections: internal withdrawal, when people stop identifying with the state; emigration, when they leave in search of a decent life; and government policies in recent years that have done everything possible to distance the state from this Russian-speaking section of Latvia’s citizenry.
What is troubling is that the politics of Harmony Centre is not evolving on this issue. For years, efforts have been made to marginalise Russian speaking voters in Latvia, reduce them to stereotypes and ultimately ignore them. As though this part of the population did not exist. As though it had no right to political agency of its own.
The new government’s European course
Latvia’s European course will not change. None of the parties in the prospective coalition questions the EU, NATO or support for Ukraine.
The nuance lies elsewhere. The values Latvia proclaims in Brussels and those practised at home seem to exist in separate worlds. Take the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, language rights or education: Latvia is steadily and sharply backtracking on all these issues, as numerous monitoring reviews have pointed out. Likewise, with this composition of the Saeima, Latvia will soon withdraw from the Istanbul Convention.
In other words, while Latvia presents itself internationally as committed to human rights and minority protection, its domestic policies increasingly point to another direction.
The Social-Democratic camp and the outlook for the coming years
Historically, the left has been represented by the Social Democratic party ‘Harmony’ and the Progressives, a member of the European Green Party.
The Progressives’ result needs to be assessed from several angles. On the one hand, they received 7.9 per cent and 10 seats – same number as in 2022. Yet this still represents a decline: in May, the party was tied with LPV for the first place, with 14.9 per cent among decided voters. Its popularity peaked during the final weeks of Siliņa’s government. It was then expelled from the governing coalition, lost its shared lead over the summer, and, in September, recorded its lowest polling figure since March. Late in the campaign, a scandal emerged involving a former Riga City Council member from the party, who is suspected of having sexual relations with an underage girl in his care. The party itself reported the matter to the police, but it nevertheless suffered a significant blow.
Unfortunately, the reasons for the decline go beyond a single scandal and were visible earlier. Support for the Progressives depends heavily on turnout, and its voters are concentrated in Riga. The party is strong in an urban, young and educated constituency, but has failed to reach beyond it. It did not engage with national minorities, and the voters it previously had among them, either moved to populist parties or stayed at home. Its role in the new political configuration is becoming limited. Nevertheless, that role still carries some value, leaving some room for bargaining, however small.
The other party’s story is even sadder. Harmony Centre, which included Harmony – once the country’s leading Social-Democratic and Russian-speaking party – received 0.8 per cent. In 2011, Harmony Centre came first with 31 seats.
The conclusion for Social Democrats is that the space for moderate, pro-European, socially oriented politics serving both Russian-speaking voters and people on modest incomes in Latvia is now empty.
In these elections, these voters largely abstained rather than supporting one of the competing party. As for the votes that went to LPV and SV/AJ, they were mostly cast on the basis that ‘at least someone is talking about us and promising to protect us’, rather than out of ideological affinity. The country’s progressive political space has narrowed because no comprehensive work is being done. Both tactics and practical execution are very weak.
For Social Democrats, the lesson is simple: moral capital and the right values do not always translate into votes. Difficult economic circumstances make people think more about their own pockets. We need to be closer to people and understand them better.
Latvia has undergone a national-conservative consolidation that will shape the next four years. A democracy in which only 46 per cent of voters turn out in the capital, and 47 per cent in one of its regions, needs a discussion about the reasons for voters’ abstention. That discussion is not taking place in Latvia because the answer is uncomfortable.
Photo credits: Shutterstock / shulers
