Jonas DRIEDGER

researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany (PRIF), specialising in interstate war, peace and security cooperation with a particular focus on Eurasia and the Transatlantic

The Trump administration’s recent actions might well result in a bitter peace in which Ukrainian and European security would be precarious, renewed escalation likely and transatlantic relations even worse than they are now. But despite the perils, Europe can secure a long-term ceasefire that safeguards Ukrainian rights, bolsters European security, constrains the Russian regime, stabilises transatlantic relations and reduces the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Amidst the chaos of the Trump administration’s recent actions, Europe faces long-term threats that go well beyond the already crucial matters of Ukrainian freedom, sovereignty and security. For starters, the remnants of the global rules-based order are in danger of being sacrificed at the altar of great power politics and the whims of a handful of old authoritarian men. The Trump administration’s recent flurry of hectic and unilateral actions could well signify that, to reach a long-term ceasefire and minimise American involvement quickly, the United States is trying to force Ukraine into giving up its rightful claims on the territories that the Russian regime had brutally attacked, conquered and annexed in 2014 and 2022. If successful, this would constitute a potentially catastrophic precedent wherein a state illegally annexed territory and successfully coerced others into accepting these annexations – contradicting the core tenet of the United Nations and damaging norms that have contributed to diminishing warfare across the globe. 

Furthermore, the strategic situation in Europe could deteriorate even further, locking in an unstable security competition and heightened risk of escalation for decades to come. The US had been one of the key advocates for extending NATO membership perspective to Ukraine, a claim it maintained even under Trump’s first presidency. If Ukraine would be forced into abandoning its membership perspective, the Russian regime would have successfully used offensive war to blackmail the US and NATO. This would spell bad news for the security of Russia’s many neighbours that are aligned with NATO or the United States, while Ukraine would be open to renewed attack while feeling understandably betrayed by the West, paving the way for authoritarian, militarist and revanchist forces that could re-escalate the conflict at any time.

Perils and possibilities

However, three main factors also open significant political leeway for Europe to curtail, contain and minimise these dangers. First, notwithstanding his personality, ideology and volatility, Trump’s actions, for now, indicate he wants a quick and sustainable ceasefire. If Europe offered a promising path towards it, the notoriously fickle president might be swayed. Second, the Russian regime might well be ready to be convinced and coerced into compromising on some of its far-reaching war goals, as it is far from being an untiring and single-minded war machine. Third, the actions and pronouncements from the French president, the British prime minister, the EU Commission and the parties that are likely to form Germany’s next government suggest that European policymakers are starting to realise both the dangers and possibilities they are facing. 

A ceasefire strategy for Europe 

If Europeans want to avert the great dangers of the current situation and advance their values and interests, they need to 1) identify core goals; 2) accept that achieving secondary goals will be unfeasible in the near future; and 3) implement feasible and sustainable policies to reach the core goals. 

Not all Europeans think alike. But many would, and all should, support three goals: safeguarding international law; supporting human rights of Ukrainians and Ukrainian democracy; and ensuring security from Russian aggression while minimising the risk of inadvertent escalation. Making steps towards these three goals will be tough, as Europe still lacks unity and crucial capabilities, battlefield dynamics disadvantage Ukraine and the room for potential cooperation with the Trump administration is small, at best. Thus, chances of success will be higher if Europe focuses on core goals over others that it deems less feasible or salient. Such a focused strategy would likely entail that, at least in the short-term, Ukrainian NATO membership and reconstitution of its legal territory should not be prioritised. The same goes for the criminal prosecution of Putin and other Russian elites and demands for Russian war reparations. Europe, however, would aid and support Ukraine in maintaining these rights and claims to resolve them to Kyiv’s satisfaction and by diplomatic means in the long run.

European action

Europe will have to quickly implement and uphold specific measures to realize its core goals. First and foremost, for a sustainable ceasefire, Ukraine requires robust security assurances to deter renewed Russian aggression against unoccupied territory. Deterring the Russian regime in Ukraine would also serve to safeguard the borders Russia shares with the EU and NATO. Such security assurances would consist of mechanisms of ongoing support that would be increased in case of Russian aggression or escalation, including the training and equipment of Ukrainian soldiers and sanctions up to second-line European troops in Ukraine, preferably with some US backing. Conceivably, and in the long run, such assurances could also be realised via accession and the EU’s collective defence clause (42.7 TEU). 

A second measure is to help free Ukraine heal. With a ceasefire and robust security assurances, Ukraine could and should start to repair the immense damage that the war has inflicted on its people and economy, solidify democracy and re-establish a modicum of normalcy. All this will require economic cooperation and aid as well as expertise across a wide range of areas. The EU is well-positioned to provide all of this, possibly in the context of the EU accession process. This would also, akin to West Germany during the Cold War, allow Ukraine to pursue justice and reunification as a stable, responsible and strong democracy firmly embedded in what will be left of the political West.

The third measure is about the short-term: getting the Russian regime to finally relent in its aggression and agree to a long-term ceasefire that lays out all these conditions in a transparent, unambiguous and enforceable way. If Ukraine declared it would not seek to join NATO any time soon and forego military means to regain its rightful territories, the Russian regime would have some positive incentives to agree. Additionally, some sanctions relief could be offered. These positive incentives, however, would need to be accompanied by clear signals that continued or renewed aggression would reliably damage the regime. This would mainly be done by dual efforts of bolstering Ukraine’s armed forces while ramping up sanctions. This might be politically feasible: recently, the EU adopted its 16th sanction package against Russia while increasing weapons production and responding to the Trump administration’s temporary halt in weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Trump administration changed course again, reinstating weapons deliveries and threatening sanctions if Russia would be unwilling to negotiate. 

For Europe, taking this path requires a well-calibrated mixture of initiative, determination, coordination, circumspection, will and patience. Hopefully, it will succeed, as the alternatives will likely be dire.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Joshua Sukoff