Ivan TODOROV

Researcher and lecturer in Economics at the University of National and World Economy (UNWE), Sofia

Bulgaria has joined the world’s most ambitious integration project by adopting the euro in January 2026 – backed by a stable parliamentary majority, yet divisive at home. With wages and public services still lagging and regional gaps remaining wide, scepticism is understandable, so the benefits and enthusiasm depend on what Bulgaria and its European partners do next.

Amid strong public anticipation, Bulgaria’s accession to the Eurozone in January 2026 comes after decades of close ties to the EU’s core. Since the late 1990s, the country has operated under a currency board – first pegged to the Deutsche Mark and later to the euro. As a result, European Central Bank decisions have long shaped domestic financial conditions. This is why the Bulgarian and Eurozone economies are closely synchronised from a macroeconomic standpoint; thus, the membership is less a leap into the unknown than a formalisation of an existing reality.

The political landscape is more complex, yet on balance it remains favourable. In parliament, a stable majority of the parties represented supports euro adoption and frames it as a long-term strategic choice that strengthens Bulgaria’s security and anchors the country more firmly in Europe, not least by giving it a stronger voice in ECB decision-making. Still, the recent government resigned at the end of 2025 amid growing public dissatisfaction, driven mainly by corruption and rule of law concerns (rather than the euro itself).

That contrast points to the more challenging part of the story. Despite years of fiscal and monetary discipline, Bulgarians continue to live with a markedly lower standard of living than the average euro-area citizen. Regional disparities remain deep, public services are uneven, wages and pensions lag behind. Against this backdrop, many ask why decades of a fixed exchange rate and European rules have not delivered faster, more visible convergence – and what, in practical terms, the formal introduction of the euro will change. 

Part of the street-level tension reflects a broader European pattern. In many core EU countries, growth has lost momentum, and the sense of security has weakened. When the results feel modest, the EU’s complex, rule-based machinery can seem distant from everyday concerns. Majoritarian politics demands visible accountability and quick results, while independent bodies work on longer horizons and pursue more abstract aims such as price stability and debt sustainability. In that climate, the common currency is easily loaded with symbolism far beyond what it can realistically deliver. Public debate is also increasingly shaped by organised disinformation, which simplifies complex trade-offs into emotionally charged stories and turns the euro into a convenient proxy for deeper frustrations. It helps explain the Eurobarometer finding that less than half of Bulgarians expect benefits in adopting the euro.

Social partners – the largest trade union, CITUB, and employers’ organisations – link the euro to faster wage convergence, better jobs and stronger investor interest. The Ministry of Finance sees membership as a chance to fund socially important projects on better terms, from infrastructure and the green transition to education and healthcare. Financial markets are even more upbeat. For investors, the euro entry validates institutional predictability and supports confidence. This is also why euro-area membership comes with rising expectations that capital markets will turn into a real source of long-term finance for businesses, through a more active stock exchange, stronger participation by pension and mutual funds and a broader base of long-horizon investors.

It is known that enthusiasm can be self-fulfilling. If a critical mass of firms, households and investors believes opportunities will expand, they invest, hire, scale up, and optimism begins to materialise. But larger inflows do not automatically translate into productivity gains or social cohesion. They can be absorbed by non-tradable sectors, fuel asset-price booms and undermine housing affordability, leading to a growth model based on concentration and weak innovation, dynamics that Bulgaria has already experienced in the run-up to the global financial crisis after EU accession in 2007.

For Bulgarians, and most of all for those in poorer regions, the euro will be judged by better jobs, services and opportunities where they live. It can reduce transaction costs, strengthen confidence, and widen the pool of available finance. But without a strong pipeline of investable projects, functioning courts and basic public services, capital flows will bypass the periphery. This is where policy has to be explicit about trade-offs. If integration is to deliver convergence rather than concentration, Bulgaria and its European partners must work through two complementary logics. The first strengthens cross-border investment to flow towards the most profitable opportunities. The second is to put cohesion policy into a higher gear. It is the deliberate corrective that channels public resources to lagging regions and sectors where social returns are high but private incentives are weak, so that convergence is not left to the storm alone.

The euro’s real significance, then, will not be decided on the day it is introduced, but in the years that follow. If Bulgaria and its partners use this window to strengthen the rule of law, narrow regional disparities, and steer both private and public finance towards sustainable gains in incomes and productivity, the common currency can support a fairer development path and show that the European framework delivers for Bulgarian citizens. Used well, euro membership can strengthen Bulgaria’s resilience and democratic legitimacy within the new global order. Squandered, sceptics will be right to say that only the unit printed on our banknotes has changed.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Mirko Kuzmanovic