Spogmay AHMED 

Senior Policy Advisor, Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative

Since launching the Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative in 2023, there have been many moments in which I asked myself: is a feminist foreign policy really, truly, possible? The world was getting scarier, closing in on every opportunity to advance gender equality and human rights. But something inside of me did not want to let go. And this year, I was so glad I never did.

When we launched the Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative, in 2023, feminist foreign policy (FFP) was rising in popularity and interest. That year, up to 15 governments would commit to a feminist foreign and/or development policy, spanning all regions of the world

2024 had other plans. Starting with Sweden, then Argentina, the Netherlands and Germany, the official renouncements began. Meanwhile, others were quietly stepping away, like Libya and Luxembourg. The surviving cohort was deeply divided, with Northern governments sounding the alarm on Ukraine and Southern governments calling for justice in Palestine. Official development assistance flowing to gender equality would be cut at the expense of rising and unprecedented levels of military expenditure.

Enter 2025. As we began our research for the Defining Feminist Foreign Policy 2025 report, we expected to find the beginning of the end, that this would be an archival report of feminist foreign policy’s rise and fall. Instead, we found a much more hopeful picture than we had ever anticipated: contrary to our fears and anxieties, feminist foreign policy efforts were persisting in ever more challenging contexts.

To start, we found that feminist foreign policies have actually survived more elections than they have lost, including in Canada, France, Liberia, Mexico,  Slovenia and Spain. Several governments developed or expanded their feminist foreign policies during this period, including by publishing new frameworks, action plans and commitments. For example, France launched its International Strategy for Feminist Foreign Policy in March 2025 – a long seven years after initially expressing its intention in and engaging with this field. Similarly, Colombia published its feminist foreign policy framework in November 2024 – the first and only to explicitly embrace a pacifist approach. At the United Nations, France and Colombia co-chair the FFP+ Group, an informal set of member states that, despite the many and growing questions surrounding multilateralism, has continued to bring together foreign ministers year after year to reiterate their commitment to this agenda.

Multilateral, regional, and bilateral activities on feminist foreign policy have also persisted. In France, we are marking the fourth annual ministerial-level conference on this topic, following the examples set by Germany in 2022, the Netherlands in 2023 and Mexico in 2024. The stakes are high, but governments are gathering to publicly express their support for women’s rights – a much-needed effort in this time of intense rollback. We have at least three international declarations on the topic, two regional ones, and multiple South-South and circular cooperation efforts. For example, in 2024, Chile and Mexico signed a memorandum of understanding on feminist foreign policy, diplomatic training and indigenous cooperation. Chile, Colombia, Germany and Mexico also agreed to develop a regional community of practice on feminist foreign policy. Examples like these demonstrate that, behind the headlines, allies inside of governments are still pushing for progress where they can.

Finally, one of the biggest concerns over the past few years has been this question of institutionalisation. In other words, when you have political will for gender-transformative change, how do you make sure it is not so easy to overturn when tides change? In our Defining Feminist Foreign Policy 2025 report, my colleagues and I identified five strategies for institutionalisation. These include:

1) Policy, through legislative or administrative frameworks;

2) Architecture, through the establishment of dedicated departments or units for this work;

3) Budgetary, through the earmarking of specific funds or investment in key initiatives;

4) Leadership, through the tapping of dedicated high-level roles or positions; and

5) Capacity, through staff training on feminist foreign and/or development policies.

Throughout our period of analysis, we found that both governments and civil society have been innovating with these strategies, finding ways to protect gender equality from impulsive political shifts. For example, in recognition of the global attacks on reproductive rights, France passed a constitutional amendment on the right to an abortion, setting a model for other countries to follow suit. Chile established the first gender unit at its ministry of foreign affairs, which will be tasked with the implementation of its FFP, and Spain codified its feminist approach into law with its landmark Cooperation Law on Sustainable Development and Global Solidarity. Our civil society colleagues from Sweden – the first government to both announce and renounce a feminist foreign policy – cautioned against tying feminist foreign policy too closely to a singular political party and/or politician, instead encouraging more expansive buy-in and cross-party consolidation.

The story of feminist foreign policy continues. This week, as I participate in the Fourth Ministerial Conference on Feminist Foreign Policy in Paris, France, I can say it has given me a vision for what I would like the world to look like, and through all its ups, downs and contradictions, it has raised the bar for what we know we can accomplish. I hope we will get at least a bit closer.

Photo credits: Julia WIld/FEPS