Trita PARSI

Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

Donald Trump’s ill-conceived war with Iran has shattered the regional security order that governed the Persian Gulf for decades, with cascading consequences for the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean. Whatever the conflict’s ultimate military outcome, the war has already overturned many of the assumptions underpinning the prewar regional architecture: the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor, the viability of indefinitely containing Iran through coercive pressure, the durability of Israel’s privileged strategic position in Washington and Israel’s role as the principal intermediary through which regional states managed relations with the US. The region’s future trajectory remains uncertain, but a return to the security paradigm that existed before 27 February 2026 is no longer plausible.

The Trump administration expected a short war that would conclude within days, ideally with the rapid degradation of Iran’s military capabilities and perhaps even the collapse of the Iranian state itself. According to a senior Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) official, Trump assured regional leaders that the war would last no more than 100 hours. He similarly told Britain’s Keir Starmer that the conflict would be over within three days. According to Trump administration officials, some GCC states quietly shared this assessment – particularly Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, though officials within the Saudi foreign ministry opposed the war – viewing Iran as weakened and vulnerable after years of sanctions, regional setbacks and internal pressures.

Yet the course of the war challenged these assumptions. Iran demonstrated greater resilience and retaliatory capacity than many regional actors had anticipated, while the costs and risks of further escalation became far clearer to neighbouring states.

This reassessment has been especially acute among the GCC states. While several Gulf governments understandably continue to view Iran as a major strategic threat, the war exposed the limitations of the existing US-led security framework. US military bases across the Gulf, long regarded as symbols of deterrence and protection, instead became liabilities and magnets for retaliation. These bases were intended to deter Iran from initiating conflict. Instead, the United States itself launched the war, and once the conflict began, the bases did not shield GCC states from Iranian retaliation; they increased the likelihood that Gulf territory would become a target. As a result, the strategic value of hosting military bases as part of the US security umbrella has suffered a profound blow.

At the same time, Washington’s prioritisation of Israel during the conflict reinforced doubts in Gulf capitals about the hierarchy of US commitments in the region. A widespread perception took hold that the United States prioritised Israel’s defence over even the protection of its own bases in the Gulf. That perception was partially reinforced by a Washington Post report revealing that the US expended more missile interceptors defending Israel than Israel itself used in its own defence. The episode deepened concerns that Gulf security interests remain secondary within Washington’s regional calculations and strengthened the view that exclusive reliance on the United States is no longer a viable strategy.

At the operational level, however, the conflict also reaffirmed the continued value of US military technology and defence systems. As a result, the likely trajectory for many GCC states is not a wholesale rupture with Washington, but rather a diversification of their security partnerships. Gulf states are increasingly likely to pursue a more flexible, multi-vector approach to external security – maintaining access to US weapons, intelligence and military cooperation while simultaneously expanding defence ties with Europe and Asia, deepening intra-Gulf coordination, and selectively engaging emerging powers such as Turkey and Pakistan. This diversification reflects not only doubts about US reliability but also a broader desire to reduce dependence on any single external patron.

The more consequential strategic question, however, concerns how GCC states will balance engagement with Iran against efforts to constrain it. From the Gulf perspective, the war reinforced rather than diminished perceptions of Iran as a long-term threat. Iran’s missile capabilities, asymmetric warfare networks and capacity to impose costs across the region were demonstrated more starkly than ever before, generating considerable anxiety among Arab states. Public sentiment and elite opinion across several Gulf countries remain deeply unsettled, making rapid normalisation with Tehran politically difficult. At the same time, the war also underscored the dangers of pursuing strategies of isolation, confrontation, or regime change against Iran. The emerging regional debate is therefore unlikely to focus on whether Iran should be balanced, but rather on how to reinforce balancing through economic interdependence, regional integration and new mechanisms for crisis management.

In this sense, the postwar regional order is likely to be defined less by rigid alliance structures than by fluid hedging strategies. Indeed, the GCC itself may no longer serve as the primary unit of analysis for regional security affairs, given the widening schisms between the UAE and several of its neighbours – divisions that this war has significantly deepened. Most regional states appear increasingly unwilling to align fully with either a maximalist anti-Iran posture or a purely accommodationist approach. Instead, they are likely to pursue a middle course that combines military preparedness with diplomatic engagement, external diversification with regional dialogue and greater strategic autonomy with selective partnerships.

The more fundamental question is whether the political will and strategic maturity exist to move beyond hedging altogether and toward a collective security paradigm built around an inclusive regional architecture. In many respects, the conditions for such a transition have rarely been more favourable.

Photo credits: Shutterstock/RAMAN SHAUNIA