Alessandro ROSINA

Full Professor of Demography and Social Statistics at the Faculty of Economics at the Catholic University in Milan

European demography is characterised by an ageing population, driven not only by increased longevity but also (and mainly) by declining birth rates. This fuels significant imbalances between generations, leading to serious social and economic consequences. To address the demographic transition, it is essential to act on three interdependent fronts: promoting fertility, improving young people’s and women’s access to (and permanence) in the labour market and implementing integrated immigration policies.

The European population is entering a new phase of its demographic history, characterised by long-term decline and accelerated ageing. The dynamics of the demographic transition have led to increased longevity and declining birth rates, resulting in profound changes to the population structure. The reduction in mortality risks from birth to old age has brought the replacement level (the number of children required to replace parents) to around two. However, fertility rates have fallen below this level in most countries worldwide, leading to insufficient fertility to sustain generational replacement.

Europe, as the continent where the demographic transition first began, is now in the most advanced phase of this process. Currently, all European Union countries report fertility rates below two children per woman, though there is considerable variation across the continent. The persistent low birth rates are now also eroding the population of reproductive age. This means that births are declining not only because fertility is below replacement level, but also because the number of potential parents is shrinking. The European population is thus ageing due to both increased longevity, which raises the number of elderly people, and declining birth rates, which reduce the younger population. This significantly changes the balance between generations: larger cohorts (born when birth rates were still relatively high) are moving into old age, while smaller cohorts (born when the total fertility rate dropped below two) are entering the prime working years.

The ageing population structure pushes birth rates further downward (due to the shrinking number of people of childbearing age, as mentioned) and raises mortality rates (due to the growing proportion of elderly individuals). This shift causes the natural balance (births minus deaths) to move from positive to negative. The EU population, just under 450 million at the beginning of 2024, has not yet begun to decline, despite the negative natural balance, only thanks to immigration and, more recently, the significant influx of refugees from Ukraine. In the coming years and decades, the magnitude of population decline and generational imbalances will depend on how low fertility remains and how effectively immigration flows are dealt with and integrated. In 2023, seven EU member states experienced population decline, where migration flows failed to offset the negative natural balance.

Building a ‘longevity society’, with the basis and conditions for living well and longer, is the primary demographic challenge of the 21st century. What makes the difference in positively addressing this challenge is the strength of the younger generations. If their demographic weight declines too much (a process known as ‘dejuvenation’), it leads to unsustainable imbalances in the ratio between the elderly population and the working-age population. The ability of a country to generate well-being – by driving economic development and ensuring the sustainability of the social system (through the funding and functioning of the welfare system) – depends on both the quantitative and qualitative mechanisms that ensure an adequate generational renewal.

To try to prevent demographic imbalances from becoming unsustainable, it is necessary to act on three interdependent fronts. 

The first is that of fertility. The basic principle is to ensure that having a child does not significantly worsen economic conditions or complicate work-life balance. Acting in this direction does not automatically lead to a recovery in birth rates, but it does help reduce the gap between the desired and actual number of children. Additionally, it promotes female participation in the labour market, reduces child poverty and generally enhances the potential for investing in children’s growth and education, which positively impacts the quality of future generations. Conversely, failing to implement effective policies in this area will undoubtedly result in a continuous decline in births and an increase in gender, social, and generational inequalities. Recent trends and experiences from various European countries indicate that birth rates tend to plummet to very low levels in the absence of adequate policies, that no single measure consistently works everywhere and that the needs and expectations of families change. This, in turn, requires continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the implemented measures and a willingness for experimentation on how to improve them.

The second line is that of a more efficient use of the working-age population through improved entry and empowerment of young people and women in the labour market. This requires increased investment in training, school-to-work transitions and work-life balance. In addition to the immediate effects of increased employment and productivity, this also has repercussions on the first line of action, as it better positions young people and women to achieve their life and family goals. Furthermore, greater, more sustained, and solid participation in the labour market allows individuals to look towards their older years with more confidence and security.

The third line is that of immigration. Even with a potential resurgence in birth rates (with which we are struggling across Europe), the positive effects on the labour market would not be observed for 20 years or more. On one hand, there is an immediate need to address the requirements of companies and organisations to find workers in many sectors. On the other, regular and integrated immigration also helps counteract the reduction in the reproductive-age population, thereby contributing – together with the policies of the first line – to an increase in birth rates.

Moreover, it positively complements the second line of action: if adequate policies for young people and women are lacking, young and immigrant women will be even more affected, leading to negative consequences for their contribution to overall fertility trends. In other words, immigration, family policies and measures to address generational and gender disparities must be integrated, with a systemic vision, and regarded as a central part of economic and social development policies. All of this is also consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals (no poverty, quality education, gender equality, decent work and reduced social inequalities, among others) and with the strengthening of full citizenship rights. These include the right not to have children, which must truly be guaranteed as a free choice, rather than as a renunciation due to unfavourable conditions, ensuring a positive balance with other personal goals such as professional achievement and social well-being.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/LuHie