The ongoing constitutional coup in Bosnia and Herzegovina – engineered by the pro-Russian separatist leader Milorad Dodik and his ruling coalition in the Republika Srpska, one of the country’s two entities – continues with no clear end in sight. It remains uncertain when, how, or even if their secessionist ambitions will be halted, and who will ultimately take action to stop them. A failed arrest attempt on 23th April – which saw the BiH state police face off with the police of the Republika Srpska entity in East Sarajevo and no discernible EUFOR presence – has only exacerbated fears of growing lawlessness and the fragmentation of the country’s security apparatus.

Dodik, who for years has steadily pursued a strategy of creeping secession from the central government, escalated his efforts following a major legal setback. On 26 February, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a first instance verdict, sentenced him to one year in prison and six years of political disqualification for defying the decisions of the High Representative, Christian Schmidt, who is who is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought the war in the country to an end. In July 2023, Dodik signed legislation that effectively nullified the enforcement of rulings from Bosnia’s Constitutional Court within Republika Srpska (RS) and obstructed the publication of decisions issued by the High Representative. Despite Schmidt’s explicit orders to block these laws, Dodik proceeded to enact them, thereby violating the authority of the international peace envoy. In response, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska passed a series of controversial measures – including the draft of a new entity constitution and the so-called Law on the Non-Application of State Laws and the Prohibition of Activities of ‘Unconstitutional Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. This legislation effectively declared that state-level institutions such as the Court and Prosecutor’s Office of BiH, the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), and the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) would no longer have authority within RS’ territory.

Dodik’s continued defiance – including ignoring the constitutional court’s suspension of the laws and repeatedly refusing to appear for questioning – accelerated the legal steps in another case against him: for assault on the constitutional order. Due to his repeated refusal to appear for questioning, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an arrest warrant and ordered a 30-day detention for Dodik. His consistent defiance of legal summonses has escalated tensions between judicial authorities and political actors. Since the warrant was issued, political and legal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been locked in a standoff over the practicalities of enforcing the arrest: who has the authority to apprehend Dodik, how such an action would be carried out given his political position, and whether it will happen at all. This impasse highlights the deep politicisation of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina and raises broader concerns about the resilience of the country’s legal order in the face of nationalist challenges.

Republika Srpska’s new Constitution marks a long-planned move by Dodik’s administration, for wich the current moment is seen as the right moment to advance. The draft directly undermines Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and constitutional order, laying the foundation for secession. It defines RS as a “sovereign, unified and indivisible constitutional-legal entity” (article 1) and claims authority over land, rivers, lakes and airspace (article 2). It grants the entity full legislative, executive, and judicial powers, retaining all functions not explicitly assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina (article 4). Crucially, it allows unilateral withdrawal from state agreements (article 5), subject to a referendum and explicitly asserts a right to self-determination, including forming special ties or joining other federal or confederal states (article 9). Alarmingly, article 116 permits Republika Srpska to form its own army and enter military alliances. These provisions amount to a constitutional coup, systematically dismantling Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legal and political framework and moving Republika Srpska closer to full secession.

Since the onset of the crisis – particularly after Interpol declined to issue a red notice, an international request issued by Interpol asking member countries to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action, for Milorad Dodik and the speaker of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Nenad Stevandić – there has been growing debate over whether, when, and how EUFOR (European Union Force), the EU-led military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, tasked with maintaining peace and security under the mandate of the Dayton Agreement, should support domestic security institutions in bringing Dodik in for questioning, or potentially detaining him. This debate is well-founded, given EUFOR’s mandate established by the European Council, formally endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1575 in 2004. According to this mandate, EUFOR has full authority, exercised through its force commander, to fulfil the role outlined in the annexes of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in monitoring military aspects and addressing non-compliance by the parties. The mission is also instructed to maintain close consultation with BiH authorities – especially the minister of defence – regarding its operations. Thus, given its legal framework and operational scope, EUFOR should remain a player in any discussions around the detention of Milorad Dodik and his allies. But, will it?

On 8th April 2025, the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina – with the votes of members Željko Komšić and Denis Bećirović – formally requested that EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina provide support to domestic police agencies in enforcing decisions issued by state judicial authorities in the case against Dodik and others.

However, at this stage, the question should no longer be whether EUFOR will assist in the operation, but how it will do so and to what extent. Unfortunately, the reality appears to be the opposite. There is still no clear official stance, aside from repeated generic assurances from EUFOR and EU officials that they are committed to maintaining a ‘peaceful environment’ in the country and that ‘every individual should be treated in accordance with the law’. While such matters may not always be suitable for public discussion, unofficial reports circulating within international circles suggest that EUFOR is reluctant to take part in detaining Dodik, viewing the operation as too risky and contingent on prior approval from the EU member states. If these reports are true, they raise a fundamental question: why is EUFOR present in Bosnia at all – and why did it temporarily increase its troop numbers by 400 following Dodik’s first-degree conviction and the onset of what is arguably the most serious political crisis since the end of the war?

To be clear, no one is calling for EUFOR to take over the entire operation – nor would that be desirable or beneficial for the state or for the progressive forces working within it. However, given EUFOR’s mandate, it is entirely reasonable to expect the mission to support efforts to uphold law and order, and to help safeguard peace and the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That support does not need to mean direct involvement in arrests, but it could – and should – include measures such as securing the perimeter of the area where a detention is to take place, and ensuring there is no external interference or escalation. In essence, EUFOR’s role should be to reinforce the conditions under which justice can be carried out safely and effectively.

If no action is taken – if EUFOR remains passive and Bosnian institutions remain paralysed in confronting Dodik and his inner circle – it would amount to a profound failure: both for the European Union and for Bosnia and Herzegovina, setting the stage for the most dangerous scenario yet.

For the EU, inaction would lay bare its eroding influence even in its immediate neighbourhood, confirming the perception that without US backing, it is incapable of decisive leadership – even when core European values like peace, democracy and territorial integrity are at stake. Such weakness would embolden autocratic and extremist forces across Europe, encouraging others to openly challenge democratic institutions, international law and established borders without fear of consequences.

For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the failure to act would be even more catastrophic. It would expose the deep fragility of its constitutional system, signalling to domestic secessionist actors that the state is powerless to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. If Dodik faces no consequences for openly defying the constitutional order, dismantling state competencies and pursuing de facto secession, it would act the erosion of the Dayton Peace framework. In practice, this would move Bosnia and Herzegovina dangerously close to full territorial fragmentation, risking renewed ethnic tensions, the collapse of the state and a serious security vacuum in the heart of Europe.

Moreover, the destabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would not remain contained. It would likely spill over into neighbouring countries, undermining regional stability, fueling nationalist agendas elsewhere and opening the door to greater influence from external actors like Russia –  at the expense of European security and credibility. 

The fear, ultimately, is that inaction today will be seen as permission tomorrow.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Bngc