27/02/2025
While the rise of the far-right AfD has caused many worries in Poland, the rather clear balance of power in the German Bundestag is welcomed. Poland, which is presently heading the EU Council presidency, is building on improvements in its relations with an EPP partner in the German chancellor’s office and one more active partner in the Polish-German-French ‘Weimar Triangle’ cooperation format.
Friedrich Merz’s election victory for the CDU and the collapse of the SPD in the federal elections came as no surprise in Poland. There are no sad feelings to see the ‘traffic-light coalition’ of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals in Germany exit the stage; a change of government had been expected. Devastating as the results of these elections might be for the German Social Democrats, and as worrisome as the record high result of over 20 per cent for the right-wing extremists from ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) are, looking from neighbouring Poland, this bad news has been overshadowed by even greater wreckage in international politics.
Any hopes that Poland might develop a privileged partnership with Trump’s “’Make America Great Again”’ reloaded have started to vanish since the Munich Security Conference and the US alignment – so far in rhetoric – with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interpretation of world history. The relationship between Germany and Poland has always been a complicated one. Since Donald Tusk’s broad coalition in Poland replaced the right-wing populists of the PiS in government in December 2023, the rhetoric towards Germany in Poland has changed. While the PiS had always demonised Germany as an adversary and a threat to Poland’s sovereignty, the atmosphere improved noticeably with the new Polish government under Donald Tusk. However, the great expectations of a ‘fresh start’ in German-Polish relations were not fulfilled. “We lost our common language during the eight years that the national populists ruled in Poland”, stated Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, the Polish representative for German-Polish relations, at the beginning of 2025.
Olaf Scholz is accused by the Polish side of not having done enough in terms of communication in the face of this lack of a common language. Furthermore, many, in Poland, distrust Germany, as it has failed to support Ukraine with enough urgency, despite all the assurances of Chancellor Scholz. And finally, the long shadow of the past, which culminated under the PiS in gigantic reparation claims against Germany, could not be escaped in any constructive or creative way. In Friedrich Merz, so they hope in Poland, Donald Tusk at least meets a fellow member of the European People’s Party. Perhaps it will be easier to find a common language. Domestically, however, Donald Tusk himself is under pressure; the Polish opposition, made up of the national-conservative PiS and the far-right ‘Konfederacja’, are chasing him as a ‘German agent’. The Polish Prime Minister must, therefore, guard against excessive openness or even concessions in relations with Germany, especially before the Polish presidential elections on 18 May 2025. The overall situation between Germany and Poland will continue to improve under the leadership of two EPP heads of government. However, progress in substance might continue to be very meagre.
This will also reflect on the Weimar Triangle, the format for cooperation between Poland, France and Germany. Poland, who is presently heading the EU Council Presidency, has placed the emphasis on security matters. But any progress on the European stage will depend on cooperation with leading partners, first and foremost with France and Germany. The main challenge will be to open the way to easier financing and better cooperation in the re-armament of the EU member states’ armies and to strengthen the defence capabilities on the eastern flank. But both of Poland’s Weimar Partners have been marred with internal quarrels over their governments. At the same time, geopolitical pressure is growing stronger. Europe must be able to withstand the imperialism that is rampant in the East and has recently begun to flare up in the West. This matter of urgency must help to overcome the difficulties in alignment of the Weimar partners. The rather simple arithmetic of coalition building in Germany, with only five parliamentary clubs and – in all pragmatic terms – only one real option for building a stable and democratic government, helps to solve part of the problem. The next German government is expected to take a clear stand with Poland and, in particular, to lead the way in the financing of European defence.
Friedrich Merz himself is still largely unknown as a politician in Poland. The country eagerly awaits his arrival and will watch closely to see where the new chancellor’s travels take him to first. After all, given the war in neighbouring Ukraine, Poland sees itself as just as important as Germany’s largest neighbour in the west, France. The rise of the AfD is being followed with great concern in Poland. However, Friedrich Merz’s clear rejection of a coalition with the AfD and the clear balance of power after the federal election have allayed the worst fears. The Polish Social Democrats of ‘Nowa Lewica’ (‘New Left’) look with pity but little surprise at the weak result of the SPD. They are themselves the smallest coalition partner in Tusk’s four-party alliance, with 6.3 per cent in the European elections in May 2024. They are most likely to draw inspiration from the media-effective election campaign of Die Linke (the left) which reached many young people with clear socio-political topics and demands.
Photocredits: Shutterstock.com/Ryan Nash Photography
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