Anke HASSEL

Professor of public policy at the Hertie School, Berlin, Germany

The decline of social-democratic parties in Western Europe is not new, but it often marks political turning points. Sunday’s German election may be such a moment, highlighting the deeply unpopular performance of the first progressive coalition in Germany, the strongest far-right surge since Nazi Germany, and the worst election result in the SPD’s 150-year history.

This election raises many questions, but for the centre-left, two of them stand out: did the progressive coalition fuel the far right? And how can the SPD reconnect to its core constituencies?

The downfall of the progressive coalition

Despite an enthusiastic start, the progressive coalition’s support quickly collapsed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 forced the government to overhaul Germany’s energy supply within months while also promoting a green transition through renewable energy expansion and heat pumps. The coalition pursued an ambitious policy agenda, leveraging budgetary funds initially earmarked for Covid-19 relief to finance energy subsidies and industrial policy.

On social issues, the coalition was remarkably progressive and unified. It introduced a liberal immigration law, reformed citizenship policies, legalised cannabis and enacted a self-identification law on gender. However, cracks emerged when Germany’s constitutional court ruled in November 2023 that repurposing those extra funds circumvented the debt brake. Since then, the coalition struggled to reconcile public spending with fiscal constraints.

The coalition – comprising a centre-right liberal party (FDP) and two centre-left parties (Greens and SPD) – fractured over budget priorities. The FDP demanded spending cuts, while the Greens and SPD pushed to loosen the debt brake or invoke emergency fiscal measures. Meanwhile, Germany entered its second year of recession and divisions over Ukraine aid intensified.

The government’s progressive social policies contrasted sharply with mounting economic struggles, creating the perception that it prioritised left-wing ‘pet projects’ over everyday concerns. Inflation, wage loss, sky-rocketing rents, a strained healthcare and education system and the ongoing influx of migrants left many feeling abandoned. The far right capitalised on this discontent, positioning itself as the voice of native Germans rather than all residents of Germany. Meanwhile, the centre-right, which had occupied a moderate stance under Merkel, shifted further right, aligning with the far right on social and migration issues (though not on Ukraine).

A shift to the right and rising polarisation

Exit polls reveal significant voter shifts: The centre-right, CDU lost voters to the far right AfD. The centre-left SPD lost voters to the centre-right CDU. The Greens lost voters to both centre right and far left. The liberal FDP suffered heavy losses to the centre and far right. The far right’s biggest gains came from previous non-voters, pushing voter turnout to a historic high –  signalling widespread frustration and a desire to end the progressive experiment.

The SPD bore the brunt of the losses, particularly among economically insecure voters, blue-collar workers and those in poorer regions –  groups that mirrored the AfD’s strongest gains. However, this does not indicate a direct voter movement from SPD to AfD.

Structural or temporary shift?

It remains unclear whether these shifts reflect a broader Western trend or the unique circumstances of Germany’s progressive coalition. Some factors, such as high inflation, have punished incumbents worldwide, from the US and UK to the Netherlands and France. Additionally, the coalition’s internal contradictions –  especially between FDP and SPD –  made a coherent economic policy nearly impossible. Given the scale of the problems, it is rather surprising that both parties did not do even worse. 

The SPD’s existential challenge

The SPD’s long-term problem is the erosion of its core voter base. It no longer represents the labour movement or the lower middle class, despite its rhetoric. Today, blue-collar workers and even trade union members are more likely to vote for the far right than for the centre left. The SPD now recruits primarily from urban, middle-class circles rather than working-class communities.

While left-wing discourse remains focused on social justice and vulnerable groups –  often linked to migrant communities in cities –  —working and middle-class voters in rural areas feel increasingly alienated. Compounding this disconnect, the SPD is dominated by career politicians who transition from student activism to advisory roles before entering parliament. Party chairman Lars Klingbeil exemplifies this path, having worked as a policy aide for Gerhard Schröder as a student before moving into politics –  a trajectory that is becoming the norm.

Rebuilding trust with its former base while governing will be the SPD’s greatest challenge in the coming years –  one it may not yet fully grasp. The party must adopt new forms of communication and decision-making that engage a broader range of members beyond those pursuing political careers. It also needs to confront difficult issues, including Islamist terrorism and the scale and nature of immigration. This shift will likely push progressive parties to move beyond cultural debates and focus on building cohesive, inclusive societies.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Ryan Nasho Photography