Michela CECCORULLI

Associate Professor, Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna

The 40th anniversary of the Schengen area this year places the EU in an uncomfortable position: too significant to be neglected, too embarrassing to be flaunted. The main reason is that the key assumption beneath it – the idea that borders are a problematic signifier among member states – is in troubled waters. The nonchalant reintroduction and persistence of controls at internal borders testify to it.

Rhetoric that does not match reality is an old story. Yet, for a political entity that has built a big chunk of its credibility as a global actor on its uniqueness, the mismatch should not be too easily dismissed. Granted, credibility is not trendy these days. Also, one could argue that the Schengen space keeps enlarging, with two more EU member states (Bulgaria and Romania) joining in early 2024, stretching out its perimeter and widening the scope of free movement. After all, it is remarked, it is a fortune that we still have it, with all that is going on: centrifugal forces and nationalist tendencies. This has not diminished calls for ‘more EU’, and thus, integration is not at stake, the argument goes. When integration means too many things, however, it loses all specific meaning for the Union. Thus, the Dorian Gray effect is self-evident: what does integration mean if the most distinguished element of integration is in jeopardy? The half-empty glass perspective is the one we should opt for, starting from considering what went wrong and when.

Until 2015, internal controls at borders had made few appearances. Yet that year, which saw the arrival in the Union of almost a million asylum seekers, marked a watershed in two meaningful ways. First, some member states reintroduced internal controls at the border, pairing ‘secondary movements’ (unauthorised crossings) to security threats (the only case that, together with dangers to public order, justifies a claim for internal checks). Second, they did so in total disrespect of the EU’s law, which provides specific conditions for the reintroduction of border controls. Coordination is key in this domain, for their restoration has manifold implications.

Let us be honest: Schengen was never intended for, nor open to, non-European citizens. Thus, one could ask what else is new. And indeed, Schengen’s inclusion into the EU’s framework only worsened concerns about the ability of other states to cope with potential challenges. For this reason, the system served precisely the objective of building trust among member states to keep a border-free space: ‘safeguard provisions’ and coordinated measures on migration and asylum at the ‘external borders’ were the trick. Yet, in 2015, several member states’ unilateral moves challenged these assumptions and ‘saving Schengen’ became a priority. Invoked for the first time in 2015, Article 29 of the Schengen Border Code recognised a persistent challenge at the external border of the Union with the potential to threaten the Schengen area, de facto endorsing the securitisation of secondary movements and of irregular migration as a reflex, with all implications this entails.

The legitimation of internal controls at borders automatically triggered massive, and – one can say now with hindsight – unexpected consequences. The Union was not able or willing (as admonished by the European Parliament) to prevent and punish either the persistence of controls at borders (many of which were unlawful, according to the Court of Justice), or the proliferation of justifications provided to keep or reintroduce internal checks. Unauthorised arrivals seemed always on the forefront, linked to instability, the unreliability of third partners (how can we be sure that we can trust Turkey in the future?), proximity, organised crime, human smuggling, terrorism and even the pandemic. The last creative outburst: the likelihood of ‘instrumentalisation’ of migration by hostile actors, that, as it was correctly noted, can refer to possibly any situation at the border.

‘Possible risks’ has become the main parameter to reintroduce or keep controls, justifying measures that, brick after brick, have installed the idea of the border as a quick fix and the ultimate saviour against the many threats menacing us. Since 2015, border controls have been reintroduced more than 400 times, too big a number not to notice it, especially when compared to the period before. At the same time, the only semblance of compliance with EU law is the website where member states notify when they – ‘temporarily’ – reintroduce border controls. One might argue that harder measures at the external borders could recreate the lost trust, allowing the lifting of internal border controls. But the numbers are off. Since 2015, the external borders have been massively fenced and externalisation has significantly reduced the numbers of migrants arriving. But guess what: internal borders are still alive and well. And even the proposal to substitute internal controls with less visible digital surveillance systems or more police cooperation defies the feeling that something has unmistakably changed (for the worse) in the EU. One could blame fierce nationalist formations and their fascination with both solid and borders of belonging, but that would be a lie because all political formations have abundantly used controls at borders. 

So, one wonders: what does the EU see when it looks at itself in the picture, as it grows older and struggles to maintain the original beauty of the integration project? Is the absence of controls at internal borders still among the most important economic and political achievements? How can the EU cope with the lack of trust among member states or heightened surveillance for persons moving within its space? Addressing these crucial questions is imperative for the EU and its member states to progress with their integration project, for their responses will determine the very nature of the Union in the future.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Tatiana Popova