Felix HETT

representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Germany) for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova

With Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine going into its fifth year, the prospects for peace remain dim. Even if a ceasefire were to be announced tomorrow, anything remotely resembling a just peace for Ukrainians seems far off. With millions displaced, thousands killed, many more scarred physically and psychologically and around 20 per cent of Ukraine’s territory remaining under Russian occupation, it is very clear that an end to the fighting might bring relief, but will only be a first step in rebuilding peace. 

Four years of war have shown: there are no quick fixes, no grand solutions and no easy ways out. Putin could not capture Kyiv in a couple of days, Zelenskyy could not liberate Ukraine’s territories in a few months and Trump could not bring peace in 24 hours. The conflict that essentially arose with Ukraine’s independence, turned into a war in 2014, and escalated in 2022, is here to stay. It might change its form, become less deadly – but its essence, the Russian challenge to Ukraine’s right to exercise its sovereignty, will remain. European strategic thinking has to start from this baseline.

While too many of the strategic debates of the last four years have circled around finding a quick fix, identifying game-changing weapons transfers and pursuing maximalist aims, bureaucracies have efficiently administered the status quo. The latter, though, seems increasingly unsustainable, first and foremost for Ukraine. More and more, it becomes clear that all possible paths out of the war are imperfect, with some being less bad than others – but none is ideal. The challenge is to transform the status quo in line with Europe’s strategic interests: to preserve and expand Ukraine’s sovereignty and to reduce and eventually end the fighting. 

European strategy has, roughly, consisted of three main elements so far: firstly, sanctioning and isolating Russia, with limited success in an increasingly multipolar world. Secondly, supporting and arming Ukraine. And thirdly, investing in Europe’s own defence capabilities. Increasingly, policymakers acknowledge that a fourth component needs to be added: diplomatic engagement with the adversary – Moscow – not to replace one of the previous three elements, but to supplement them. 

Diplomacy is a cultural technique invented to speak to one’s enemies, not to friends. If Europe were to re-engage diplomatically with Russia, one should not fear that this would amount to caving in to Russian demands, nor hope for quick breakthroughs. Diplomatic engagement might help to reduce escalation risks, avoid missing opportunities to find a way out of the war, and bring European nations closer to ‘the seat at the table’ that they so far have unsuccessfully demanded from the Trump administration. 

European support for Ukraine must continue, regardless of the outcome of diplomatic talks. So far, arms deliveries and macro-financial support have been immensely successful: Ukraine stands its ground, defends its sovereignty and the state continues to function. Ukrainian society has shown outstanding resilience, not least in the current harsh winter, amid blackouts and heating disruptions caused by a systematic Russian bombing campaign. The challenge for the future is to preserve this social cohesion, which is especially strong on a horizontal, people-to-people level. Neoliberal pipe dreams of unleashing market forces from bureaucratic burdens in Ukraine risk undermining this impressive cohesion. If the social fabric frays, Ukraine’s long-term capacity to resist external pressure will weaken.

For progressives, this point is crucial. A sustainable peace cannot be built on a hollowed-out state and an exhausted society. Support for housing, energy affordability, healthcare, education and veterans’ reintegration is not secondary to security – it is part of security. The European Union should embed social cohesion into a coherent resilience strategy.

Europe’s interest should be clear: whatever imperfect peace can be achieved – Ukraine must win it. Countries can win wars, but lose the peace – a feeling prevalent in the UK after World War I, which led the Labour Party to demand that “this time, the peace must be won” in its 1945 election campaign. If the war ends, Ukraine is in many senses too big to fail, or too important to lose the peace. No matter if it remains a candidate country at the doorsteps of the European Union, or a member state in the short time frame many Ukrainians hope for – their country should become an economic and social success story. Only from a position of military, economic and societal strength can Ukraine withstand the pressure of neighbouring Russia, which, in all likelihood, will remain adversarial for the foreseeable future. 

In pursuing this aim, Brussels must review its previous policies: can standard, one-size-fits-all enlargement conditionalities really apply? All policies should be reviewed with one guiding question in mind: will this strengthen or weaken Ukraine? Answers here are not easy. Ukraine, after all, also poses competitive challenges to business interests inside the EU. Those will also push for preferential access to post-war recovery tenders. Here it is of utmost importance not to prioritise the short-term profit, but the long-term interest of Europe, including Ukraine. 

Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has experienced more than 30 years of industrial decline. The structure of its economy has become more primitive: from (Soviet) high tech to exporting unprocessed goods. This trend needs to be reversed: an industrial economy with a skilled workforce and a strong fiscal base is a partner Europe needs. A depopulated exporter of raw materials would form a much weaker neighbour and would likely also be much more unstable politically. In the past, the EU has resisted Kyiv’s modest attempts at industrial policy, such as an export ban on wood to revive the timber industry. It was introduced in 2015, at a time when war was already raging in Ukraine’s east, and the economy contracted. Brussels should not go back to this kind of short-sighted policy. 

To the contrary, the EU should consider creating incentives for displaced Ukrainians to return home. Small grants programmes to resettle might be helpful. Of course, most important are the domestic conditions. These are not only shaped by the rule of law and a business-friendly environment, but also by the availability of kindergartens, quality health care, good schools and well-paid, decent jobs. Ukraine, facing a severe demographic crisis and acute labour shortage, needs its citizens to return. It is in the EU’s strategic interest that Ukraine remain a country worth coming back to.

Photo credits: Shutterstock / Yurii Andreichyn