Ana GARCIA

Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and associate researcher of the BRICS Policy Center

Brazil will host the BRICS+ summit in July this year, marking 16 years since the first leaders’ meeting in 2009. At that time, the world was facing the global financial crisis, which had begun in the United States in 2008. Indeed, it was the perception that international financial institutions did not reflect the distribution of power in the global economy that brought the BRICS countries together. Their shared objective was to reform these institutions, with particular emphasis on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had shown limitations in preventing the 2008 financial crisis.

In its initial phase, the BRICS adopted a reformist agenda, seeking greater representation and influence within existing institutions, without necessarily confronting them. However, this reformist drive has gradually lost momentum as geopolitical tensions have intensified. In this context, factors such as growing tensions between the United States and China, Russia’s annexation of Crimea followed by the invasion of Ukraine, debates over monetary alternatives to the US dollar, and the expansion of the bloc to include regionally significant countries have all contributed to the transformation of the BRICS into a geopolitical coalition.

The Johannesburg summit in 2023 was a turning point as it marked the BRICS’ expansion. This move was shaped by global tensions and back-to-back BRICS presidencies in the G20 – India in 2023, Brazil in 2024 and South Africa in 2025. Public debates focused on the BRICS as a potential driver of de-dollarisation, and on a shifting global power balance. Yet concrete financial outcomes remained limited. Brazil, in particular, was concerned that expansion would dilute the group’s cohesion and its own influence.

Russia’s presidency of the BRICS in 2024 pushed the agenda further. Four new countries became full BRICS members, and others were designated as strategic partners. Russia also announced ambitious initiatives: the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the Cross-Border Payment Initiative, BRICS Clear (a settlement and depository platform), and a BRICS (Re)Insurance Company. All these aim to increase the financial autonomy of the BRICS and to reduce reliance on Western systems. Yet they remain at the proposal stage, with voluntary participation and lengthy testing ahead. Notably, BRICS governance is shifting. While decisions once required full consensus, the new approach allows for voluntary, non-binding adoption. This flexibility reflects the growing diversity within the bloc. It is thus an ambitious BRICS agenda that Brazil has inherited from Russia for 2025. Adding complexity, Brazil’s presidency of the BRICS coincides with two other major roles for that country: the G20 presidency in 2024 and hosting COP30 in late 2025.

Meanwhile, the international landscape has shifted dramatically. The ongoing genocide in Gaza and the escalation of Israel’s war against Iran underscore the deepening crisis in global leadership – or hegemony – exposed by the absence of universally accepted and enforced international rules and norms. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has further reinforced this trend. The new US administration has ramped up tariffs, particularly on Chinese goods, threatened traditional allies such as Mexico and Canada, and unsettled global markets with new rounds of retaliatory trade measures. Tensions with Europe have intensified, particularly after Trump unilaterally tried to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine and made continued US aid to Kyiv conditional. Washington’s retreat from multilateral institutions, coupled with its growing embrace of trade protectionism, now defines the challenging global environment that Brazil must navigate.

In response, Brazil has adopted a cautious BRICS strategy – minimising both external and internal tensions. Internationally, Brasília avoids open confrontation with the US, focusing on trade facilitation rather than on monetary alternatives to the dollar. Domestically, the government steers clear of divisive debates that could trigger a political backlash. This recalibration can be seen in Brazil’s economic priorities for the BRICS. While previous presidencies have pushed for de-dollarisation and the increased use of local currencies, Brazil has centred its agenda on practical trade facilitation. Given that BRICS trade remains heavily China-focused and centred on commodities and energy, easing transaction mechanisms makes sense – and provokes less political resistance at home and abroad. Brazil is also repositioning the BRICS away from an ‘anti-Western’ image. As Celso Amorim, President Lula da Silva’s chief adviser for foreign policy, has stressed, the goal is a more balanced and fair international system, rooted in development, multilateralism and peace.

In practice, Brazil has scaled back its BRICS ambitions in comparison with previous years, adopting a more pragmatic agenda. As ambassador Tatiana Rosito, head of the BRICS finance track, has noted, the BRICS should serve as a “stabilising” rather than a “transformative” force. Reflecting this approach and faced with a tight negotiation calendar, Brazil is concentrating on outcomes that are feasible and deliverable in the short term. One concrete achievement was Indonesia’s accession as a full BRICS member in early 2025. Indonesia brings economic weight and a unique position bridging East and West – an important strategic gain for the bloc.

Yet in the monetary-financial sphere, major breakthroughs remain unlikely. Proposals for new payment platforms and alternatives to the dollar have largely been sidelined. One potential area for progress is the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which was created in 2014 but which has never been put into operation. The Central Bank of Brazil is now reviewing its statutes and testing functionality, but it is unclear if a new implementation plan will emerge this year.
Institutional reform remains a top priority. With the BRICS doubling its membership in just two years – from five to eleven countries – governance mechanisms need urgent revision. Establishing clear criteria for future enlargement is also essential. Brazil faces a delicate balancing act: preserving the BRICS’ reformist spirit, maintaining group cohesion and avoiding political pitfalls at home and abroad. Despite these challenges, the BRICS continues to play a critical role in the broader effort to build a more balanced and just world.

Photo credits:  Ricardo Stuckert / PR
26.02.2025 – Abertura da Primeira Reunião de Sherpas da presidência brasileira do BRICS”
by Palácio do Planalto, CC BY-ND 2.0