László ANDOR

FEPS Secretary General

This would have been the time for the EU to prove that ‘strategic autonomy’ is not an empty concept. That in the face of adversity, we can step up our game and, once united and energised, take the bull by the horns. The three tests the EU has faced were the trade debate with the United States, the launch of the new cycle of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and answering the calls of President Donald Trump regarding the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Nobody should pretend that the EU leadership has been facing an easy challenge. These were tests of strength, courage and cunning, reminiscent of the 12 labours of Heracles. But that is where the comparison ends. The events of this summer exposed our weakness at all levels, turning into the worst nightmare and awaiting a proper wake-up call.

First, European leaders – with the notable exception of Pedro Sánchez – accepted Trump’s crazy demand to drive up military expenditure to 5 per cent of the annual GDP, in the hope that the general tariff level could be limited to 10 per cent. But of course, Trump does not know mercy, and a 15 per cent tariff was imposed. Then the EU accepted this tariff with a smile on Ursula von der Leyen’s face in the hope that perhaps Trump would not walk away from the war in Ukraine. Shortly, but not surprisingly, Europeans had to witness Trump not only hosting Vladimir Putin in Alaska but also parroting his narrative about the ‘root causes’ of the war, and dropping the demand for a ceasefire, as well as the entire sanctions agenda. 

During the press conference in Scotland, von der Leyen could not give a straight answer to the question on what exactly the Americans had made concessions, as the US had not made any, and demanded even more. The 15 per cent (and on some products, higher) tariff hurts, but, even more dramatically, the EU leadership failed to stand up for multilateralism in international trade and echoed Trump’s false narrative about ‘rebalancing’ instead. Besides, promises were made that European companies would ‘turbo charge’ investment in the United States, which contradicts the entire EU campaign originating from the Draghi Report, highlighting the need to fill the investment gap not in the US or elsewhere in Europe, but within the EU itself.

Considering investment, the EU’s key tool is the MFF, and, by mid-July, all eyes were on the Commission when the new proposal was unveiled for the upcoming two-year period. ‘Retreat camouflaged as innovation’ could have been the motto of this event. Von der Leyen remained true to herself, as in her second mandate, she tends to undo what she built in her first one.

In 2020, in response to the Covid-19 crisis, there was a kind of budget revolution, resulting in a surge in EU fiscal capacity with the establishment of NextGenerationEU. Now, while nominally we speak about the largest ever MFF, the real value of key EU programmes is about to fall. The ill-conceived nationalisation (which would apply to both agricultural policy and cohesion) will undermine the MFF’s potential for funding European public goods. 

Then, in August, the EU had to face up to the harsh reality: Donald Trump was not joking, disowning the war in Ukraine and blaming it all on Joe Biden. A new transatlantic divide emerges because if a decision has to be made now, the choice is between a horrible end and an endless horror. Trump prefers the first, while most European leaders would opt for the second. All this was displayed in the White House once Trump returned from Alaska and a sample of European leaders flew in. 

Regarding peace negotiations, the situation in the theatre of war is the most important determinant of the dynamics and the eventual outcome. In Ukraine, currently, Russia has had the upper hand. This, however, does not mean that Russia is on track to achieve all its goals; far from it. For over two years, since the botched counteroffensive of June 2023, the situation has been some kind of stalemate, which is subject to diverse interpretations. 

It is unlikely that the war will end with the capitulation of either side, which makes negotiations important. Russia has not lost, but Ukraine has not won. It will not be a clear-cut victory or defeat for either side, but one thing is for sure: both countries have lost a lot, and Trump has created a momentum for a settlement, as long as the two sides, Russia and Ukraine, can converge. This would also mean that the clear and maximalist goals Europeans have been trying to uphold will become unattainable. 

Some European leaders’ maximalist approach to Ukraine is in sharp contrast with their negligence on Gaza and failure to sanction Israel. The EU has a legal obligation to do so due to the breach of Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement and other international legal obligations. Sadly, this was only explained publicly by the previous and not the incumbent High Representative of the EU. 

So, the big picture is that on trade, there is still some rearguard action after the surrender; on Ukraine, there is a search for a new position after the EU being wrong-footed by the US; and the MFF should be a key tool for Europe to upgrade itself, while the existing proposal falls very short. The latest comparable crisis was in 2010-2012, when European leaders did not realise for far too long that they were digging themselves into a hole. In the summer of 2012, the EU stepped back from the brink, but the recovery took some further years. Today, this threat of imminent disintegration is not looming, but the simultaneous stress in the economic, financial and security dimensions may become just too great. In such times, a lot depends on good leadership, which is currently lacking. 

Ursula von der Leyen was just very lucky that a motion of censure against her in the European Parliament passed just before the wind turned into a storm. On 10th  July in Strasbourg, 175 MEPs voted for the motion to force her out, 360 against and 18 abstained, on a turnout of 77 per cent. Some of the MEPs who voted against her dismissal did so to avoid a long period, potentially five to six months, of uncertainty until a new European Commission could be in place. This means that the votes against the motion cannot all be interpreted as an expression of strong confidence in von der Leyen, but as a rejection of instability and further shift to the right that such a transition may entail.

The culmination of events during this summer also serves as a cautionary tale about politicians who wanted to play geopolitics without understanding geoeconomics and only demonstrated timidity and cognitive dissonance. The consequence of such a lack of preparedness at the leadership level is, at the international level, a deep and genuine transatlantic crisis, and, at the European level, a new divide between the verbally courageous who would be keen to militarise the EU and the quiet pragmatics who wish to maintain the integrity of the European single market and social model. The question is whether the EU can continue to represent its own values without undermining its strategic interests (to the extent that the latter has been defined at all). 

There is some truth in the statement that in these negotiations, the room for manoeuvre for the EU leaders could only be limited, and the asymmetry between the EU and the US determined the outcome, no matter what. However, von der Leyen has weakened the Commission by  building an autocratic regime and overruling the established methods of coordination, suppressing the logic of specific portfolios, and eliminating the heavyweights from the Commission who could have helped facing the challenge and the pursuit of a viable strategy. Nonetheless, today the main discussion should not be about individuals but the cohesion and viability of the European Union as a community. 

In 2003, when the US and the UK launched their illegal war against Iraq, the neoconservative author Robert Kagan wrote, “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”. In those times, such comments were made to mock the Europeans, many of whom developed a kind of inferiority complex, having seen the military manifestations of US unilateralism. Since 24 February 2022, the beginning of the European ‘Zeitenwende‘, some Europeans started to walk with their heads high, believing that we are also from Mars, and emancipated from the US. Three and a half years later, it is time to think again about which planet we are from and what kind of world we want to build for ourselves.

Photo credits: NATO