Donald Trump’s Oval Office seems to have become the backdrop for a new reality TV show as he stages his idiosyncratic international diplomacy. His recent emblematic encounters with Volodymyr Zelensky and Cyril Ramaphosa furthermore signal to the world that a paradigm shift is underway – following on from the pandemic, the Russian war against Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza conflict. 

Under Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine, the US has withdrawn from many international organisations and agreements (the Paris Agreement on climate change, WHO, WTO, UNHCR, UNRWA, SDGs and others). With the closure of USAID, the Trump administration has brought America’s official development policy to an end. This shift to unilateralism emphasises national sovereignty and interest over multilateral cooperation. The creator and hitherto most powerful and determined defender of the existing multilateral order is switching sides and joining the proponents of an imperialist perception of world politics, based on competing empires accompanied by their vassal states in their respective spheres of influence. This puts the other players on the stage under pressure to redefine their roles, and it also opens up space for new alignments.

Since the BRICS entered the international stage during the financial crisis in 2009 (originally the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, then quickly joined by South Africa in 2010), the bloc has perceived itself as a challenger to the unfair model of neoliberal globalisation and to the existing multilateral order. Consequently, the BRICS agenda was developmentalist, and this resulted in the bloc’s voice being heard not only in the Global South but worldwide. However, with the recovery of the global economy, and against the backdrop of Western ignorance regarding reforms, the BRICS developmental ambitions were largely frustrated. For a decade, the bloc then led an existence in the shadow of international attention.

The BRICS only reappeared on the international stage in the context of the pandemic and the Russian war against Ukraine. This time, the bloc’s in-built contradictions with the West have become more visible. As a result of both the Western refusal to classify Covid-19 vaccines as ‘global common goods’, and of the comprehensive sanctions system imposed on Russia, the anti-Western sentiment in the Global South has grown. The sanctions policies of the US and Europe have caused problems for global trade, and the debt pressure for many countries in the Global South has returned to the agenda. The BRICS has thus turned from being a bloc with ambitious development objectives into a geopolitical challenger to the West. This change in priorities was documented in the enlargement of the bloc in 2024  to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This accession of important energy exporters has boosted the bloc’s significance as an energy and financial partnership. And countries like Iran, Russia and China are highly motivated to develop an alternative currency system due to their concerns about sanctions and being excluded from the dollar-based economy. 

At the same time, these developments nevertheless shed light on the internal fissures that the BRICS has experienced since its foundation. India and Brazil opposed the enlargement of the BRICS and, together with South Africa, they are less inclined to position the bloc against the West. Instead, they want to use the BRICS to democratise and reform the existing order. The democracies in the BRICS are more interested in genuine multipolarity, in which countries should be autonomous enough to steer between eventual US-led and Chinese-led blocs. This divergence between anti-Western states and non-aligned or multi-aligned states still continues, and the fissures remain a characteristic of the bloc. With the formal admission of Indonesia in January 2025, one of the biggest democracies in the world, this divergence has only been underlined. The dichotomy of these forces will most probably shape not only the future of the BRICS, but also that of the global order.

Europe and the BRICS: overlapping interests?

As a multi-layered governance system with many deliberative elements, Europe is struggling to keep pace with the dynamic development of the international system. The US president’s denunciation of what for decades has been called the ‘West’ seems to be the final argument for Europeans to strive seriously for autonomy. This implies creating new alignments or strengthening alternative ones. Due to the low degree of institutionalisation on the BRICS side, contact tends to take place directly between the bloc’s member countries. This contact has been characterised by dialogue (often regarding the prevention of conflicts), economic and trade questions, and multilateral cooperation regarding global challenges (climate change, development among others). With the ever-increasing uncertainty in international relations, more concrete areas of interaction are coming into view.

De-dollarisation  

Fewer and fewer international players want to conduct their transactions in US dollars. This trend is particularly noticeable in the energy sector, where many players, among them BRICS members, are opting for alternatives. Under the Trump administration, the dollar has experienced heightened volatility due to unpredictable tariff threats. By diversifying their foreign exchange reserves, developing countries aim to reduce vulnerability to external shocks. Their goal is not only financial independence – such as avoiding conversion disadvantages – but also political autonomy. In this context, Trump’s threat of universal tariffs does not deter the BRICS countries from going their own way. Indeed, his tariff threat has rather driven them closer to China and Russia and their ‘alternative economic ambitions’.

This could lead to fundamental changes in the global financial system, though not necessarily negative ones. Europe could even benefit – if it acts strategically. The euro is the second most important currency on international markets, accounting for around 20 per cent of global reserves. To boost this performance, the EU must offer investors – especially those from the Global South – a genuine alternative to the dollar. A European bond market would further increase the eurozone’s global relevance. This would support a strong European economy and reinforce the euro as an international reserve currency, reducing Europe’s dependence on US political and economic uncertainties. Strengthening the euro’s role in the green transition, deepening financial market integration and advancing the digital euro project could also boost Europe’s international standing and leverage.

EU capital market integration and its spillover effects

The option to align the economies of the Global South more deeply with the EU capital market would bring significant advantages for developing countries, including access to stable and transparent capital, improved corporate governance, technological progress and greater economic resilience. The EU’s capital markets union seeks to create a unified market that facilitates investment and economic stability. Through this, Europe’s partner countries could also attract essential funding for infrastructure and industrial development, reducing capital costs and increasing foreign direct investment. Financial integration further enables more efficient capital allocation and risk sharing, strengthening national financial sectors and diversifying economies.

Exposure to EU regulatory standards could promote better corporate governance, transparency and investor confidence in companies located in countries in the Global South. Additionally, collaboration with advanced EU markets accelerates technology transfer and innovation, enhancing the global competitiveness of their economies. Furthermore, the dynamic and diverse markets of those states offer valuable opportunities for portfolio diversification and higher returns, attracting global investors and supporting local financial market development.

SDGs: a common concern?

Like the EU, the BRICS countries have committed themselves to the UN Sustainable Development Goals. According to various reports, European countries rank highest in the implementation of these goals. When it comes to international spillovers, high-income countries, including EU countries, tend nevertheless to generate negative effects. This is mainly related to unsustainable production and consumption, which fuels deforestation and other negative environmental and social impacts worldwide.

But even in areas where the EU is trying to renew its legislative arsenal to live up to the 2030 sustainability agendas, it is accused of hindering sustainable reforms in southern economies. The EU Green Deal legislation, for instance, raises questions. The EU should be aware of this problem, incentivise legislative dialogues and review its policies that impact the Global South in order to improve mutual relations. African shareholders fear protectionist motivations on the European side and wish that their views would be included earlier in the finalisation of European legislation.

Europe’s challenge

If the EU wishes to remain a global player, it should prepare itself because multipolarity is here to stay, and the strategic landscape is likely to become even more complicated. Getting ahead in such an environment will require the EU to move beyond the West-centric transatlantic perspective. It needs clarity regarding its own interests and, at the same time, the political will for a true and fair engagement with developing countries. This means sharing Europe’s knowledge and experience with partners – but not lecturing them. The EU should actually be in a better position to do this than many other actors. As an alliance of very different member states with often-conflicting interests, it is accustomed to complex challenges and the art of compromise in negotiations.

In today’s reality, where the rich countries of the north are de-risking and de-coupling from one-sided dependencies on individual countries, developing countries in the south have leverage for the first time in years. They are suddenly being courted – either for their raw materials, or because they are needed to manage migration, or simply because the increasing polarisation between China and the US is opening up additional negotiating space not only for the big BRICS countries but in some cases also for the ‘nobodies’ of the international community.The BRICS is giving many of these changes an institutional face. For this to be successful, it is often sufficient to promote symbolic politics. Looking at the legacy of the ‘loose association’, it is evident that substantial developmental and economic achievements are limited. In contrast, the geopolitical impact in a world of competing narratives is considerable. However, history teaches that a world with multiple centres of power tends to increase the risk of conflict and war. A multipolar world can only ensure stability if the major powers collaborate. Where multipolarity is not integrated into multilateralism, the outcome might be fragmentation and war.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Poetra.RH