Ilke TOYGÜR

When historians will write the timeline of transatlantic relations, they will give a specific emphasis to January 2026 – the Greenland spat – as the moment when the Europeans really saw where their transatlantic red line lies. Even if both sides have lived through many moments of trade tensions, different approaches to multilateralism or argued over NATO defence spending, this was a first.

It was a moment of broken trust, in which Europeans got a glimpse of a world where territorial integrity could easily be threatened with the use of force or economic coercion. This was the moment that forced European leaders to abandon (or at least pause) the appeasement strategy they had been using during the last year. An instrument that was designed (but never used) for China – the anti-coercion instrument – was about to be employed against a historical ally. A moment of firsts. 

Even if this crisis is averted – for now – there must be a real takeaway. We are living through a period where the domestic and foreign policies of the United States are inherently linked. The country’s democratic backsliding is coupled with an aggressive foreign policy stance directed against neighbours and allies alike. 

Understanding the MAGA movement is key

The MAGA movement (Make America Great Again) is often framed as domestic policy. But MAGA has always implied a foreign policy – and that policy is already reshaping the global order. Sceptical of alliances, dismissive of multilateralism and liberal internationalism, MAGA’s worldview has always spilt over national borders. Greenland is the case where this spillover has become very visible to Europeans. 

It is important to understand that at its core, MAGA rejects the assumption that American power is best exercised through alliances, rules and shared norms. Instead, it advances a doctrine of sovereignty: states as self-interested actors, diplomacy as transactional bargaining, and institutions as constraints to these transactional conversations. Following that logic, no other supranational institution than the European Union poses as big a threat to the US’s perceived interests. 

This vision was already formalised in the 2017 US national security strategy (NSS), which marked a sharp break from earlier strategies. Democracy promotion was sidelined, alliances were framed as conditional and economic nationalism was elevated to a strategic principle. Multilateral institutions were cast as an exploitation of the US, while economic coercion was normalised as a tool of statecraft. Although the Biden Administration’s 2022 NSS attempted to restore alliance-centred leadership, the NSS of 2025 brought this understanding to a whole new level. It has become very visible that for the European Union: MAGA’s impact is both ideological and structural.

Ideologically, the MAGA movement is validating narratives that have already been circulating within Europe’s populist right. Its attacks on ‘globalism’, hostility towards migration (that has reached a whole new level with ICE’s recent actions), and disdain for supranational governance echoed seamlessly with some political movements in Europe. When the United States – the EU’s principal strategic partner – openly questioned the value of alliances and institutions, it lent legitimacy to European actors seeking to weaken them from within.

This is not an abstract influence. MAGA’s leading voices repeatedly praised Europe’s ‘illiberal democracies’, particularly Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. They have actively supported extreme right candidates in European elections. The implicit message was unmistakable: checks and balances are expendable, pluralism is not an asset, and sovereignty trumps the rule of law. For the EU – an entity built precisely to pool sovereignty through treaties and institutions – this represented a direct normative challenge.

Furthermore, combined with the existing discontent among European citizens, fuelled by a declining investment in public services, a cost-of-living crisis, housing crisis and inequality (perceived and real), this transatlantic alliance is elevating the far-right here in Europe. While the extreme right can engage in transatlantic conversation, the centrist forces on both sides lack a visible platform. In the upcoming elections in Europe, including France’s presidential elections, the transatlantic link and the MAGA movement’s magnifying effect are likely to become even more visible. 

This effect is not limited to domestic politics. Structurally, MAGA also destabilised Europe’s security assumptions. Scepticism toward NATO and the transactional framing of defence commitments injected uncertainty into European calculations. Even without a formal withdrawal, ambiguity itself became corrosive. European states are trying to respond with increased defence spending, attempts at coordination, and scenario planning that includes many exercises that would have been perceived as a wild card only a year ago. 

Combined with four years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europeans discovered that their security assumptions from the 20th century are not valid anymore. The Greenland spat crystallised this understanding. When President Donald Trump floated the idea of purchasing Greenland, the proposal was widely mocked. Yet it was perfectly consistent with MAGA’s transactional worldview. Greenland was framed not as part of a web of alliances involving Denmark, the EU and NATO, but as a strategic asset – valuable for Arctic access and critical minerals to start with – and therefore something to be acquired. It’s people’s right to self-determination was perceived as a non-issue. For European partners, the alarm was not the feasibility of a deal, but the signal it sent: sovereignty and alliances were negotiable if the price was right. Combined with the threat of using force or economic coercion, it created a whole new level of awareness in European circles. 

What, then, can be done?

First, the EU must treat this disruption as a structural feature of the new international system. This means accelerating efforts to strengthen internal resilience: defending rule-of-law mechanisms, insulating EU institutions from political capture and countering disinformation that frames multilateralism as elite conspiracy and actively go against European integration.

Second, Europe must deepen – not dilute – its capacity for collective action. Completing the single market – now set to 2028 – has become a no-brainer under any scenario of international relations. European strategic autonomy should not necessarily mean decoupling from the United States at this stage, given major security and defence dependencies, but rather reducing vulnerability to political swings in Washington. This requires credible defence capabilities, coordinated industrial policy, and unified positions on trade and technology.

Finally, a clear acknowledgement of the irony will also be necessary. The MAGA movement’s promise of restored sovereignty risks producing the opposite: a world less ordered, less predictable and more dangerous for everyone – including the United States. For Europe, the lesson is clear: If it wants an order in the world, it has to follow Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s suggestions and rebuild it with middle powers. The major powers have abandoned the pretence of respecting even an imperfect order. The rest of the countries are left with only two options: either appease and compete for political favours, or unite under a commitment to rebuild a new order in the 21st century.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Stig Alenas