Sanusha NAIDU

Foreign policy analyst, focusing on South Africa and African international engagements. Associate Researcher at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town, and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Dialogue linked to UNISA.

The relationship between the Global South and the BRICS is often viewed as complementary, rooted in South-South cooperation, and defined by solidarity and non-alignment. But is this really a realistic reflection of the relations between the BRICS and the Global South? To answer this question, the strengths and challenges of the BRICS-Global South connection need to be examined.

In the current global context, the BRICS founding members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – are pivotal in shaping the future of the Global South. This aligns with the spirit of the Bandung Conference, the first large-scale Asian-African conference in 1955, which emphasised economic development and political non-alignment that was seen as crucial for growth and stability, where the developing world would not be caught in supporting one power over another. Furthermore, the BRICS today aims to foster a more inclusive multipolar international system that represents Global South voices better.

At first glance, the BRICS embodies benign ideals of mutual interests and win-win partnerships for the Global South. However, whether this truly reflects the dynamic between the BRICS and the Global South needs to be scrutinised. The BRICS represents a critical element for the Global South’s identity in responding to systemic challenges within the international order. The ties that connect the BRICS to the Global South can be characterised in the following way:

1. Shared development challenges

The BRICS serves as a platform for nations with similar historical experiences and development challenges, enabling them to unite and advocate for collective interests.

2. Reforming global governance

The BRICS seeks to reform institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to ensure fairer representation, and to promote a more equitable global order for developing nations.

3. Economic cooperation

The BRICS has established institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) thus providing alternative financial mechanisms to reduce reliance on traditional Western-dominated institutions.

4. South-South cooperation

The alliance fosters collaboration among Global South countries and promotes solidarity across various sectors, including finance, trade and technology.

However, these ties can also become sources of internal fragmentation and friction due to competing interests and regional or global rivalries for power. The Global South is not a homogeneous bloc, and by extension the BRICS reflects this diversity. Promoting the BRICS as the pivot of the Global South therefore raises levels of contestation both within the bloc and externally. The complexities underpinning the push and pull between the BRICS and the Global South are embedded in the institutional architecture of their engagement. Several structural conditions make this evident.

Contestation for leadership

Both China and India position themselves as de facto leaders of the Global South. Their rivalry stems from historical tensions and their efforts to leverage soft power in various regional contexts. A prime example is the tension over the Indian Ocean, where India perceives China’s encroachment into its sphere of influence as a threat to its interests. This rivalry complicates their interactions within the BRICS, as both nations strive to mitigate each other’s influence. While the expansion of the BRICS may enhance its outreach, it serves as a reminder to India of China’s use of economic power to extend that country’s political influence in the Global South. Consequently, India faces the dilemma of balancing its interests between the Global North and the Global South. What remains to be seen is whether this contestation for power within the BRICS and the broader Global South will result in the emergence of competing power blocs led by China and India respectively. More importantly, this rivalry might create opportunities for other actors in the Global South to leverage their positions through strategic trade-offs and compromises, effectively playing China and India off against each other.

The trust deficit

The trust deficit between the BRICS and several nations of the Global South is a significant concern, stemming from various factors such as differing national priorities, historical grievances and the perception that the BRICS prioritises its own interests over those of the broader Global South. Internal divisions within the Global South, combined with scepticism regarding the BRICS’ commitment to equitable development, further exacerbate this lack of trust.

Moreover, this issue of trust also exists within the BRICS itself, potentially fuelling tensions that could lead to further conflicts in the Global South. For instance, the South China Sea dispute illustrates these tensions, where China faces frictions with the Philippines and Vietnam, while other BRICS members like India and Russia uphold their own strategic interests with the actors concerned. This not only complicates cooperation within the BRICS, but it also informs the BRICS’ muted stance on issues of peace and security. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran serves as another example. China has condemned Israel’s violation of Iran’s sovereignty, while India has remained silent on Israel’s attack on Iran, despite Tehran becoming a formal member of the BRICS in January 2024. 

The consensus dilemma

The efficacy of the BRICS can thus be hampered by a ‘consensus dilemma’, where divergent interests complicate decision-making outcomes. Although the BRICS operates under the principle of ‘the right to agree to disagree’, achieving consensus on overarching goals related to global governance reform is often obstructed by competing interests and disagreements over processes. The issue of reforming the UN Security Council (UNSC) exemplifies this dilemma, particularly with the recent BRICS accession of Egypt and Ethiopia, who reportedly objected to a BRICS declaration favouring the aspirations of India, South Africa and Brazil for permanent seats on the UNSC. This opposition underscores potential divisions within the expanded BRICS, especially among African nations regarding representation and influence. 

The disagreement highlights divergent views on UNSC representation from the African perspective, driven by the Ezulwini Consensus – the African Union common position on the reform of the United Nations – which calls for two African countries to become permanent members of the UNSC with veto power. While South Africa, along with India and Brazil, might have settled for a softer reform without veto power, Pretoria now faces the challenge of balancing its BRICS interests with its engagements in Africa. Both Ethiopia and Egypt have noted that South Africa’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the UNSC remains undecided, and the process of determining who should represent the continent’s interests on the global stage is still unresolved. This situation complicates efforts to achieve consensus among the diverse membership of the BRICS and it highlights the difficulties that could hinder the BRICS’ ability to act cohesively and effectively on the global stage, particularly regarding the positioning of the Global South to speak with one voice.
The Global South and the BRICS represent a new era of cooperation, marked by both strengths and challenges. By leveraging economic potential, increasing political influence, and focusing on social development, these nations can foster a fairer global order. However, it is essential for them to address differing interests, economic disparities, and geopolitical tensions. As the world changes, collaboration between the Global South and the BRICS could shape international relations, promoting a more inclusive and sustainable global community. The BRICS alone will not, however, be the panacea for the Global South’s agency, interests and positioning in global affairs.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.come/YashSD