Hannah TYLER

Program Officer, Foreign and Security Policies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung DC

When I woke up on 6 November, my phone was flooded with texts from family in Europe. Shock, fear, anxiety, dread – it was all reflected in the questions on my screen. What will happen to you? Will you be okay? And what does this mean for us, here in Europe? Though it is difficult to answer the last question with certainty, given that uncertainty is Trump’s hallmark regarding foreign policy, one thing is certain: Europe should brace for impact.

In his first term, and in the intervening years since, Trump made it clear what a second Trump administration would mean for Europe, and the US-EU relationship: Europe is on its own, and the transatlantic relationship as we know it will be consigned to the ash heap of history. He has said that Europe will largely be on its own when it comes to defence; he has expressed scepticism about continued US support for Ukraine; and he has promised to implement tariffs that will inflict pain on European manufacturers. NATO, too, is at risk. Though Trump cannot unilaterally withdraw from the alliance, he could ‘quiet quit‘ and he has laid out concrete plans where the US takes a backseat to Europe when it comes to NATO. The consequences of a second Trump term are, of course, not limited to defence. The US will approach cooperation on all issues – including energy, climate, health and competition – differently.

European leaders said throughout Trump’s first term that they needed to start taking on more responsibility for Europe’s defence, and in some ways, they did, but much of that progress slowed under a friendlier Biden administration. Under Biden, ‘America was back’ – and the traditional transatlantic alliance with it. But under the second Trump administration, ‘America First’ is back – and Europe will have to adjust. The flood of congratulatory messages for Trump from European leaders shows that they have understood one fundamental truth to working with Trump: flattery is necessary, and criticism will result in punishment for their nation. And even if Europe has to stand alone, European leaders understand that EU-US cooperation will have to remain (though it will not be on their terms).

The two finalists for Secretary of State that the Washington Post reports are under consideration – Florida Senator Marco Rubio, and former acting director of national intelligence Richard Grenell (and former Ambassador to Germany) – would have different approaches to foreign policy, and especially to the US-EU relationship. Rubio is, in most senses, a traditionalist Republican, a foreign policy hawk who fundamentally believes in international engagement. Though he has adapted his foreign policy views to be more ‘Trumpian,’ he would likely represent a more ‘pragmatic‘ foreign policy vision for the US. Grenell delighted in provoking Germany during his ambassadorship, and would focus on building out a foreign policy network, in Europe and beyond. He would embody a much darker impulse towards foreign policy within Trump world.

But ultimately, in issues of foreign and domestic policy, Trump will have the final say. He will sometimes listen to his advisers, and sometimes he won’t, and there is no predictable pattern when it comes to either. He considers unpredictability his signature weapon – a difficult prospect for allies and partners who seek to work together with him and with the US. With Trump at the helm, the US will no longer be a reliable partner.

The transatlantic relationship will not disappear under Trump. There are underpinnings deeper than the top of the ticket that will help maintain the relationship – on a state, local and civic engagement level, especially. And the ties that bind, pragmatically, will remain; though Trump will always prioritise America, there will be concrete issues that will call for continued cooperation, globally and transatlantically. 

For better or for worse, Europe will have to learn to carry its own weight – quickly. And Europe will have to take up the mantle on global issues that Trump will cast aside: climate, tech, AI and regulation. This will require a commitment to European solidarity – not a given – and working closely together at an EU level to compellingly represent forceful policy positions on these issues.

And ultimately, this is a warning for Europe, and for future elections in Europe. Democrats will join the ‘graveyard of incumbents‘ – for the first time in 120 years, the incumbents in every one of the ten major countries that have held elections in 2024 have been punished by voters. ‘Incumbency advantage’ has been replaced by ‘incumbency disadvantage’. And this election was firmly a ‘post-truth’ election – voters were moved more by their feelings and impressions than by facts. European incumbent parties would do well to try to adjust to this new reality as quickly as possible, or they risk learning the same painful lessons that the Democrats here in America must grapple with for the next few years.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/melissamn