Giovanni GREVI

Senior Associate Fellow, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, Brussels School of Governance

There are times when history repeats itself, others when it rhymes and yet others when it takes new directions. At the current juncture in Europe, history is accelerating at warp speed, transforming the geostrategic context of European security and European integration. The Trump administration’s behaviour in the last few weeks has severely affected strategic trust across the Atlantic.

The US has so far excluded Europe from bilateral peace negotiations with Russia over Ukraine, while expecting Europe to take responsibility for Ukraine’s security largely on its own, if a deal is done. The narrative coming from Washington about American commitment to NATO and European security at large is ambivalent. Europeans have also been told that the main threat to Europe does not come from external powers, but from Europe, allegedly, censoring free speech and being undemocratic. 

As Europeans process these messages, three considerations can be made. First, the political and normative disconnect between much of Europe and the Trump administration, which is siding with illiberal and far-right forces across the continent, challenges the principles at the basis of the transatlantic partnership. Second, Europe finds itself in a conundrum of its own making, having repeatedly failed to define its own priorities, and to empower itself to follow up on them in a more volatile and competitive world. Third, recent developments in Washington clearly call for a drastic shift in the European defence agenda. Calling upon Europe to chart its own course and become less dependent on the US – in other words, advancing Europe’s strategic autonomy – without recognising that large resources are required to strengthen Europe’s security and defence simply lacks credibility.

Reinforcing Europe’s defence is not the only dimension of the broader agenda of European empowerment that EU member states and institutions are defining, which includes investments in innovation, enhancing Europe’s competitiveness and upholding Europe’s democracy and welfare, but it is a pressing priority. ​​Relative to the 2 per cent threshold agreed at NATO level, most European countries have hugely underspent from the late 1990s until 2022, enjoying the ‘peace dividend’ while Russia, among various other powers, has been steadily expanding its military in the last 15 years. This pattern has left Europeans with razor-thin weapons stockpiles, as the efforts to support Ukraine in the last three years have painfully shown. Besides, relative to major military powers, several EU member states spend far more on personnel than on capabilities, and European defence expenditure is fragmented. Given this background, debating whether Europe as a whole or Russia spend more in defence today is inconclusive. The bottom line is indisputable: Europe sorely lacks critical capabilities, from air and missile defences to artillery, missiles and space, and is largely dependent on the US across the board for its own defence – an unsustainable situation that requires spending more, better and, increasingly, European.

European leaders have taken ownership of the defence agenda, meeting since mid-February in smaller groupings and at the European Council level to work out shared priorities for defence and support for Ukraine. That includes the contentious question of the deployment of European troops in Ukraine following a possible peace deal, which would involve a coalition of the willing and depend on an (increasingly uncertain) backup from the US.

Upgrading European defence demands consequent financial investments. The defence package outlined by EU Commission President Von der Leyen on 4 March, the conclusions of the 6 March European Council and the momentous turnabout in Germany’s fiscal stance to finance defence and infrastructure investments, mark important steps forward. At the EU level, the agenda so far builds on three main pillars, namely the exemption of additional national defence expenditure from the budget deficit limits under the Stability and Growth Pact (which is estimated to generate about €650 billion by 2030), the proposed €150 billion loan backed up by the EU budget, to boost joint investment in key capability domains, and the objective to mobilise private finance. This package is part of a wider evolving picture. Member states have asked the Commission to propose additional funding sources from existing EU funding programmes, and the debate will soon start on expanding defence allocations under the next EU multiannual financial perspectives (2028-2034).

Several questions remain concerning the actual amount of additional resources that will be mobilised, how they will be spent, and implications for other investment priorities. It is essential that additional spending delivers the capabilities that Europe actually needs from a military standpoint. This consideration should drive collaborative efforts, from the research and development phase to procurement, to build economies of scale and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base. The forthcoming white paper on the future of European defence is expected to advance this debate, further outlining concrete instruments to catalyse efforts. 

These steps are urgent but, ultimately, the sustainability of the European defence agenda will depend on political unity within and between the member states. This is why it is essential to address the fiscal implications of growing defence spending for other critical priorities. It may be difficult to fully rule out trade-offs, but strengthening Europe’s defence cannot come at the cost of weakening its social and political cohesion. Establishing a much larger collective borrowing capacity for European defence and critical infrastructure, which would help preserve the necessary fiscal space for innovation, welfare, the energy transition and international cooperation, must be part of the solution. 

The defence agenda should also be driven by a larger sense of purpose, consistent with Europe’s interests and values on the international stage. The case needs to be made that taking responsibility for Europe’s security does not amount to a zero-sum mindset but is a necessary condition to pursue a broader global agenda. Empowering Europe should enable the EU and its member states to address major global challenges, such as the impact of climate change, protectionism, armed conflicts, declining human security, the reversal of development patterns in many countries, the growing concentration of wealth and technological power, democratic backsliding and multilateral gridlock. 

In response to these largely regressive trends, Europe’s core message should be one of progress and partnership with all those willing to engage in solving problems and delivering global public goods. This narrative of progress should define Europe in a fraught and contested international context. But to be credible in upholding its values and priorities, at home and abroad, Europe must be strong to deter further aggression from Russia, support Ukraine and maintain peace. The alternative for Europe is between becoming a major power – a power for progress – or being powerless in a world where others call the shots.

Photo credits: European Union