Sven BISCOP

lecturer on grand strategy at Ghent University, heads the Europe in the World programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels

There is a paradox at the heart of European defence. Fundamentally, European states do not trust any scheme for harmonising defence planning and capability development that does not include the United States. Yet the reason why such harmonisation is necessary, is precisely because the US might not show up. The irony is that just as the focus of the European debate was shifting from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to a ‘European pillar’ in NATO, the US announced their intention to pull out its conventional capabilities, prodding Europe to take ownership of the conventional defence of Europe, under the American nuclear umbrella. Suddenly, there is no more time to debate – Europe has to act, and fast.

The operational dimension of the CSDP works: the EU does conduct military operations, though it could be more ambitious. But not a single EU member state really believes in the CSDP as a framework for defence planning and capability development. Yet for some reason, most want to pretend that they do. Thus, the EU Military Staff continues to run the Headline Goal Process, aimed at creating an army corps for expeditionary operations that everyone knows will never see the light of day, and the European Defence Agency keeps on updating the Capability Development Plan, which all are aware has zero influence on national defence planning. Knowingly setting pointless tasks: in the private sector, this is called harassment.

One might ask: does it matter, apart from the waste of talented people? It does, because it is insufficient that all European states are increasing defence budgets. The issue is that all of Europe’s armed forces put together do not make up a complete force package. Europe is missing intelligence, air defence, deep precision strike, military space and cyber, air transport, command and control as well as secure communications. No European state alone can afford these strategic enablers in quantities that matter, so they must coordinate and spend their additional defence effort on these strategic enablers. Of course, the US contributes these to NATO, which is why, for decades, Europeans did not see the urgency. Russia’s war against Ukraine finally seemed to have convinced them to take things more seriously. 

Suddenly everyone was talking about a ‘European pillar’ of NATO, though mostly without defining it, and certainly without any roadmap for achieving it. Yet a ‘European pillar’ requires a set of European states to take a political initiative. It was not going to drop from the sky – until it did. The US suddenly seemed to decree that in the European theatre, there would only be a European conventional force. 

NATO’s New Force Model actually already went in that direction: it aims for a force of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness on the Eastern flank. European troops, but it was understood that the US would continue to provide the enablers. Furthermore, there is a rule in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) that in no area should more than 50 per cent of the capability be provided by a single ally (meaning the US), but it was never enforced. Now, the US seems to imply that its conventional assets might be withdrawn from Europe, though to which extent and how fast remains unclear. The US military will definitely want to maintain a considerable part of the base structure, not only to be able to redeploy to Europe if Article 5 is activated, but also to serve American deployments into the Middle East and other theatres. A transition period will be inevitable, for it will take time for the Europeans to adapt their defence posture. 

It is now very urgent, therefore, for the European Allies (and that means everybody except the US and Canada) to sit together and decide which strategic enablers that until now only the US provided, they will acquire themselves, in which numbers, over and above their current NDPP targets. They must then order the NATO apparatus to adapt the NDPP accordingly – if Europeans are to take ownership, the logical implication is that they can use the NATO command structure as they see fit. Whether this is an implication that the US has foreseen and is willing to accept, also remains to be seen. 

The role of the EU is to support its member states to realise this ambition through its investment in the defence industry. One cannot invest productively, however, if one does not know which force one is building: a link must, therefore, be created between the Commission initiatives and the NDPP, which must serve as its guidance. Absent a direct channel, a club of states that is a member of both NATO and the EU can provide the Commission with the necessary input, but eventually a formal mechanism for EU-NATO cooperation on classified issues will have to be set up. 

There still is a role for the CSDP, though: organising a pool of forces fit for expeditionary operations outside Europe, on the Southern flank in particular, which NATO is not preparing for. This cannot be the headline goal, though, which is unrealistic. Nor can it be the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), which is an empty box: the two battlegroups (the two combat battalions) on which it is based, cannot deal with any but the least demanding scenario. A new initiative is called for. 

The new US view on the defence of Europe is not illogical. But the US must be careful that in its haste and ire it does not endanger Europe, and thus its own interests there, by putting in doubt its overall commitment. Of course, the US nuclear umbrella remains the ultimate guarantee (and European leaders, for their part, would do well not to question that prematurely). But Washington should state unequivocally that although the Europeans will man the first line of conventional deterrence and defence, American reinforcements will be there if ever Article 5 is activated. The seed of distrust has been sown, however, and that is very damaging to the credibility of deterrence. Following the shameful treatment of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by the White House, which subsequently cut all aid to Ukraine, many in Europe have begun to wonder: is this American president still our ally, or is he Vladimir Putin’s ally? 

Europe hopefully has learned an important lesson about Grand Strategy. Only strong players can conclude beneficial alliances, for they are worth having as allies. Such a player defends itself, and calls on its allies only when in need. Weak players pay the price for their dependence. Those who cannot defend themselves, ought not to be surprised if their stronger allies end up treating them as a protectorate.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Aleksandros Michailidis