Alexandra LEITÃO

Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon and Member of the Partido Socialista’s National Secretariat and former Minister for Modernisation of the State and Public Administration, Former Deputy Secretary of State for Education

The snap elections in Portugal on 18th May had deeply worrisome results for democratic and progressive forces. They had become necessary after parliament rejected a vote of confidence issued by the right-wing coalition AD (Aliança Democrática). The concern is not only – or even mainly – related to the wider victory by the right-wing coalition that already governed the country since April 2024, but rather to the growth of the racist, xenophobic and anti-progressive far-right party Chega, which surpassed the Socialist Party (PS), becoming the second most voted party and, hence, the leader of the opposition.

This far-right political force appeared in Portugal later than in other European countries, but grew astonishingly fast: from one member of Parliament in 2019 to 12 MPs in 2022, 50 MPs in 2024 and now 60 MPs. This growth is truly terrifying as it represents the strengthening (and potential arrival to power) of radical and authoritarian ideologies that are contrary to the democratic rule of law and the welfare state. Additionally, we saw a structural change to the Portuguese party system, shifting from a two-party system – until 2024, the centre-right and the centre-left parties represented 70 per cent of the parliament – to a three-party one, three political parties now vie for electoral victory.

This new reality produces greater fragmentation and difficulties in creating government coalitions, especially as these new political forces are ideologically anti-system and do not contribute to stability, thus forcing negotiations between the two moderate left- and right-wing parties. However, this necessity for negotiations can become a trap for the defeated party (in these elections, the PS), which runs the risk of becoming irrelevant in the face of bipolarisation between the other moderate party and the far-right forces. This happened to the Socialist and Social-Democratic parties in France and Greece, and might now occur in Germany as well. In these countries, radical parties became realistic government alternatives. But why does this happen?

No Western country has found an antidote to the growth of the radical right. The resentment felt by many people who were left behind by globalisation is channelled into votes for these populist parties, which offer simplistic solutions to complex problems and take advantage of the discontentment and disbelief in the institutions of democracy. In fact, not everyone who votes for radical parties believes in far-right ideologies. Many do it as a form of protest against a society that left them behind. Desperate people seek radical solutions. Furthermore, in Portugal, there are southern and inland territories with no job opportunities or public services coverage, where people feel forgotten by the political system and underrepresented due to the rules that convert votes into parliament representation. Poor quality of public services, low wages, loss of a sense of belonging and a perception of insecurity, wrongly associated with immigration, contribute to the growth of the far right. This is aided by the spreading of fake news on social media and the use of artificial intelligence to condition opinions and behaviours. Finally, voting for the radical right is predominantly male – in Portugal, young men voted five times more for the far right than young women – and likely occurs as a reaction to the expansion of women’s rights and gender equality.

Democratic parties must have concrete and effective measures so that no one is left behind, as happened throughout Europe during the sovereign debt crises in the 2000s. We need to prioritise social justice; regulate the market; reinforce the welfare state; ensure labour rights, including in their collective dimension; invest in free and universal public services; adopt a distributive fiscal policy with progressive taxation and which does not target incomes over capital gains; strengthen social security and refuse its privatisation; adopt a progressive agenda regarding individual rights and liberties, including for minorities; implement humane and solidary immigration policies and fight climate change. This is the matrix of European Democratic Socialism and the most viable alternative not only to the far right but also to neoliberalism and the conservative right, both in Portugal and in Europe.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Alexandre Rotenberg