Europe’s defence strategy must be peace-oriented

European leaders are hastily reacting to the decisions of the US government regarding the war in Ukraine and transatlantic military cooperation. The sequence of events that shook the world in one week: 

• 28 February 2025 – derailed press meeting in the Oval Office between Trump and Zelensky; 
• 2 March 2025 – Securing Our Future London Summit  endorsing the idea of a European (Franco-British) “peace plan”;
• 5 March 2025 –  The new German coalition agreement to do away with the infamous debt break and launch large-scale rearmament; 
• 6 March 2025 – The European Council positions itself towards a common EU borrowing for a rearmament programme. 

In this series of events, global leaders more or less acknowledged that the war in Ukraine is not winnable (according to aims set out in 2022).

Europeans should avoid falling into Trump’s narrative, which suggests that the EU has been piggybacking on US security. The US has used its institutional positions in Europe to its own benefit, and the majority of US military expenditures had nothing to do with European defence (or any kind of defence). US actions have often harmed multilateral cooperation and institutions, while Europe had to share costs and moral consequences. The EU must have its own long-term approach to security and peace, rather than simply following what Trump and NATO leadership push onto it. 

Defence needs to be always discussed in the framework of respect to international law, including international humanitarian law (arms control agreements,  treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, current and future legislation of control of AI and autonomous weapons), international criminal law (support to the ICC and respect of the Rome Statute) as well as the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (restriction of arms sales to certain contexts).

If implemented, the new plans outlined last week will lead the EU into a different dimension in terms of defence capacity and security profile. It is important that decisions with long-term implications are based on a sound assessment of the situation instead of shocks and hysteria.  Decisions about defence must be embedded in a broader security policy, which in the case of the EU needs to factor in all member states, including those committed to military neutrality. It is not so easy – but probably also not desirable – to turn the EU from a peace project into a war project f. Leaders of EU countries, but also the UK, must make efforts to sustain NATO as a defensive alliance according to its original mandate without additional non-defensive functions. 

Spending more on defence in Europe should not be a pretext to cuts in public services and the welfare state, or even development aid. If the EU and its member states are ready to borrow more, investments supporting the green transition, economic innovation, and competitiveness should be prioritised. Europe’s commitment to humanitarian aid and ODA in general must remain firm, especially looking at the tremendous (human) impact of the dismantling of USAID, the defunding of WHO and UNFPA, in addition and the cuts on ODA by the UK, Sweden(and probably Germany) at the same time. There is clearly a need to rethink international aid, but it should not come at the expense of communities whose lives depend on it (thanks to the provision of vaccines, all types of life-saving assistance, and reproductive and sexual services). 

In Europe, moving away from a peace and security approach toward a defence/militarist agenda potentially undermines the foundations of feminist foreign policy (FFP). This shift prioritizes militarisation over human security, reinforcing militarized masculinities and diverting resources from conflict prevention and resolution. The Netherlands, Argentina, Sweden and other countries are walking away from FFP commitments. The links between militarisation and backtracking on feminism are intrinsically linked. The achievements of the recent years in this field should be protected. 

There should be no doubt that if the US cuts back its involvement in military capacity in Europe, which seems likely, Europeans will have to upgrade their capacities. However, before arbitrary numbers are thrown out to impress the audience, leaders should have discussed what type of military capacity is lacking and what is the best way to attain it. EU financial commitments must be preceded by thorough impact assessment, not least because allocating more resources for the military means less funding for productive investment and likely creates inflationary pressure. Strengthening EU strategic autonomy also should include thinking about what kind of defence industry we want to have and avoiding mirroring the US military-industrial complex. 

When arguing for more spending on defence, officials will surely emphasise how much employment it would create but also that investments in military technology would have beneficial effects on civilian R&D, which may become a focus point in common EU strategy. Though such points might be valid, the defence sector also requires scrutiny from the point of view of waste and corruption. Should the EU play a role in funding defence capacity (from redirected structural funds or otherwise), the cross-country distribution of spending from EU sources must be agreed ex-ante. It is also important to reiterate the ethical requirements for developing modern technological weapons. Artificial intelligence (AI) has entered the world of weapons, but little reflection on the human and moral implications of using them for warfare has taken place so far in EU circles. 

European countries outspend Russia by far on defence. Counting at current prices in 2024, Germany and France together spent as much as Russia on the military. If we also add the UK, Italy and Poland, the sum is already twice as much as Russian military expenditure. Assuming that Europe does not need to fear internal military conflict, and the main question is matching the Russian capacity, the key is finding different arrangements rather than spending much more. The EU’s role should be primarily in the field of better coordination of this spending to boost collective defence. In this spirit, in a new policy brief for FEPS, Roberto Castaldi outlines the need for “a strategic shift towards a defence model that combines shared European military capabilities with the ability to mobilise national forces when needed, also positioning the EU as a strong pillar within NATO.” 

Due to a rapprochement between Russia and the United States, the war that was launched by Russia in February 2022 is coming to an end in Ukraine. Most likely we are in the endgame already. Much of the reconstruction costs (on Ukrainian territory which is not controlled by Russia) will fall on European countries. Obviously, the longer the war lasts, the higher the reconstruction costs will be. Europe’s interest is to create the conditions of reconstruction as soon as possible. 

Since the EU does not command over an army, and it is unlikely to ever do so, the EU cannot give security guarantees to any country. However, a new EU neighbourhood policy should have a security dimension alongside its developmental one. Dialogue and diplomacy must play a major role in addressing threat perceptions, which are rather uneven among EU countries. 

The EU should welcome all negotiations between the US, Russia and China (bilateral or trilateral) which aim at disarmament and the coordinated reduction of military spending.  It is not the EU which spends too little on defence but these three countries spend too much. In the future, the UN Security Council— of which China, Russia, the U.S., France, and the U.K are permanent members—should become a forum to work collectively on human security issues.