About

The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) is the think tank of the progressive political family at EU level. Our mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform socialist and social democratic politics and policies across Europe.

FEPS works in close partnership with a solid network of 76 member organisations, boosting coherence among stakeholders from the world of politics, academia and civil society at local, regional, national, European and global levels. More

Our topics

Economy

Digital & Industrial Policy

Environment

World

Gender Equality

Social

Migration

Political Europe

Democracy

Social Democracy

Find all publications
Publications
Find all related publications
Publications
06/12/2024

A feminist foreign policy approach to EU security and defence

A contradiction in terms
13/05/2024

Toward a progressive geopolitical EU

FEPS YAN Series
18/04/2023

Strengthening the global role of the Euro

European Strategic Autonomy series - Economy & Trade
15/03/2023

A five-point agenda for how development cooperation can support EU’s strategic autonomy

European Strategic Autonomy series - Economy & Trade
Find all related Progressive Post
Progressive Post
13/03/2025

The EU and the Ukrainian people deserve more than armaments

The recent push by the European Commission towards a sizable ‘ReArm EU’ programme that boosts […]
13/03/2025

Empowering Europe for progress

There are times when history repeats itself, others when it rhymes and yet others when […]
13/03/2025

How the EU can support Europe’s NATO

There is a paradox at the heart of European defence. Fundamentally, European states do not […]
Find all related events
Events
Past
07/11/2024
FEPS HQ, Brussels (Hybrid)

State of the Unions

The US election: implications for the US, the EU and global politics
27/09/2023
FEPS HQ, Brussels

‘Europe and the war in Ukraine’ book launch

More than one year and a half after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when emotional fatigue […]
03/03/2023
Warsaw, Poland

The future of EU Strategic Autonomy

Global Progressive Forum
Find all related news
News
13/03/2025

Europe’s defence strategy must be peace-oriented

FEPS Position Paper on European defence
15/05/2024

Notice of vacancy – Policy analyst on international relations

This vacancy is now closed.
31/05/2022

HRVP Josep Borrell participates in FEPS expert meeting on the war and the reconstruction of Ukraine

On May 23rd, FEPS organised a timely expert meeting on the war and the reconstruction […]
22/09/2021

FEPS leads a new flagship research project on EU Strategic Autonomy with top European experts

Does the EU have the capacity and agency to set priorities and make decisions autonomously […]
Find all related in the media
In the media

Ex-EU-Kommissar Andor: Orbán gerät an die Peripherie

by Austria Presse Agentur 28/05/2024
"Former EU Commissioner Andor: Orbán is relegated to the periphery" Austrian news agency APA interviewed FEPS Secretary General László Andor on Europe's political situation ahead of the upcoming EU elections.
Find all related publications
Publications
28/02/2025

Moving towards an inclusive green agenda in the Western Balkans

Balkan Focus Series
17/05/2024

External influences in the Western Balkans: Where are we at?

Balkan Focus Series
13/05/2024

Labour migration from the European periphery to the EU’s core

FEPS YAN Series
15/04/2024

Labour migration in the Western Balkans

Balkan Focus series
Find all related Progressive Post
Progressive Post
03/05/2024

The Union’s identity is shared sovereignty

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was the result of a longer historical […]
19/01/2024

Europe’s revamping is underway

After two years of war in Ukraine, several geopolitical consequences of Vladimir Putin’s fatal decision […]
21/06/2023

The Thessaloniki Declaration: more relevant than ever?

20 years ago, the leaders of the EU and the Western Balkans committed themselves to […]
Find all related events
Events
Past
20 - 22/11/2024
FEPS HQ, Brussels (Expert meeting)

Friends of the Western Balkans – Brussels

How will the new balance of power in Europe impact the accession process?
30 - 31/08/2024
Korčula, Croatia (Expert meeting)

The social dimension of enlargement

FEPS fringe event with FMS
21 - 22/06/2024
Berlin, Germany

Progressive Governance Summit 2024

Progressive security: Championing change in times of uncertainty
Find all related news
News
03/12/2024

Joint statement by the Friends of the Western Balkans (FoWB) 

Brussels, 3 December 2024 We, the Friends of the Western Balkans – consisting of representatives […]
29/04/2024

FEPS celebrates 20 years of the biggest EU enlargement

The European Union enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe on 1 May 2004 was a […]
02/04/2024

Interview with Maria João Rodrigues on the need for EU treaty changes with Euronews

On the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, FEPS President Maria João […]
13/12/2023

Friends of the Western Balkans’ statement

Sarajevo, 25 November 2023 We, the network of the Friends of the Western Balkans, representatives […]
Find all related in the media
In the media

Hungary’s Transactions in the South Caucasus

by Caucasus Watch 28/12/2024
FEPS Secretary General László Andor talks to Caucasus Watch about Hungary's role in the South Caucasus

NATO-bővítés sok vitával: érvek, ellenérvek és lobbik a Clinton-elnökség idején

by BBC History 07/07/2024
"The controversial NATO enlargement: pros, cons and lobbying during the Clinton presidency" This article, written by FEPS Secretary General László Andor, looks back to the 1990s when the Eastern enlargement of NATO was requested, discussed, orchestrated, and eventually completed.

EU-VÍZIÓ, Dull Szabolcs újságíró Andor Lászlóval beszélget

by MÚOSZ Magyar Újságírók Országos Szövetsége 11/04/2024
On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EU great Eastern enlargement, FEPS Secretary General László Andor talks, in this video interview to the Hungarian Journalists' Association, the functioning of the Commission and its further development.

The EU pursues make-believe in Bosnia

by Financial Times 23/03/2024
Financial Times featured our policy brief 'Bosnia-Herzegovina', which analyses the journey of BiH's EU membership and the necessary reforms to make it happen
Find all related publications
Publications
28/02/2025

Political parties in the EU and the challenges of EU enlargement

Balkan Focus Series
17/02/2025

Expected labour market effects of the Green Deal Industrial Plan (2)

A regional labour policy approach
27/01/2025

Forging the new EU agenda

Progressive inputs for European economic policy
05/12/2024

A unified industrial strategy for the EU

Industrial policy recommendations to promote decarbonisation, competitiveness and cohesion in Europe
Find all related Progressive Post
Progressive Post
22/05/2024

Navigating the greenlash

Putting people at the heart of climate action in Europe
03/05/2024

The Union’s identity is shared sovereignty

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was the result of a longer historical […]
08/02/2024

A just transition in crisis mode

How do we manage to maintain a focus on long-term goals in times of crises? […]
Find all related events
Events
Upcoming
11/04/2025
FEPS HQ, Brussels (Stakeholder meeting)

Roadmap to the next MFF

Supporting Just Transition & Cohesion
Past
06/12/2024
FEPS HQ, Brussels

Industrial Renewal – No strategy, no party

Policy study launch
06/12/2024
FEPS HQ, Brussels (Expert meeting)

For an EU budget and an EU Green Deal working in sync

Stakeholder meeting on the next MFF
Find all related news
News
03/12/2024

Joint statement by the Friends of the Western Balkans (FoWB) 

Brussels, 3 December 2024 We, the Friends of the Western Balkans – consisting of representatives […]
29/04/2024

FEPS celebrates 20 years of the biggest EU enlargement

The European Union enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe on 1 May 2004 was a […]
02/04/2024

Interview with Maria João Rodrigues on the need for EU treaty changes with Euronews

On the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, FEPS President Maria João […]
13/12/2023

Friends of the Western Balkans’ statement

Sarajevo, 25 November 2023 We, the network of the Friends of the Western Balkans, representatives […]
Find all related in the media
In the media

Hungary’s Transactions in the South Caucasus

by Caucasus Watch 28/12/2024
FEPS Secretary General László Andor talks to Caucasus Watch about Hungary's role in the South Caucasus

NATO-bővítés sok vitával: érvek, ellenérvek és lobbik a Clinton-elnökség idején

by BBC History 07/07/2024
"The controversial NATO enlargement: pros, cons and lobbying during the Clinton presidency" This article, written by FEPS Secretary General László Andor, looks back to the 1990s when the Eastern enlargement of NATO was requested, discussed, orchestrated, and eventually completed.

EU-VÍZIÓ, Dull Szabolcs újságíró Andor Lászlóval beszélget

by MÚOSZ Magyar Újságírók Országos Szövetsége 11/04/2024
On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EU great Eastern enlargement, FEPS Secretary General László Andor talks, in this video interview to the Hungarian Journalists' Association, the functioning of the Commission and its further development.

The EU pursues make-believe in Bosnia

by Financial Times 23/03/2024
Financial Times featured our policy brief 'Bosnia-Herzegovina', which analyses the journey of BiH's EU membership and the necessary reforms to make it happen
Find all related publications
Publications
28/02/2025

Moving towards an inclusive green agenda in the Western Balkans

Balkan Focus Series
13/02/2025

Mad Max or does Ukraine really want to be part of the European social model?

Progressive Ukraine series
04/02/2025

Tackling tax avoidance

Reforming Capital Income Taxation in the EU
29/01/2025

Progressive Yearbook 2025

2024 was announced as a ‘super election’ year. In fact, about half of the world’s […]
Find all related Progressive Post
Progressive Post
21/02/2025

Keep it simple, stupid – a good idea taken too far and misapplied

The European Commission has presented its work programme for 2025. Not least for those whose […]
11/02/2025

Reclaiming workers’ rights in the age of AI: from data protection to collective justice

As AI and data-driven technologies reshape the workplace, they often undermine workers’ rights, privacy and […]
11/02/2025

Algorithmic management in Europe: from key features to governance and beyond

In today’s increasingly digitalised workplaces, automated systems orchestrate and monitor tasks, measure performance, and even […]
Find all related events
Events
Upcoming
09/04/2025
Berlin, Germany

Day of Progressive Economic Policy 2025

The new European Commission and the incoming German government are facing unprecedented challenges:  an industry […]
Past
14/03/2025
Turin, Italy (Expert meeting)

The Survival of Cohesion Policy

EU Investment Capacity Group
20/02/2025
Online (Expert meeting)

Kicking off the EU budget discussion

EU Investment Capacity Group
Find all related news
News
26/02/2025

FEPS reaction to the European Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal

What Teresa Ribera presented today is an ambitious plan that makes the case for Europe […]
07/02/2025

FEPS President on the European car industry and the Competitive Compass on Euronews ‘Brussels, my love?’

FEPS President Maria João Rodrigues took part in the Euronews talk show ‘Brussels, my love?‘ […]
27/06/2024

Join Tax the EU Billionaires Day!

Do you know that the richest 1% in Europe owns half of European wealth? Join […]
07/03/2024

Call for videos – Your Call to Europe

This call closed on 24/03/2024
Find all related in the media
In the media

Study: EU needs a clear strategy for digital independence

by Europe.Table 09/12/2024
Read the coverage of our policy study 'Time to build a European digital ecosystem', in which experts call for the development of a European digital industrial policy.

Regolamentare l’Intelligenza artificiale è la prossima frontiera progressista

by Gil Stati Generali 17/11/2024
The study "Algorithmic Management in the workplace| is discussed in this article on the implications of algorithmic managemnet on workers

Brussels, my love? Europe’s economy in a struggle for survival

by Euronews 21/10/2024
FEPS director of studies and policy David Rinaldi participated in this episode of Euronews’ show ‘Brussels my love’.

Näitä työtehtäviä yritykset korvaisivat tekoälyllä

by MTV Uutiset 09/10/2024
Finnish Television interviews OP Yrityspanki CEO Katja Keitaanniemi and Demos Helsinki's senior expert Johannes Anttila about FEPS Policy Study 'Algorithmic management and workplace digitalisation in Finland'
See more ...
Find all events
Events
Upcoming
20/03/2025
New York, USA

Redrawing the lines of foreign policy through feminism  

UN CSW69 Parallel Event 
21 - 22/03/2025
Warsaw, Poland

Call to Europe: Peace, Prosperity and Progress – Europe!

Pokój, dobrobyt i postęp – Europo! Call to Europe, held bi-annually in the country hosting […]
Past
07/03/2025
Budapest, Hungary

Defending democracy, empowering women

International Women's Day conference
Find all Progressive Post
Progressive Post
The Progressive Post

The EU and the Ukrainian people deserve more than armaments

The recent push by the European Commission towards a sizable ‘ReArm EU’ programme that boosts […]
18/06/2024

The recent push by the European Commission towards a sizable ‘ReArm EU’ programme that boosts national financing of armaments with EU tools (fiscal rules, EU loans, EIB and cohesion policy) is to be first and foremost understood as a political response to the upsetting treatment of Ukraine by the new US administration. Not only to the shameful public humiliation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by his US counterpart but, even more importantly, it is a response to the unreasonable deal the US proposes together with Russia. A deal that completely disregards Ukraine, and one that would concede Russian President Vladimir Putin parts of Ukrainian territories and key resources. 

It is difficult to accept that the Union has moved from a discussion on peace and security to a discussion on the European Defence Union, on boosting Europe’s defence industry and plans for financing its militarisation.

ReArm EU can, at best, partially respond to Europe’s challenges. It is imperative to accompany this financing programme with a more political path to unite military forces, conceive a solid European security strategy and align diplomatic efforts at the EU level. It should be clear that true deterrence is not about how much we spend, but how united we can be. Europe’s geopolitical peace power depends on our ability to speak with one voice. And the unifying voice cannot be the most extreme one of our diverse community.

It is not easy to reconcile all the objectives that need to be attained, but it is at least useful to bring clarity to the debate by recalling the three different objectives that should be addressed today by EU leaders:

  1. Providing comprehensive support to Ukraine with diplomatic, military and economic means, while actively promoting inclusive negotiations and fully backing its recovery, reconstruction and EU integration process. The focus must be on Ukraine, and the Timeline for this must be: immediately. 
  2. Building a real EU defence and security strategy by integrating national defence systems as much as possible to give our Union a credible and strong stance in the new geopolitical order while boosting EU energy, diplomacy and defence capabilities. Here, the focus is on the EU and the timeline is the mid-term.
  3. Working towards global disarmament and peace in all corners of the world, starting from conflict areas closer to our borders, to fostering alliances with like-minded countries, a fair multilateral system and initiatives for lasting peace and arms reduction. For this objective, the focus is the entire planet and the timeline the medium to long-term. 

These objectives have different urgencies, timelines and geographical foci, but there should still be political and policy coherence in the different sequential moves. The EU Commission presented ReArm EU as a plan to address objective two, even though it only partly addresses objective one and fails on objectives two and three. For instance, the defence investment must be part of a broader and long-term peace and security strategy- isolating the defence agenda would be a short-sighted mistake. Hopefully, the upcoming EC White Paper will point in this direction. 

Some basic principles need to be factored in to design a series of measures that coherently address short- and long-term objectives. The following general lines should not be compromised and can hopefully drive European political actions. 

Security is more than military equipment 

Europeans deserve more than just a plan for militarisation. The concepts of defence and security must be expanded. It is no longer sufficient to equate security solely with guns, tanks and helicopters. True security encompasses intelligence sharing, cybersecurity resilience, diplomatic engagement and all aspects of human security. Security for both European and Ukrainian citizens must be viewed within a broader framework that includes protection from economic, social, environmental and energy-related threats. A viable security approach is one that offers protection from external and internal threats and that safeguards democracy, peace and prosperity by addressing the root causes of insecurity, disasters and conflicts. 

Upholding a multilateral rule-based order

We must ensure that the EU Defence Union complements and does not undermine dialogue and diplomatic mechanisms, including strong engagement in multilateral forums and adherence to a multipolar rule-based order. The EU’s peace and security framework, along with its defence agenda, must be rooted in a strong commitment to international law, particularly international humanitarian law, which is severely under threat. This includes unequivocal support for the International Criminal Court (ICC), strict adherence to arms control agreements and regulations including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the establishment of robust and ethical frameworks for the regulation of AI and autonomous weapons. 

Europe is more than the sum of its members

It is widely understood that the room for manoeuvre within the existing treaties is limited and that member states are reluctant to share power and control in a truly integrated system. However, the current moment represents a historic opportunity for the EU to advance toward greater political unity. Given the scale of the challenge, it would be reasonable to expect institutions with the power of initiative – such as the European Commission – to open a political discussion that goes beyond merely addressing the member states immediate financial needs. The Commission must demonstrate leadership by both giving and demanding, much like Jacques Delors did at his time. At the very least, it should initiate a high-level political discussion, leading to a re-assessment of ambitions and possibilities by the EU Council. As highlighted in the FEPS study Europe’s defence for security and peace the Commission could have proposed to reinvigorate the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or to pool together a portion of national military capabilities to create a genuine European contingent. It is about seizing the opportunity to advance the European project. By fostering a collective approach to security, the EU can demonstrate that it is more than the sum of its member states. If we don’t achieve more political unity now, when will we?

Militarisation is not without risks

The Observatory on Public Finance at the Catholic University of Milan, after correcting the computations of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, finds that in 2024, the EU spent 18.6 per cent more than Russia in military expenditures. If we add other European NATO allies (the UK, Norway and Turkey), the collective expenditure on defence was 58 per cent above that of a country in war, like Russia. Such comparisons should highlight that the defence deficits of Europe should not be simply measured in quantitative terms but rather in qualitative ones.

EU leaders should be mindful that large rearmament campaigns are not only costly but may also generate a further arms race and escalate conflicts. Governments should also think twice before making their economic development dependent on investments in the military-industrial complex. Mirroring the US is not a wise approach. There is also the risk that spending more on defence could be a pretext to cut on public services, the welfare state and development cooperation. And even in a scenario where social, climate and cohesion spending remain unaffected – which is, unfortunately, not what we are seeing –, if citizens perceive that the EU’s only real priority is arming itself and funding military industry, the erosion of trust in the European project is certain. A balanced approach is needed, not only in terms of spending but also in priority setting. Two days after presenting ‘ReArm EU’, the affordable and sustainable housing initiative has been launched with a €10 billion for two years. These are peanuts compared to the €800 billion promised for defence contractors and national armies. At a time when support for far-right political forces is high, and in some countries growing further, safeguards are also needed that boosted weaponry does not fall into the wrong hands. 

Ill-conceived armament campaigns or military romanticism should not lead us to repeat history’s mistakes, as, for instance, the rush to militarisation in the 1930s, when militarisation was partly seen as a cure against the economic depression. While upgrading defence cooperation in Europe is imperative, Ukraine itself soon needs a colossal reconstruction programme, in which Europeans will have to take the lead. The Ukrainian people deserve more than just weapons. And European people deserve more than the prospect of perpetual conflicts and a forever war on our borders. 

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/AI generated

Find all related Progressive Post
Progressive Post
13/03/2025

Empowering Europe for progress

There are times when history repeats itself, others when it rhymes and yet others when […]
13/03/2025

How the EU can support Europe’s NATO

There is a paradox at the heart of European defence. Fundamentally, European states do not […]
13/03/2025

Rebuilding European security via a ‘supra-governmental avantgarde’

Given the profound change of direction of US foreign and security policies, a group of […]
The Progressive Post

Empowering Europe for progress

There are times when history repeats itself, others when it rhymes and yet others when […]
18/06/2024

There are times when history repeats itself, others when it rhymes and yet others when it takes new directions. At the current juncture in Europe, history is accelerating at warp speed, transforming the geostrategic context of European security and European integration. The Trump administration’s behaviour in the last few weeks has severely affected strategic trust across the Atlantic.

The US has so far excluded Europe from bilateral peace negotiations with Russia over Ukraine, while expecting Europe to take responsibility for Ukraine’s security largely on its own, if a deal is done. The narrative coming from Washington about American commitment to NATO and European security at large is ambivalent. Europeans have also been told that the main threat to Europe does not come from external powers, but from Europe, allegedly, censoring free speech and being undemocratic. 

As Europeans process these messages, three considerations can be made. First, the political and normative disconnect between much of Europe and the Trump administration, which is siding with illiberal and far-right forces across the continent, challenges the principles at the basis of the transatlantic partnership. Second, Europe finds itself in a conundrum of its own making, having repeatedly failed to define its own priorities, and to empower itself to follow up on them in a more volatile and competitive world. Third, recent developments in Washington clearly call for a drastic shift in the European defence agenda. Calling upon Europe to chart its own course and become less dependent on the US – in other words, advancing Europe’s strategic autonomy – without recognising that large resources are required to strengthen Europe’s security and defence simply lacks credibility.

Reinforcing Europe’s defence is not the only dimension of the broader agenda of European empowerment that EU member states and institutions are defining, which includes investments in innovation, enhancing Europe’s competitiveness and upholding Europe’s democracy and welfare, but it is a pressing priority. ​​Relative to the 2 per cent threshold agreed at NATO level, most European countries have hugely underspent from the late 1990s until 2022, enjoying the ‘peace dividend’ while Russia, among various other powers, has been steadily expanding its military in the last 15 years. This pattern has left Europeans with razor-thin weapons stockpiles, as the efforts to support Ukraine in the last three years have painfully shown. Besides, relative to major military powers, several EU member states spend far more on personnel than on capabilities, and European defence expenditure is fragmented. Given this background, debating whether Europe as a whole or Russia spend more in defence today is inconclusive. The bottom line is indisputable: Europe sorely lacks critical capabilities, from air and missile defences to artillery, missiles and space, and is largely dependent on the US across the board for its own defence – an unsustainable situation that requires spending more, better and, increasingly, European.

European leaders have taken ownership of the defence agenda, meeting since mid-February in smaller groupings and at the European Council level to work out shared priorities for defence and support for Ukraine. That includes the contentious question of the deployment of European troops in Ukraine following a possible peace deal, which would involve a coalition of the willing and depend on an (increasingly uncertain) backup from the US.

Upgrading European defence demands consequent financial investments. The defence package outlined by EU Commission President Von der Leyen on 4 March, the conclusions of the 6 March European Council and the momentous turnabout in Germany’s fiscal stance to finance defence and infrastructure investments, mark important steps forward. At the EU level, the agenda so far builds on three main pillars, namely the exemption of additional national defence expenditure from the budget deficit limits under the Stability and Growth Pact (which is estimated to generate about €650 billion by 2030), the proposed €150 billion loan backed up by the EU budget, to boost joint investment in key capability domains, and the objective to mobilise private finance. This package is part of a wider evolving picture. Member states have asked the Commission to propose additional funding sources from existing EU funding programmes, and the debate will soon start on expanding defence allocations under the next EU multiannual financial perspectives (2028-2034).

Several questions remain concerning the actual amount of additional resources that will be mobilised, how they will be spent, and implications for other investment priorities. It is essential that additional spending delivers the capabilities that Europe actually needs from a military standpoint. This consideration should drive collaborative efforts, from the research and development phase to procurement, to build economies of scale and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base. The forthcoming white paper on the future of European defence is expected to advance this debate, further outlining concrete instruments to catalyse efforts. 

These steps are urgent but, ultimately, the sustainability of the European defence agenda will depend on political unity within and between the member states. This is why it is essential to address the fiscal implications of growing defence spending for other critical priorities. It may be difficult to fully rule out trade-offs, but strengthening Europe’s defence cannot come at the cost of weakening its social and political cohesion. Establishing a much larger collective borrowing capacity for European defence and critical infrastructure, which would help preserve the necessary fiscal space for innovation, welfare, the energy transition and international cooperation, must be part of the solution. 

The defence agenda should also be driven by a larger sense of purpose, consistent with Europe’s interests and values on the international stage. The case needs to be made that taking responsibility for Europe’s security does not amount to a zero-sum mindset but is a necessary condition to pursue a broader global agenda. Empowering Europe should enable the EU and its member states to address major global challenges, such as the impact of climate change, protectionism, armed conflicts, declining human security, the reversal of development patterns in many countries, the growing concentration of wealth and technological power, democratic backsliding and multilateral gridlock. 

In response to these largely regressive trends, Europe’s core message should be one of progress and partnership with all those willing to engage in solving problems and delivering global public goods. This narrative of progress should define Europe in a fraught and contested international context. But to be credible in upholding its values and priorities, at home and abroad, Europe must be strong to deter further aggression from Russia, support Ukraine and maintain peace. The alternative for Europe is between becoming a major power – a power for progress – or being powerless in a world where others call the shots.

Photo credits: European Union

Find all related Progressive Post
Progressive Post
13/03/2025

The EU and the Ukrainian people deserve more than armaments

The recent push by the European Commission towards a sizable ‘ReArm EU’ programme that boosts […]
13/03/2025

How the EU can support Europe’s NATO

There is a paradox at the heart of European defence. Fundamentally, European states do not […]
13/03/2025

Rebuilding European security via a ‘supra-governmental avantgarde’

Given the profound change of direction of US foreign and security policies, a group of […]
The Progressive Post

How the EU can support Europe’s NATO

There is a paradox at the heart of European defence. Fundamentally, European states do not […]
18/06/2024

There is a paradox at the heart of European defence. Fundamentally, European states do not trust any scheme for harmonising defence planning and capability development that does not include the United States. Yet the reason why such harmonisation is necessary, is precisely because the US might not show up. The irony is that just as the focus of the European debate was shifting from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to a ‘European pillar’ in NATO, the US announced their intention to pull out its conventional capabilities, prodding Europe to take ownership of the conventional defence of Europe, under the American nuclear umbrella. Suddenly, there is no more time to debate – Europe has to act, and fast.

The operational dimension of the CSDP works: the EU does conduct military operations, though it could be more ambitious. But not a single EU member state really believes in the CSDP as a framework for defence planning and capability development. Yet for some reason, most want to pretend that they do. Thus, the EU Military Staff continues to run the Headline Goal Process, aimed at creating an army corps for expeditionary operations that everyone knows will never see the light of day, and the European Defence Agency keeps on updating the Capability Development Plan, which all are aware has zero influence on national defence planning. Knowingly setting pointless tasks: in the private sector, this is called harassment.

One might ask: does it matter, apart from the waste of talented people? It does, because it is insufficient that all European states are increasing defence budgets. The issue is that all of Europe’s armed forces put together do not make up a complete force package. Europe is missing intelligence, air defence, deep precision strike, military space and cyber, air transport, command and control as well as secure communications. No European state alone can afford these strategic enablers in quantities that matter, so they must coordinate and spend their additional defence effort on these strategic enablers. Of course, the US contributes these to NATO, which is why, for decades, Europeans did not see the urgency. Russia’s war against Ukraine finally seemed to have convinced them to take things more seriously. 

Suddenly everyone was talking about a ‘European pillar’ of NATO, though mostly without defining it, and certainly without any roadmap for achieving it. Yet a ‘European pillar’ requires a set of European states to take a political initiative. It was not going to drop from the sky – until it did. The US suddenly seemed to decree that in the European theatre, there would only be a European conventional force. 

NATO’s New Force Model actually already went in that direction: it aims for a force of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness on the Eastern flank. European troops, but it was understood that the US would continue to provide the enablers. Furthermore, there is a rule in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) that in no area should more than 50 per cent of the capability be provided by a single ally (meaning the US), but it was never enforced. Now, the US seems to imply that its conventional assets might be withdrawn from Europe, though to which extent and how fast remains unclear. The US military will definitely want to maintain a considerable part of the base structure, not only to be able to redeploy to Europe if Article 5 is activated, but also to serve American deployments into the Middle East and other theatres. A transition period will be inevitable, for it will take time for the Europeans to adapt their defence posture. 

It is now very urgent, therefore, for the European Allies (and that means everybody except the US and Canada) to sit together and decide which strategic enablers that until now only the US provided, they will acquire themselves, in which numbers, over and above their current NDPP targets. They must then order the NATO apparatus to adapt the NDPP accordingly – if Europeans are to take ownership, the logical implication is that they can use the NATO command structure as they see fit. Whether this is an implication that the US has foreseen and is willing to accept, also remains to be seen. 

The role of the EU is to support its member states to realise this ambition through its investment in the defence industry. One cannot invest productively, however, if one does not know which force one is building: a link must, therefore, be created between the Commission initiatives and the NDPP, which must serve as its guidance. Absent a direct channel, a club of states that is a member of both NATO and the EU can provide the Commission with the necessary input, but eventually a formal mechanism for EU-NATO cooperation on classified issues will have to be set up. 

There still is a role for the CSDP, though: organising a pool of forces fit for expeditionary operations outside Europe, on the Southern flank in particular, which NATO is not preparing for. This cannot be the headline goal, though, which is unrealistic. Nor can it be the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), which is an empty box: the two battlegroups (the two combat battalions) on which it is based, cannot deal with any but the least demanding scenario. A new initiative is called for. 

The new US view on the defence of Europe is not illogical. But the US must be careful that in its haste and ire it does not endanger Europe, and thus its own interests there, by putting in doubt its overall commitment. Of course, the US nuclear umbrella remains the ultimate guarantee (and European leaders, for their part, would do well not to question that prematurely). But Washington should state unequivocally that although the Europeans will man the first line of conventional deterrence and defence, American reinforcements will be there if ever Article 5 is activated. The seed of distrust has been sown, however, and that is very damaging to the credibility of deterrence. Following the shameful treatment of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by the White House, which subsequently cut all aid to Ukraine, many in Europe have begun to wonder: is this American president still our ally, or is he Vladimir Putin’s ally? 

Europe hopefully has learned an important lesson about Grand Strategy. Only strong players can conclude beneficial alliances, for they are worth having as allies. Such a player defends itself, and calls on its allies only when in need. Weak players pay the price for their dependence. Those who cannot defend themselves, ought not to be surprised if their stronger allies end up treating them as a protectorate.

Photo credits: Shutterstock.com/Aleksandros Michailidis

Find all related Progressive Post
Progressive Post
13/03/2025

The EU and the Ukrainian people deserve more than armaments

The recent push by the European Commission towards a sizable ‘ReArm EU’ programme that boosts […]
13/03/2025

Empowering Europe for progress

There are times when history repeats itself, others when it rhymes and yet others when […]
13/03/2025

Rebuilding European security via a ‘supra-governmental avantgarde’

Given the profound change of direction of US foreign and security policies, a group of […]
See more ...
Find all news
News
13/03/2025

Europe’s defence strategy must be peace-oriented

FEPS Position Paper on European defence
10/03/2025

FEPS reaction to the Roadmap on Women’s Rights

On Friday 7 March, the European Commission presented its Roadmap for Women’s Rights ahead of […]
27/02/2025

European roundtable of Progressive think tanks

The European progressive way in the face of Trump's and the far-right agenda
26/02/2025

FEPS reaction to the European Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal

What Teresa Ribera presented today is an ambitious plan that makes the case for Europe […]